European Commission
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Demography Report
2010
DEMOGRAPHY REPORT
2010

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
iv
This publication is a joint effort by Commission services, mainly the Directorate General for
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union. The
'in-house' contributors are as follows
Summary: DG EMPL (Emanuela Tassa);
Part I (Main Demographic Trends):
chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7: Eurostat (Veronica Corsini, Albane Gourdol, Katarzyna Kraszewska,
Monica Marcu, Apolonija Oblak Flander and Katya Vasileva);
end-parts of chapters 6 and 7 and the boxes: DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti);
Part II (Borderless Europeans): DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti)
Annex on Migration in the Recession: Eurostat (Piotr Juchno and Apolonija Oblak Flander) and DG
EMPL (Ettore Marchetti).
Country Annexe: DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti)
The report could not have been prepared without contributions from
Giampaolo Lanzieri (Eurostat) for his populations projections by foreign background;
the organisations Gallup (
1
) and Clandestino
(
2
), for data on migration intentions and irregular
migration;
researchers at the NIDI institute (
3
), especially Gijs Beets, Jeannette Schoorl, Nico van Nimwegen and
Peter Ekamper, who provided analysis of 'Borderless Europeans';
researchers at the VID institute (
4
), especially Dimiter Philipov and Julia Schuster, who provided
analysis of the 'tempo effect' on fertility, long-term effects of migrants on national population
structures;
researchers at the MPI-Rostock (
5
), especially Sigrun Matthiesen, Jim Vaupel and Harald
Wilkoszewski, who provided the analysis of healthy life expectancy in the box;
Hans-Peter Kohler (University of Pennsylvania) for data and analysis on the relationship between
fertility and economic development;
members of the Demography Expert Group, who provided feedback on the country summaries.
(
1
)
http://www.gallup.com/
(
2
)
http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/
(
3
)
http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/smartsite.dws?lang=NL&ch=NID&id=2807
(
4
)
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/
(
5
)
http://www.demogr.mpg.de/

Acknowledgements
v
Any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors in the European Commission.

CONTENTS
vii
Summary 1
Überblick 7
Résumé 14
Part I:
Main Demographic Trends
23
1. Introduction
25
2. Fertility
26
2.1.
Recovery of Fertility
26
2.2.
Women still postponing births
27
2.3.
Revisiting fertility trends
29
3. Mortality
31
3.1.
Mortality Trends over the Past 30 years
31
3.2.
Recent gains in life expectancy
31
4. Migration: Trends
40
4.1. Migration flows
40
5.
Migration: Foreign Population
46
5.1.
Non-nationals in the EU
46
5.2.
Acquiring citizenship of EU Member State
47
5.3. Foreign-born population
49
5.4.
Education levels of the foreign-born
51
5.5.
Non-nationals younger on average than nationals
55
6.
Population Change and Structure
57
6.1. Population growth
57
6.2. Population ageing
60
7. Families
66
7.1.
Fewer marriages, more divorces
66
7.2.
A rise in births outside marriage
67
7.3.
Fertility and the family
67
7.4.
Changing household structure
70
Part II:
Borderless Europeans
73
1. Introduction
75
2.
Migrants across Generations
78
2.1.
How migrants shape the structure of EU-27 populations
78
2.2.
Integration of migrants and their descendants across generations
80
2.3.
How migrants can shape future EU populations
86
3.
Moving into and across the EU
89
3.1.
Ancestry and Life choices
90
3.2.
Connectedness and Attitudes
92
4.
Further Ways of Connecting to Other Countries
93
4.1.
Commuting across borders
93
4.2.
Personal and cultural connections across borders
94

viii
Part III:
Annex - Demography and the Recession
97
1. Introduction
99
2.
Migration in the recession
100
2.1.
How the recession affected migration
100
Country Annex
107
1. The European Union
108
1. Belgium
110
2. Bulgaria
112
3.
The Czech Republic
114
4. Denmark
116
5. Germany
118
6. Estonia
120
7. Ireland
122
8. Greece
124
9. Spain
126
10. France
128
11. Italy
130
12. Cyprus
132
13. Latvia
134
14. Lithuania
136
15. Luxembourg
138
16. Hungary
140
17. Malta
142
18. The Netherlands
144
19. Austria
146
20. Poland
148
21. Portugal
150
22. Romania
152
23. Slovenia
154
24. Slovakia
156
25. Finland
158
26. Sweden
160
27. The United Kingdom
162
1. Country Indicator Sources
164
LIST OF TABLES
I.1.1.
Main demographic trends: Main findings
25
I.2.1.
Total Fertility Rate (TFR), selected years
26
I.2.2.
Mean age of women at childbirth, selected years
27
I.2.3.
Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth in
EU-27, 2002-2008
28
I.2.4.
Fertility rate differences (2006-2008) and 'tempo' adjustment
30
I.3.1.
Life expectancy at birth by sex, 1993 and 2009
31
I.3.2.
Life expectancy at age 65 by sex, 1993 and 2009
33
I.3.3.
Life expectancy in EU-27 by age and sex, 2002-2008
33
I.3.4.
Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, men
1993 and 2009
34
I.3.5.
Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group,
women 1993 and 2009
35

ix
I.3.6.
Healthy life years at birth, by gender, 2007 and 2009
36
I.3.7.
Life expectancy by sex and educational attainment at
selected ages, 2008
39
I.4.1.
Top ten citizenships of immigrants to EU-27 Member States,
2008 42
I.4.2.
Median age of the population (as of 1 January 2009) and
immigrants by basic citizenship groups, 2008
45
I.5.1.
Population by group of citizenship, 2009 (units and share of
the resident population)
46
I.5.2.
Acquisitions of citizenship, 2001-2008 (in thousands)
48
I.5.3.
Population by group of country of birth, 2009 (units and
share of the resident population)
50
I.5.4.
Main countries of birth of foreign-born residents, for selected
EU-27 Member States, 2009
51
I.5.5.
Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by group
of country of birth, 2009 (%)
52
I.5.6.
Population aged 25-54 with high educational level having a
medium or low skilled job as a proportion of persons with
high educational level respective population by group of
country of birth, 2009 (%)
53
I.5.7.
Median age of the population by group of citizenship, 2009
56
I.6.1.
Demographic balance for EU-27 in 2009
59
I.6.2.
EU-27 Member States by contribution of natural change and
net migration (1) to population growth/decline in 2009
59
I.6.3.
Crude rates of population change in 2000, 2008 and 2009
60
I.6.4. Population age structure by major age groups, on 1st
January 1990 and 2010
61
I.6.5.
Median age and age dependency ratios, 1st January 2010,
by country
61
I.7.1.
Crude marriage rate, by country, 1960-2009, (in marriages
per 1000 residents)
66
I.7.2.
Crude divorce rate, by country, 1960-2009, (in divorces per
1000 residents)
67
I.7.3.
Live births outside marriage, as proportion of total live births
(%), by country, 1960-2009
67
I.7.4.
Young adults living with at least one parent and no
spouse/partner, by sex and age group, 2009, (%)
72
II.1.1.
Borderless Europeans: main findings
75
II.2.1.
Differences between actual 2007 population and 2007
population based on projections that exclude migration
from 1960, age 0-79 (thousands and % of actual population)
78
II.2.2.
Unemployment rates of women aged 25-54 by place of
birth, own and of parents, 2008
81
II.2.3.
Unemployment rates of men aged 25-54 by place of birth,
own and of parents, 2008
81
II.2.4.
Employment rates of women aged 25-54 by place of birth,
own and of parents, 2008
81
II.2.5.
Employment rates of men aged 25-54 by place of birth, own
and of parents, 2008
82
II.2.6.
Women aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of education, by
place of birth, own and of parents, 2008 (%)
83
II.2.7.
Men aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of education, by place
of birth, own and of parents, 2008 (%)
83

x
II.2.8.
Employment rates of women aged 25-49 by place of birth,
own and of parents, 2008
84
II.2.9.
Employment rates of men aged 25-49 by place of birth, own
and of parents, 2008
84
II.2.10.
EU nationals feeling that they belong to minority or majority
groups, by ancestry, 2010 (%)
85
II.2.11.
Foreign-born population by world area of residence (millions
and %)
87
II.3.1.
Attachment to specific foreign countries, by ancestry and
life-choices, 2010 (%)
92
II.3.2.
Attachment to the EU, by ancestry and life-choices, 2010 (%) 92
II.3.3.
Likelihood of moving abroad in the future, by ancestry and
life choices, 2010 (%)
92
II.4.1.
EU nationals with foreign friends or relatives, by ancestry,
2010 (%)
94
II.4.2.
EU nationals with cultural links to other countries, by
connectedness (ancestry and life-choices), 2010 (%)
95
III.2.1.
New residence permits issued and valid permits at the end
of the year, 2008 and 2009
105
LIST OF GRAPHS
I.2.1.
Number of live births in EU-27, 1980-2009
26
I.2.2.
Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth,
2009 28
I.2.3.
Fertility of mothers aged 30 and over, 2000 and 2009
(ordered by difference 2009-2000) (%)
29
I.2.4.
Fertility by age group of mothers, 2009 (%)
29
I.3.1.
Number of deaths in EU-27, 1980-2009
31
I.3.2.
The gender gap (women – men) in life expectancy at birth,
1993 and 2009
32
I.3.3.
The gender gap (women — men) in life expectancy at age
65, 1993 and 2009
33
I.3.4.
Infant mortality rate, 1993 and 2009 (ranked by size of
reduction) 36
I.3.5.
Life expectancy gaps between high and low educational
attainment at selected ages, by sex, 2008
38
I.4.1.
Age structure of the population on 1 January 2009 and of
immigrants in 2008, EU-27
40
I.4.2.
Immigration, EU-27, 2004-2008
40
I.4.3.
Relative change in migration inflows to EU Member States by
citizenship groups, EU-27, 2002-2008
41
I.4.4.
Immigrants by citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008
41
I.4.5.
Immigrants by groups of country of birth, EU-27, 2008
41
I.4.6.
Immigrants to EU-27 (from outside EU) by the level of
development of the country of previous residence, EU-27,
2008 42
I.4.7.
Non-EU immigrants by continent of country of citizenship, EU-
27, 2008
42
I.4.8.
Immigration (per 1 000 inhabitants), EU-27, 2008
44
I.4.9.
Age structure of immigrants by basic citizenship groups, EU-
27, 2008
45
I.5.1.
Non-nationals in the EU by country of residence, EU-27, 2009
46

xi
I.5.2. Distribution of non-nationals by EU/non-EU citizenship, as a
percentage of the usually resident population, 2009
47
I.5.3.
Ten most numerous groups of foreign citizens usually resident
in the EU-27, in millions and as a % of the EU total foreign
population, 2009
47
I.5.4.
Acquisitions of citizenship per thousand non-nationals, 2008
48
I.5.5.
Main previous citizenship of persons acquiring citizenship of
an EU-27 Member States, 2008
49
I.5.6.
Share of foreign-born and non-nationals of the total
population, 2009
49
I.5.7.
Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by sex
and group of country of birth, EU-27, 2009 (%)
52
I.5.8.
Educational attainment of non-nationals aged 25-54, 2009
(%) 53
I.5.9.
Foreign-born aged 25-54 with high educational level having
a medium or low skilled job as a share of persons with high
educational level respective population by sex, 2009 (%)
54
I.5.10.
Non-nationals aged 25-54 with high educational level
having a medium or low skilled job as a share of persons
with high educational level respective population, 2009 (%)
55
I.5.11.
Age pyramid of the national and foreign population, EU-27,
2009 55
I.6.1.
Population on 1 January, EU-27, 1960-2010
57
I.6.2.
Population change by component, EU-27, 1961-2009
58
I.6.3.
Live births and deaths in EU-27, 1961-2009
58
I.6.4.
Population pyramids, EU-27, 1990 and 2010
62
I.6.5.
Proportion of population aged 65 years or over, %
increase/decrease 1990-2010
62
I.6.6.
Median age of the total population, EU-27, 1990-2010
62
I.6.7.
Median age of population
63
I.6.8. Population age structure by major age groups, EU-27(1) 63
I.6.9.
Population pyramids, EU-27, 2010 and 2060
64
I.6.10.
Percentage of 65+ in the EU, Sweden , Germany and
Slovakia, 2010-2060
64
I.7.1.
Proportion of live births outside marriage and total fertility
rate, 2009
68
I.7.2.
Employment rate of women aged 25-49 and total fertility
rate, 2009
68
I.7.3.
Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 and total fertility
rate, 2009
68
I.7.4.
Households with children by type (1), 2009 (%)
70
I.7.5.
Single parents among women aged 15-24, 2009, (%)
71
I.7.6.
Percentage of young adults who live with at least one
parent and no spouse/partner, by sex and age group, EU-
27, 2009, (%)
71
II.2.1.
France, population without migration since 1960 and
migration effect, including non-nationals, by age group,
2007 (millions)
79
II.2.2.
Spain, population without migration since 1960 and
migration effect, including non-nationals, by age group,
2007 (millions)
79
II.2.3.
Ireland, population without migration since 1960 and
migration effect, by age group, 2007 (100,000s)
79

xii
II.2.4.
Portugal, actual population, including non-nationals, and
population without migration since 1960, by age group, 2007
(100,000s) 80
II.2.5. Lithuania, population without migration since 1960 and
migration effect, by age group, 2007 (100,000s)
80
II.2.6.
Resident population aged 25-49 born in EU-27, by birth-
place of parents, 2008 (%)
83
II.2.7.
Projected foreign-born population and their descendants,
2061 (%)
87
II.2.8.
Theoretical net migration (% of the population aged 15+)
88
II.3.1.
EU nationals who have lived and worked abroad in the past,
by age, 2009 (%)
89
II.3.2.
EU nationals who have lived and worked abroad in the past,
by age at end of full-time education, 2009 (%)
90
II.3.3. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life choices/no
ancestry by sex, EU, 2010 (%)
90
II.3.4. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no
ancestry by age group, 2010, (%)
91
II.3.5. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no
ancestry by age at end of full-time education, EU 2010 (%)
91
II.3.6. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no
ancestry by occupation, EU, 2010 (%)
92
II.4.1.
Workers residing in another Member State and residents
working in another Member State, among workers, 2009 (%)
93
II.4.2.
EU nationals who have close friends who live abroad, 2010
(%) 94
II.4.3.
EU nationals who speak at least one other language (than
that of the interview) (%)
94
II.4.4.
EU nationals who spend regularly holidays in another
country, 2010 (%)
95
III.2.1.
Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States (Spain,
Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy), 2003-2009
(thousands) 100
III.2.2.
Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27 Member States
(Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) by citizenship groups,
2008-2009 (thousands)
100
III.2.3.
Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States (Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009
(thousands) 101
III.2.4.
Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27 Member States
(France, Austria and Sweden) by citizenship groups, 2008-
2009 (thousands)
101
III.2.5.
Structure of immigrants to Ireland by citizenship groups,
2007-2009 (thousands)
101
III.2.6.
Emigration from selected EU-27 Member States (Germany,
the United Kingdom Spain and Italy), 2003-2009 (thousands) 102
III.2.7.
Structure of emigrants from selected EU-27 Member States
(Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) by citizenship groups,
2008-2009 (thousands)
102
III.2.8.
Emigration from selected EU-27 Member States (Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009
(thousands) 103
III.2.9.
New residence permits issued, by reason, EU-27, 2008 and
2009 104

xiii
LIST OF BOXES
I.3.1.
Living longer healthy lives
37
I.4.1.
Where immigrants come from
43
I.7.1.
Does wealth increase fertility in developed countries?
69
II.1.1.
Cross-border Migration, Mobility and Marriages
76
II.2.1.
Are there many irregular migrants?
86

 
SUMMARY
1
Since the last 2008 Demography Report was published in 2008, the EU
population has passed the 500 million mark while continuing to develop
along lines that were already discernible two years ago. The EU’s
demographic picture has become clearer: growth is fuelled mainly by
immigration, whereas the population is becoming older and more diverse.
The impact of the economic crisis is still difficult to assess.
In its October 2006 Communication entitled ‘The Demographic Future of
Europe — from Challenge to Opportunity’
(6)
, the Commission presented its
views on the demographic challenges the EU was facing and on options for
tackling them. The Communication expressed confidence in Europe’s ability
to cope with demographic change and an ageing population in particular, but
also stressed the need to act in five key policy areas: demographic renewal,
employment, productivity, integration of migrants and sustainable public
finances.
This third Demographic Report aims to provide the latest facts and figures
that are needed for an informed debate on these issues. In addition to the EU-
level overview, data are provided as far as possible for each EU-27 Member
State, enabling policy makers and stakeholders to compare their own
country's situation with that of other Member States, to understand the
specific characteristics of their country and, possibly, to identify other
countries that could provide interesting experiences from which to learn.
This year the report is a joint undertaking between the Directorate General
for ‘Employment, social affairs and inclusion’ and Eurostat, and draws on
Eurostat's experience in demographic analysis. It consists of two parts, a
short annex on migration in the recession and a country annex.
Part I looks at historical and recent trends in fertility, life expectancy and
migration - the three drivers of population change. It includes a review of
population structure by age and family composition.
Part II explores an increasingly important phenomenon that was identified in
a recent Eurobarometer survey: the increasing number of European citizens
who seek opportunities across national borders for study, work, life
experience and inspiration, resulting in different forms of international
connectedness across national borders.
1.
MORE, OLDER AND MORE DIVERSE EUROPEANS
1.1.
New patterns lead to slight increases in fertility
Gradual but nonetheless major changes are affecting the population of
Europe. Two main positive trends are emerging: a slight increase in fertility
and greater life expectancy. Lowest-low fertility – below 1.3 children per
woman – has ended in all Member State and the most recent figure for EU-27
was 1.6 and could rise to over 1.7 if adjustments for the postponement of
births (the so-called ‘tempo effect’) are taken into account. This small
adjustment does not make up for the shortfall in relation to the replacement
(
6
) COM(2006) 571, adopted on 12 October 2006.

 
Demography Report, 2010
2
ratio of 2.1, but it could contribute to a slower rate of population decline in
the medium/longer term, in conjunction with a possible increase in fertility as
EU Member States become wealthier.
The modest increase in fertility results from somewhat new family building
patterns: countries with fewer marriages, more cohabitation, more divorces
and an older average age of women at childbirth tend to have higher fertility
rates. Changing social perceptions of the role of marriage and greater fragility
of relationships have resulted in more extramarital births, including to lone
parents, or in childlessness.
The impact of family policies on these trends is difficult to assess since
cultural factors play an important role. However, the data suggest that
postponement of childbearing to a later age is accompanied in some countries
(France, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands for instance) by higher
fertility rates and relatively generous public support for parents. At the other
end of the scale, in countries such as Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, a
lower age at childbirth is not associated with a high fertility rate.. This would
also be consistent with the first indications that fertility rises again with
wealth, after decades of decaying fertility as countries grew richer. The
emerging evidence reinforces the case for having better policies that can help
parents to cope with the constraints of a modern society.
1.2.
An "ageing" population structure
Although it is difficult to predict the impact of policies, an analysis of the
impact of changes in population structure is more straightforward. Low
fertility rates are only one side of the coin, the other being a decline in the
number of deaths or, in more positive terms, an increase in life expectancy. In
2009, the median age of the population was 40.6, and it is projected to reach
47.9 years by 2060.
The EUROPOP2008 projections prepared by Eurostat and presented in the
previous Demography Report indicate that by 2014 the working age
population (20-64) will start to shrink, as the large baby-boom cohorts born
immediately after World War II are now entering their sixties and retiring.
The number of people aged 60 and above in the EU is now rising by more
than two million every year, roughly twice the rate observed until about three
years ago. The working population is also ageing, as the proportion of older
workers in employment increases compared to the cohorts made up of
younger workers. Every year about 5 million children are born in the EU-27
and over 2 million people immigrate from third countries. Births outnumber
deaths by several hundred thousand persons each year, whereas net migration
is well over a million. As a result, migration accounts for the largest
proportion of the EU's population growth.
In 2008 life expectancy for the EU-27 was 76.4 for men and 82.4 for women.
Differences among Member States are still very significant, ranging from
almost 13 years for men to 8 for women. Infant mortality in 2009 was also
still relatively high in some countries like Romania (10.1 ‰) and Bulgaria
(9.0 ‰), even though a reduction of about 50% for EU-27 has been achieved
over the last 15 years. Socio-economic status appears to play a major role,
especially in some Central European countries. Consequently, by improving
the life expectancy of disadvantaged groups, a general increase in overall life
expectancy is also to be expected.

 
Summary
3
A possible development is the improvement in healthy life expectancy by
delaying the stage at which physical condition starts to deteriorate rapidly,
thereby postponing death to a later age. More evidence and analysis is
required on this important subject.
Policies which address the ageing of the population and the work force focus
on enabling older workers to remain active and productive for a longer
proportion of their life span. One of the benefits of an ageing population is
that it offers more opportunities for flexible arrangements during the life
course. A longer active life allows for extended or recurring periods in
education; greater working-time flexibility during the intense years when
childbearing and career commitments coincide; occasional career breaks
when it becomes necessary to take care of family members; and productive
retirement through volunteering and general engagement in the civil society.
1.3.
Europe on the move
Migration, especially from non-EU countries, could provide a (temporary)
respite from population ageing, since most people migrate primarily as young
adults (aged 25-34). As young cohorts of foreigners feed progressively into
the older national cohorts, the total population is rejuvenated and diversity
increases. Unprecedented levels of immigration both from third countries and
within the EU-27 (intra-EU mobility) over the past decade have substantially
increased the proportion of European inhabitants who do not live in their own
native country or culture.
EU-27 Member States are host to some 20 million non-EU-nationals. A
further 10 million EU nationals are living in another Member State, and
about 5 million non-nationals have acquired EU citizenship since 2001. As
most migrants are relatively young and have arrived quite recently, they
contribute to the size of the EU-27 labour force. In the future, the labour
force will increasingly include people with a migration background. Among
EU nationals, in addition to the approximately 8% of foreign-born (
7
) people
residing in the EU, a further 5% have at least one foreign-born parent, and
this category will continue to grow. By 2060, persons of all nationalities with
at least one foreign-born parent are expected to account for close to a third of
the EU-27 population. An even larger percentage of the work-force will be of
foreign descent.
These trends imply that additional efforts are needed to ensure that
immigrants have the opportunity to integrate into their host society and,
crucially, to enable them to contribute to the labour market by making full
use of their education. A mobile population can be seen as an asset to the host
countries. As more people seek experience abroad, they can contribute to a
more efficient and productive economy, while also enhancing their personal
skills.
2.
AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE AND MOBILE EU POPULATION
As the flows of migration from non-EU countries and mobility between
Member States have intensified, a growing proportion of the working-age
population (15% in 2008) was either born abroad or has at least one parent
who was born abroad.
(
7
) Here foreign-born includes those who were born in a different Member State than the one in which they reside.

 
Demography Report, 2010
4
Changing patterns of migration and mobility in Europe are making national
sentiments and feelings about belonging to a particular nation more diffuse
and complex, especially in the case of mobility between EU Member States.
Although traditional long-term, employment-driven, male-dominated
migration still takes place, other forms of migration and mobility are
emerging. Mobility flows have also changed: some of the major traditional
emigration Member States have become poles of attraction for migrants.
Large-scale migration and mixing of cultures are clearly not new phenomena
in the history of the EU. Past flows have had a different impact on the size
and structure of the population in most EU-27 Member States, and they have
contributed to a more European outlook among its citizens. Immigrants often
want to maintain a close attachment to their country of origin, but these
linkages tend to weaken over time.
The integration of immigrants across generations occurs rather rapidly. In
most countries with a substantial proportion of second-generation
immigrants, these fare far better in education and on the labour market than
first-generation immigrants and almost as well as those of no foreign descent;
this applies to descendants of mobile people from other Member States and
of immigrants from non-EU countries. Nevertheless, even after three
generations – the time it usually takes for full integration – descendants of
migrants maintain some attachment to the countries of their ancestors,
through their knowledge of foreign languages, for example.
Alongside traditional migration and mobility, new forms of mobility are
taking place. People are moving abroad for shorter periods, mainly to other
Member States, to seek work, pursue their education or other life
opportunities. These mobile people tend to be well-educated young adults,
towards the higher end of the occupational scale. Increasingly, this form of
mobility is based on personal preferences and life choices, and not only on
economic opportunities. The increased propensity to be mobile could be of
great benefit to the EU by enabling a better matching of skills and language
ability with job opportunities. The results of a Eurobarometer survey (
8
) point
to the presence of a diverse, growing number of mobile young people
characterised by a common interest in looking beyond national borders.
The Eurobarometer survey also indicates that around one in five of the EU-27
respondents has either worked or studied in another country at some point,
lived with a partner from another country or owns a property abroad. Half of
these respondents have ties to other countries by ancestry; the other half are
most often young and well educated and consciously making a life choice
that brings them into contact with other countries. They share a strong
willingness, if not propensity, to move abroad, up to four times greater than
those who do not have any connections with another country. Given that this
phenomenon is likely to become even more important in the future, policy
makers may want to consider its implications in planning for the socio-
economic future of the European population.
3.
DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY IN THE RECESSION
Before the economic recession, EU Member States' commitment to
implementing the policy goals in the Lisbon agenda had begun to show
results in the form of employment for young people, women, older workers
(
8
)
Eurobarometer
EBS
346
at
at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf

 
Summary
5
and migrants. When the recession struck, the first groups to be affected were
younger people and immigrants. Governments faced increasing difficulties in
balancing support for families, consolidation of budgets, assistance for young
people and immigrants in a shrinking labour market, and funding for
retirement schemes.
It is too early to draw any firm conclusions about the effect of the crisis on
fertility and life expectancy. Recent experience with past recessions indicates
that both fertility and mortality may initially decrease slightly, only to return
to their pre-recession levels shortly after the crisis has ended.
New Eurostat data on residence permits throws light on the reasons for
migration from non-EU countries. The available data show that the decline in
migration is largely due to a reduction in migration for employment and
family reasons, while the number of residence permits issued for education
and other reasons increased slightly from 2008 to 2009.
4.
WHAT IS BEING DONE
In June 2010 the European Council adopted the new 10-year Europe 2020
strategy for more jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (
9
). The
strategy sets out to reorientate existing policies from crisis management to
medium- and longer-term goals to promote growth and employment and
ensure the future sustainability of public finances. The latter is a precondition
for sustainable social cohesion in the EU.
The recession has not diminished the commitment of Member States to
respond to the demographic challenge; on the contrary, the commitment
appears to have been reinforced. The strategy adopted in addressing
demographic change seems to dovetail with the overall thrust of the new
Europe 2020 strategy. In the wake of the recession, and despite the bleak
outlook for public finances, the European Commission is convinced that the
demographic dimension deserves to be taken fully into account by Member
States when they are formulating their exit strategies from the current
recession.
The need to mobilise the EU’s demographic potential was already
highlighted in October 2006 in the Commission Communication on Europe’s
Demographic Future
(10)
. This Communication suggested that the problem of
low fertility should be addressed by creating better conditions for families to
deal with the problem of a shrinking labour force by raising employment
rates and productivity levels, by relying on immigration and better integration
and, finally, by preserving the ability to meet the future needs of an ageing
society by creating sustainable public finances. Member States are
responsible for deciding how they realise their potential. The Communication
highlighted the type of support that the EU can offer to Member States in
terms of existing policy coordination. At the request of the Member States,
and with the support of the European Parliament, this process is
complemented by the activities organised under the umbrella of the European
(
9
)
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm
(
10
)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:EN:PDF
.

Demography Report, 2010
6
Alliance for Families (
11
) and the planned European Year 2012 for Active
Ageing (
12
).
The success of the strategy hinges largely on the EU’s ability to face up to
the major demographic transformations of this coming decade.
Europe’s future depends to a great extent on its capacity to tap the strong
potential of the two fastest growing segments in its population: older people
and immigrants. Three policy areas appear crucial to boost economic growth
and achieve greater social cohesion:
The promotion of active ageing: older people, and in particular ageing
baby-boomers, can look forward to many more years of healthy life, and they
possess valuable skills and experience. More opportunities for active ageing
will allow them to continue to contribute to society, even after retirement.
The integration of migrants and their descendants: this is crucial for
Europe because migrants will make up an even larger share of Europe’s
labour force. The low employment rate of migrants is both socially and
financially unaffordable.
The reconciliation of paid work and family commitments: people
with caring responsibilities still lack adequate support and suitable
arrangements for combining their different responsibilities. As a result,
economic growth is hampered because too many people are not able to
exploit their high level of skills and education on the labour market. Women
are particularly affected because of the persistent gender–employment and
pay gaps.
At the same time, Europe needs to find ways of maintaining greater
productivity while preparing for increasing levels of ageing-related
expenditure, despite the demise of public finances as a result of the recession.
(
11
)
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm
(
12
)
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=860

 
ÜBERBLICK
7
Seit der Veröffentlichung des letzten Demografieberichts im Jahr 2008 hat
die EU-Bevölkerung die 500-Millionen-Marke überschritten und sich weiter
in die bereits vor zwei Jahren erkennbare Richtung entwickelt. Mittlerweile
liegt ein klareres Bild der demografischen Situation in der EU vor: Das
Wachstum wird hauptsächlich durch Immigration genährt, während die
Bevölkerung immer älter und vielfältiger wird. Überdies sind die
Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftskrise noch schwierig abzuschätzen.
Im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission die Mitteilung ‘Die demografische
Zukunft Europas – Von der Herausforderung zur Chance’
(13)
herausgegeben
und ihre Ansichten zu den demografischen Herausforderungen der EU und
den möglichen Herangehensweisen vorgestellt. In der Mitteilung wurde zum
Ausdruck gebracht, dass man darauf vertraue, Europa werde mit dem
demografischem Wandel und insbesondere der alternden Bevölkerung
zurechtkommen, aber es wurde auch Handlungsbedarf in fünf politischen
Schlüsselbereichen ermittelt: demografische Erneuerung, Beschäftigung,
Produktivität, Integration von Migranten und zukunftsfähige öffentliche
Finanzen.
Mit diesem dritten Demografiebericht sollen die aktuellen Fakten und Zahlen
vorgelegt werden, die für eine fundierte Debatte über diese Punkte vonnöten
sind. Neben dem EU-weiten Überblick werden soweit möglich Daten für alle
27 Mitgliedstaaten der EU vorgelegt, die politische Entscheidungsträger und
Interessenvertreter nutzen können, um die Situation ihres Landes mit der
anderer Mitgliedstaaten zu vergleichen, um die besonderen Merkmale ihres
Landes zu verstehen und um etwaige andere Länder zu ermitteln, die über
interessante Erfahrungen berichten, von denen man lernen kann.
Der diesjährige Bericht ist das Ergebnis eines Gemeinschaftsprojekts
zwischen DG ‘Beschäftigung, Soziales und Integration’ und Eurostat und
stützt sich auf die Erfahrung von Eurostat im Bereich demografischer
Untersuchungen. Er besteht aus zwei Teilen, einem kurzen Anhang zur
Abwanderung in Zeiten der Rezession und einem Länderanhang.
Teil I befasst sich mit den früheren und aktuellen Entwicklungstrends in
puncto Geburtenhäufigkeit, Lebenserwartung und Migration, den drei
Faktoren, die Bevölkerungsveränderungen auslösen. Darin enthalten ist ein
Überblick über die Bevölkerungsstruktur nach Alter und
Familienzusammensetzung.
In Teil II wird ein zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnendes Phänomen
untersucht, das in einer kürzlich durchgeführten Eurobarometer-Studie
ermittelt wurde. Die Studie war der steigenden Zahl europäischer Bürger
gewidmet, die sich ins Ausland begeben, um dort zu studieren, zu arbeiten,
Lebenserfahrung zu sammeln oder nach Anregungen suchen, was zu
unterschiedlichen Formen internationaler Verbundenheit über Staatsgrenzen
hinweg führt.
(
13
) KOM(2006) 571, angenommen am 12. Oktober 2006.

 
Demography Report, 2010
8
1.
VERMEHRT ÄLTERE UND VIELFÄLTIGERE EUROPÄER
1.1. Neue Lebensweisen führen zu geringfügiger Steigerung
der Geburtenhäufigkeit
Die Bevölkerung Europas ist von allmählichen Veränderungen betroffen, die
jedoch beträchtliche Ausmaße erreichen. Es sind zwei positive Haupttrends
auszumachen: ein leichter Anstieg der Geburtenrate und eine höhere
Lebenserwartung. Die Geburtenrate befindet sich in keinem Mitgliedstaat
mehr auf niedrigstem Niveau (weniger als 1,3 Kinder pro Frau). Neuesten
Zahlen für die EU-27 zufolge lag sie bei 1,6 und könnte bei Bereinigung um
die Geburtenverschiebung (der sogenannte ‘Tempoeffekt’) auf über 1,7
steigen. Diese kleine Anpassung kann das Defizit in Bezug auf die Ersatzrate
von 2,1 nicht ausgleichen. Sie könnte jedoch zusammen mit einer möglichen
Zunahme der Geburtenrate bei zunehmendem Wohlstand in den EU-
Mitgliedstaaten mittel- bis längerfristig zu einem langsameren
Bevölkerungsrückgang beitragen.
Der mäßige Anstieg der Geburtenzahlen ergibt sich aus ziemlich neuen
Mustern der Familienzusammensetzung: In Ländern, in denen weniger
geheiratet wird, mehr eheähnliche Gemeinschaften bestehen, es mehr
Scheidungen gibt und Frauen, die Kinder gebären, ein höheres
Durchschnittsalter haben, liegt die Geburtenrate tendenziell höher. Die sich
verändernde gesellschaftliche Wahrnehmung der Bedeutung des Heiratens
und die geringere Dauerhaftigkeit von Beziehungen haben zu mehr
außerehelichen Geburten, auch alleinerziehender Eltern, bzw. Kinderlosigkeit
geführt.
Es ist schwierig, den Einfluss der Familienpolitik auf diese Trends zu
ermitteln, da eine wichtige Rolle kulturellen Faktoren zukommt. Die Daten
lassen allerdings darauf schließen, dass das spätere Kinderkriegen in einigen
Ländern (z. B. Frankreich, Dänemark, Finnland und die Niederlande) mit
höheren Geburtenraten und relativ großzügiger staatlicher Unterstützung für
die Eltern einhergeht. Auf der anderen Seite besteht für Eltern in Ländern,
wie z. B. Rumänien, die Slowakei und Ungarn, die ein niedrigeres Alter bei
Geburt der Kinder aufweisen kein Zusammenhang mit einer hohen
Geburtenrate herstellen.,. Dies würde auch mit den ersten Anzeichen
übereinstimmen, die darauf hindeuten, dass die Geburtenraten mit
steigendem Wohlstand auch wieder steigen, nachdem zuvor jahrzehntelang
genau das Gegenteil der Fall gewesen war. Aus den vorliegenden
Anhaltspunkten geht hervor, dass wir eine bessere Politik benötigen, die
Eltern dabei unterstützt, mit den Zwängen einer modernen Gesellschaft
zurechtzukommen.
1.2.
Eine „alternde“ Bevölkerungsstruktur
Es ist schwierig, die Auswirkungen politischer Maßnahmen vorherzusagen.
Eine Analyse der Konsequenzen einer sich verändernden
Bevölkerungsstruktur ist da einfacher. Niedrige Geburtenraten sind nur die
eine Seite, auf der anderen steht ein Rückgang der Sterblichkeitsziffer oder
positiv ausgedrückt eine längere Lebenserwartung. 2009 betrug das
durchschnittliche Bevölkerungsalter 40,6. Hochrechnungen zufolge wird es
2060 bei 47,9 Jahren liegen.

 
Überblick
9
Laut den Eurostat-Projektionen EUROPOP2008, die im vorangegangenen
Demografiebericht enthalten waren, wird sich ab 2014 ein Rückgang der
Erwerbsbevölkerung (20–64) bemerkbar machen, da die Babyboomer, die
direkt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg geboren wurden, jetzt Anfang 60 sind
und in Rente gehen. Die Zahl der 60- und Über-60-Jährigen in der EU steigt
gegenwärtig um über 2 Millionen jedes Jahr, rund doppelt so schnell wie
noch vor drei Jahren. Auch die Erwerbsbevölkerung altert, da der Anteil
älterer Arbeitnehmer in Arbeit verglichen mit den jüngeren
Arbeitnehmergruppen zunimmt. Jedes Jahr werden rund 5 Millionen Kinder
in der EU-27 geboren und wandern über 2 Millionen Menschen aus
Drittländern ein. Jedes Jahr werden mehr Geburten als Sterbefälle gezählt,
wobei die Differenz mehrere Hunderttausend beträgt, und werden unter dem
Strich weit über eine Million Einwanderer verzeichnet. Die Zuwanderung
trägt folglich am meisten zum Wachstum der EU-Bevölkerung bei.
2008 lag die Lebenserwartung von Männern in der EU-27 bei 76,4 und von
Frauen bei 82,4 Jahren. Es gibt nach wie vor signifikante Unterschiede
zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, die von knapp 13 Jahren für Männer bis zu 8
bei Frauen reichen. Außerdem war die Säuglingssterblichkeit 2009 in einigen
Ländern wie Rumänien (10,1 ‰) und Bulgarien (9,0 ‰) noch immer relativ
hoch, auch wenn in den vergangenen 15 Jahren ein Rückgang von um die
50 % in der EU-27 erreicht wurde. Eine größere Rolle scheint dabei der
sozioökonomische Status zu spielen, insbesondere in einigen
mitteleuropäischen Ländern. Infolgedessen darf eine Erhöhung der
Lebenserwartung insgesamt erwartet werden, wenn die Lebenserwartung von
benachteiligten Gruppen verbessert wird.
Eine mögliche Entwicklung ist die Verbesserung der gesunden
Lebenserwartung, durch Verzögerung des Stadiums, in dem der
Gesundheitszustand sich rasch zu verschlechtern beginnt, und dadurch die
Verschiebung hin zu einem höheren Sterbealter. Zu dieser Frage sind weitere
Belege und Untersuchungen nötig.
Programme, die sich mit der alternden Bevölkerung und Erwerbsbevölkerung
befassen, sorgen schwerpunktmäßig dafür, dass ältere Arbeitnehmer länger
im aktiven und produktiven Erwerbsleben bleiben können. Einer der Vorteile
einer alternden Bevölkerung liegt darin, dass sich mehr Möglichkeiten für
flexible Vereinbarungen im Laufe des Lebens bieten. Ein längeres aktives
Leben ermöglicht ausgedehnte oder wiederkehrende Weiterbildungsphasen,
eine höhere Arbeitszeitflexibilität während der Jahre, in denen Kinder und
berufliche Verpflichtungen nur schwer miteinander vereinbart werden
können, die Unterbrechung der beruflichen Laufbahn, wenn man sich um
Familienangehörige kümmern muss, und ein produktives Ausscheiden aus
dem Arbeitsleben durch ehrenamtliche Mitarbeit und allgemeines
gesellschaftliches Engagement.
1.3.
Europa in Bewegung
Die Migration, insbesondere aus Nicht-EU-Staaten, könnte die Überalterung
der Bevölkerung (vorübergehend) stoppen, da in erster Linie junge
Erwachsene (im Alter von 25–34) in andere Länder abwandern. Durch die
jüngeren ausländischen Personengruppen, die zunehmend zu den älteren
nationalen Personengruppen hinzukommen, verjüngt sich die
Gesamtbevölkerung und erhöht sich die Vielfalt. Aufgrund der
Einwanderung sowohl aus Drittländern als auch aus der EU-27
(innereuropäische Mobilität) in bislang unbekanntem Ausmaß während des

 
Demography Report, 2010
10
vergangenen Jahrzehnts hat sich der Anteil der Europäer, die nicht in ihrem
Heimatland oder Kulturkreis leben, beträchtlich erhöht.
In den Mitgliedstaaten der EU-27 leben rund 20 Millionen Nicht-EU-
Staatsbürger. Weitere 10 Millionen EU-Staatsbürger leben in einem anderen
Mitgliedstaat und etwa 5 Millionen Menschen haben seit 2001 die EU-
Staatsbürgerschaft erworben. Da die meisten Einwanderer relativ jung sind
und erst vor recht kurzer Zeit in die EU gekommen sind, leisten sie einen
großen Beitrag zur Erwerbsbevölkerung der EU-27. In der Zukunft wird sich
die erwerbstätige Bevölkerung zunehmend aus Menschen mit
Migrationshintergrund zusammensetzen. Von den EU-Staatsbürgern haben
neben den rund 8 % der EU-Ansässigen ausländischer Herkunft(
14
) weitere
5 % mindestens ein im Ausland geborenes Elternteil, und dieser Anteil wird
weiter wachsen. Man geht davon aus, dass der Anteil der Personen aller
Staatsangehörigkeiten mit mindestens einem im Ausland geborenen Elternteil
bis zum Jahr 2060 knapp ein Drittel der Bevölkerung der EU-27 betragen
wird. Bei der Erwerbsbevölkerung wird ein noch größerer Teil ausländischer
Abstammung sein.
Diese Trends erfordern, dass zusätzliche Anstrengungen unternommen
werden, um sicherzustellen, dass Immigranten die Möglichkeit haben, sich in
die Gesellschaft ihres Gastlandes zu integrieren. Noch wichtiger ist es, ihnen
zu ermöglichen, sich ihrem Bildungsniveau entsprechend am Arbeitsmarkt zu
beteiligen. Eine mobile Bevölkerung kann eine Bereicherung für die
Gastländer sein. Immer mehr Menschen möchten Auslandserfahrung machen.
Dadurch können sie zu einer effizienteren und produktiveren Wirtschaft
beitragen und außerdem ihre persönlichen Kompetenzen verbessern.
2. EINE ZUNEHMEND VIELFÄLTIGE UND MOBILE EU-
BEVÖLKERUNG
Da die Zuwanderung aus Drittländern und die Mobilität zwischen den
Mitgliedstaaten zunimmt, stammt ein wachsender Teil der
Erwerbsbevölkerung (15 % im Jahr 2008) aus dem Ausland oder verfügt über
mindestens ein Elternteil, das im Ausland geboren wurde.
Durch die sich verändernden Muster der Zuwanderung und Mobilität
innerhalb Europas wird das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten
Nation diffuser und komplexer, insbesondere im Falle der Freizügigkeit
zwischen den EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Wenngleich die traditionelle langfristige,
beschäftigungsbedingte und männerdominierte Zuwanderung nach wie vor
existiert, immigrieren zunehmend auch Frauen und bilden mittlerweile in
einigen Mitgliedstaaten die Mehrheit. Auch die Richtung der Mobilität hat
sich geändert: Einige der Mitgliedstaaten, aus denen traditionell viele
Auswanderer stammten, sind mittlerweile sehr beliebte
Einwanderungsländer.
Es ist definitiv kein neues geschichtliches Phänomen, dass die Bürger der EU
in andere Länder abwandern und die Kulturen sich vermischen. Frühere
Migrationsströme haben sich unterschiedlich auf die Größe und Struktur der
Bevölkerung in den meisten EU-27-Mitgliedstaaten ausgewirkt und bei den
Bürgern zu einer verstärkt europäischen Perspektive beigetragen.
Einwanderer möchten häufig eine enge Bindung zu ihrem Herkunftsland
(
14
) Zur Gruppe der im Ausland Geborenen zählen hier Personen, die in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat geboren sind als dem, in dem
sie wohnen.

 
Überblick
11
aufrechterhalten, diese Verknüpfungen nehmen jedoch mit der Zeit
tendenziell ab.
Die generationsübergreifende Integration von Einwanderern erfolgt recht
zügig. In den meisten Ländern, in denen ein beträchtlicher Anteil an
Einwanderern der zweiten Generation lebt, schneiden diese in der Schule und
im Berufsleben deutlich besser als die erste Generation und fast so gut wie
die Einwohner ohne ausländische Wurzeln ab. Dies gilt sowohl für
Nachkömmlinge von Migranten aus anderen Mitgliedstaaten als auch für
diejenigen aus Drittländern. Trotz allem sind die Nachkommen von
Migranten auch noch in der dritten Generation – der üblichen Dauer bis zu
vollständigen Integration – in gewisser Weise mit dem Herkunftsland ihrer
Vorfahren verbunden, beispielsweise in Form von
Fremdsprachenkenntnissen.
Neben der traditionellen Migration und Mobilität sind auch neue Formen der
Mobilität zu erkennen. Umzüge ins Ausland finden hauptsächlich innerhalb
der Mitgliedstaaten und für kürzere Zeiträume auf der Suche nach Arbeit, im
Rahmen der Ausbildung oder zwecks Wahrnehmung sonstiger Möglichkeiten
statt. Bei diesem mobilen Teil der Bevölkerung handelt es sich in der Regel
um gut ausgebildete junge Menschen, die eher am oberen Ende der
Berufsskala angesiedelt sind. Diese Form der Mobilität basiert zunehmend
auf persönlichen Präferenzen und der Wahl eines bestimmten Lebensstils,
und nicht ausschließlich auf wirtschaftlichen Gründen. Die erhöhte
Mobilitätsneigung könnte für die EU von großem Nutzen sein, da so ein
besserer Abgleich von Kompetenzen und Sprachkenntnissen mit
Stellenangeboten möglich wird. Die Ergebnisse einer Eurobarometer-Studie
(
15
) deuten auf das Vorhandensein einer vielfältigen und wachsenden Anzahl
mobiler junger Menschen hin, die sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie allesamt
gerne einen Blick über die eigenen Landesgrenzen hinweg werfen möchten.
Der Eurobarometer-Studie ist ferner zu entnehmen, dass ungefähr ein Fünftel
der Teilnehmer aus den 27 EU-Ländern irgendwann im Laufe des Lebens
entweder im Ausland gearbeitet oder studiert hat, mit einem Partner aus
einem anderen Land liiert war oder Immobilien im Ausland besitzt. Bei der
Hälfte dieser Befragten sind Vorfahren aus anderen Ländern der Grund für
die Verbindung, bei der anderen Hälfte handelt es sich meistens um junge
und gut ausgebildete Menschen, die sich bewusst für eine bestimmte
Lebensform entscheiden, um andere Länder kennenzulernen. Ihre
Bereitschaft, wenn nicht gar Lust, auszuwandern, ist bis zu viermal höher als
bei Personen, die keinerlei Verbindungen zu einem anderen Land haben. Da
dieses Phänomen künftig wahrscheinlich noch stärker an Bedeutung gewinnt,
sollte die Politik die damit verbundenen Konsequenzen in die Planung der
sozioökonomischen Zukunft der europäischen Bevölkerung mit einbeziehen.
3.
BEVÖLKERUNGSPOLITIK WÄHREND DER REZESSION
Vor Beginn der Rezession hatte das Engagement der EU-Mitgliedstaaten im
Hinblick auf die Umsetzung der politischen Zielsetzungen des Vertrags von
Lissabon bereits erste Ergebnisse in Form von Beschäftigung für junge
Menschen, Frauen, ältere Arbeitnehmer und Einwanderer gezeigt. Die ersten,
die die Rezession zu spüren bekamen, waren jüngere Menschen und
Einwanderer. Den Regierungen fiel es zunehmend schwer, die Unterstützung
(
15
)
Eurobarometer
EBS
346
abrufbar
unter
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf

 
Demography Report, 2010
12
für Familien, die Konsolidierung der Haushalte, die Leistungen für junge
Menschen und Einwanderer sowie die Finanzierung der Rentensysteme vor
dem Hintergrund eines schrumpfenden Arbeitsmarktes miteinander zu
vereinbaren.
Es ist noch zu früh für sichere Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf die
Auswirkungen der Krise auf die Geburtenhäufigkeit und Lebenserwartung.
Die in vergangenen Rezessionsperioden gemachte Erfahrung zeigt, dass
sowohl die Geburtenrate als auch die Sterblichkeit anfangs leicht
zurückgehen, aber dann kurz nach Ende der Krise wieder auf den Stand vor
der Krise steigen.
Neue Wohnsitzdaten von Eurostat lassen Rückschlüsse auf die Gründe für
die Einwanderung aus Drittländern zu. Den verfügbaren Daten ist zu
entnehmen, dass der Zuwanderungsrückgang hauptsächlich darauf
zurückzuführen ist, dass weniger Menschen aus beruflichen und familiären
Gründen auswandern, während die Zahl der zu Studien- und sonstigen
Zwecken ausgestellten Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen zwischen 2008 und 2009
leicht angestiegen ist.
4.
WAS WIRD UNTERNOMMEN?
Im Juni 2010 verabschiedete der Europarat die neue zehnjährige Strategie
Europa 2020 für mehr Beschäftigung und intelligentes, nachhaltiges und
integratives Wachstum (
16
). Die Strategie dient der Neuausrichtung
vorhandener politischer Maßnahmen weg vom Krisenmanagement hinzu
mittel- bis längerfristigen Zielsetzungen zur Förderung von Wachstum und
Beschäftigung sowie zur Sicherstellung der zukünftigen Tragfähigkeit
öffentlicher Finanzen. Letzteres ist eine Grundvoraussetzung für den sozialen
Zusammenhalt in der EU.
Die Rezession hat das Engagement der Mitgliedstaaten, sich den
demografischen Herausforderungen zu stellen, nicht geschmälert. Die
Mitgliedstaaten scheinen im Gegenteil noch stärker dazu entschlossen zu
sein. Die Strategie, mit der man den demografischen Veränderungen
begegnen wollte, stimmt anscheinend genau mit dem Grundtenor der neuen
Strategie Europa 2020 überein. Als Folge der Rezession – und trotz der
trüben Aussichten für die öffentlichen Haushalte – ist die Europäische
Kommission davon überzeugt, dass der demografische Aspekt von den
Mitgliedstaaten bei der Ausarbeitung ihrer Strategien zur Überwindung der
derzeitigen Rezession umfassend berücksichtigt werden muss.
Bereits im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission in ihrer Mitteilung zur
demografischen Zukunft Europas
(17)
hervorgehoben, dass sich die EU die
demografischen Möglichkeiten zunutze machen sollte. In der Mitteilung hieß
es, man solle das Problem der niedrigen Geburtenraten durch Schaffung
besserer Bedingungen für Familien angehen, damit das Problem der
schrumpfenden Erwerbsbevölkerung gelöst würde, indem man die
Beschäftigungsquote und Produktivitätsrate erhöht, sich auf Zuwanderung
und bessere Integration stützt und letztendlich auch die zukünftigen
Bedürfnisse einer alternden Gesellschaft durch Schaffung tragfähiger
öffentlicher Haushalte erfüllt. Es liege in der Verantwortung der
Mitgliedstaaten, zu entscheiden, wie sie ihr Potenzial verwirklichen. In der
(
16
)
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_de.htm
(
17
)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:DE:PDF

Überblick
13
Mitteilung wurde die Art der Unterstützung hervorgehoben, welche die EU
den Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf die Koordinierung der bestehenden
politischen Maßnahmen anbieten kann. Auf Ersuchen der Mitgliedstaaten
und mit Unterstützung des Europäischen Parlaments wird dieser Prozess
durch die Aktivitäten ergänzt, die unter dem Dach der Europäischen Allianz
für Familien (
18
) und des geplanten Europäischen Jahres für aktives
Altern 2012 (
19
) organisiert werden.
Der Erfolg der Strategie ist weitgehend an die Fähigkeit der EU gebunden,
sich den großen demografischen Veränderungen des kommenden Jahrzehnts
zu stellen.
Die Zukunft Europas hängt in hohem Maße davon ab, ob das hohe Potenzial
der beiden am schnellsten wachsenden Bevölkerungsteile genutzt werden
kann: ältere Menschen und Einwanderer. Es lassen sich drei politische
Bereiche ausmachen, die für die Förderung des Wirtschaftswachstums und
die Schaffung eines stärkeren sozialen Zusammenhalts entscheidend sein
dürften:
– Die Förderung des aktiven Alterns: Ältere Menschen und
insbesondere die älter werdende Generation der Babyboomer können sich auf
ein langes gesundes Leben freuen und verfügen über wertvolle Kompetenzen
und Erfahrungen. Durch ein größeres Angebot an Möglichkeiten des aktiven
Alterns können diese Personengruppen auch nach ihrer Pensionierung noch
einen sozialen Beitrag leisten.
Die Integration von Migranten und deren Nachkommen: Dieser Punkt
ist für Europa von entscheidender Bedeutung, da Migranten sogar einen noch
größeren Teil der Erwerbsbevölkerung ausmachen werden. Die niedrigen
Beschäftigungsquoten von Migranten sind sowohl in sozialer als auch
finanzieller Hinsicht nicht tragbar.
– Die Vereinbarkeit von bezahlter Arbeit und familiären
Verpflichtungen: Personen mit Betreuungsverantwortung erhalten immer
noch keine angemessene Unterstützung und geeignete Optionen, um ihre
unterschiedlichen Pflichten miteinander zu vereinbaren. Als Folge davon
wird das Wirtschaftswachstum blockiert, weil zu viele Menschen ihre
erstklassigen Kompetenzen und erworbenen Kenntnisse auf dem
Arbeitsmarkt nicht in vollem Umfang nutzen können. Besonders Frauen sind
aufgrund der hartnäckigen geschlechterbezogenen Kluft in Bezug auf Beruf
und Gehalt betroffen.
Gleichzeitig müssen in Europa aber auch Wege gefunden werden, wie eine
höhere Produktivität aufrechterhalten werden kann, während man sich auf
steigende Kosten in Verbindung mit einer alternden Gesellschaft einstellen
muss, und das vor dem Hintergrund schrumpfender öffentlicher Haushalte
infolge der Rezession.
(
18
)
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=de&id=1
(
19
)
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=de&catId=89&newsId=860

 
RÉSUMÉ
14
Depuis le dernier Rapport 2008 sur la démographie, publié la même année, la
population de l’UE a franchi le seuil des 500 millions d’individus tout en
continuant à se développer conformément à l’évolution déjà perceptible il y a
deux ans. Le tableau démographique de l’UE a gagné en précision : la
croissance est principalement alimentée par l’immigration, tandis que la
population vieillit et se diversifie. L’influence de la crise économique est
toujours difficile à évaluer.
En octobre 2006, dans sa communication intitulée
«L’avenir démographique
de l’Europe, transformer un défi en opportunité»
(20)
,
la Commission a
présenté ses points de vue sur les défis démographiques rencontrés par l’UE
et sur les options pour les relever. La communication a exprimé sa confiance
en la capacité de l’Europe à faire face aux changements démographiques et
au vieillissement de la population en particulier, mais a également souligné la
nécessité d’agir dans cinq secteurs clés : le renouveau démographique,
l’emploi, la productivité, l’intégration des migrants et les finances publiques
soutenables
Ce troisième Rapport sur la démographie vise à fournir les derniers chiffres et
données nécessaires pour un débat éclairé sur ces questions. Outre la vue
d’ensemble au niveau communautaire, les chiffres sont donnés, dans la
mesure du possible, pour l’ensemble des 27 États membres de l’UE,
permettant aux décideurs politiques et aux parties prenantes de comparer la
situation de leur propre pays avec celle des autres États membres, de
comprendre les caractéristiques spécifiques de leur pays et, si possible,
d’identifier d’autres pays qui pourraient apporter d’intéressantes expériences
dont on pourrait s’instruire.
Cette année, le rapport est réalisé en collaboration avec la Direction Générale
«
Emploi, affaires sociales et inclusion
»
et Eurostat, et tire parti de
l’expérience d'Eurostat en matière d’analyse démographique. Il se compose
de deux parties, d’une brève annexe sur la migration au cours de la récession
et d’une annexe contenant des fiches par pays.
La partie I est consacrée aux tendances historiques et récentes concernant la
fécondité, l’espérance de vie et la migration, qui sont les trois facteurs clés de
l’évolution de la population. Elle inclut un examen de la structure de la
population par âge et composition familiale.
La partie II se penche sur un phénomène de plus en plus important qui a été
identifié dans une récente enquête Eurobaromètre : un nombre croissant de
citoyens européens recherchent des opportunités au-delà des frontières de
leur pays pour étudier, travailler, puiser leur inspiration et vivre des
expériences, ce qui conduit à la création de différentes formes de liens par-
delà les frontières nationales.
(
20
) COM(2006) 571, adoptée le 12 octobre 2006.

 
Résumé
15
1. DES EUROPÉENS PLUS NOMBREUX, PLUS ÂGÉS, VIVANT
DANS UNE PLUS GRANDE DIVERSITÉ
1.1. Des modèles nouveaux entraînent une légère
augmentation de la fécondité
Des changements progressifs, mais néanmoins significatifs, touchent la
population en Europe. Deux tendances positives principales émergent : une
légère augmentation de la fécondité et une plus grande espérance de vie. La
très faible fécondité – inférieure à 1,3 enfant par femme – n’est plus de mise
dans l’ensemble des États membres. Le chiffre le plus récent pour l’Europe
des 27 s’est élevé à 1,6 et pourrait grimper à plus d’1,7 si les ajustements
pour le report des naissances (les dénommés « effets de tempo ») sont pris en
considération. Ce petit ajustement ne compense pas le déficit par rapport au
seuil de renouvellement de 2,1, mais pourrait contribuer à un ralentissement
du taux de la baisse de la population à moyen/plus long terme, parallèlement
à une possible augmentation de la fécondité à mesure d’un enrichissement
des États membres de l’UE.
La progression modeste de la fécondité est le résultat de modèles quelque peu
nouveaux en termes de schéma familial : des pays avec moins de mariages,
davantage de concubinage, plus de divorces et une moyenne plus élevée de
l’âge des femmes au moment de l’accouchement tendent à engendrer une
fécondité plus élevée. Le changement des perceptions sociales quant au rôle
du mariage et une plus grande fragilité des relations sont à l’origine d’un
nombre plus élevé de naissances extraconjugales, y compris dans les familles
monoparentales, ou d’une infécondité.
L’impact des politiques familiales sur ces tendances est difficile à évaluer
dans la mesure où les facteurs culturels jouent un rôle important. Cependant,
les données suggèrent que l’ajournement de la maternité à un âge plus avancé
s’accompagne dans quelques pays (France, Danemark, Finlande et Pays-Bas
par exemple) de taux de fécondité plus élevés et d’aides publiques
relativement généreuses pour les parents. À l’autre extrémité de l’échelle,
dans des pays comme la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et la Hongrie, un âge
inférieur à l’accouchement n’est pas associé à un taux de fécondité élevé.
Cette situation serait également en phase avec les premiers éléments
indiquant que la fécondité s’accroît encore avec la richesse, après des
décennies de fécondité en berne alors que les pays s’enrichissaient.
Cette évidence émergente étaie la thèse selon laquelle il est nécessaire de
disposer de meilleures politiques pouvant aider les parents à faire face aux
contraintes d’une société moderne.
1.1.
Une structure de la population « vieillissante »
Bien qu’il soit difficile de prédire l’influence des politiques, une analyse de
l’impact des changements dans la structure de la population est plus simple.
Les faibles taux de fécondité ne constituent qu’un des deux aspects du
phénomène, l’autre aspect étant une baisse du nombre des décès, ou en
termes plus positifs, d’une hausse de l’espérance de vie. En 2009, l’âge
moyen de la population était de 40,6 et il devrait atteindre, selon les
prévisions, 47,9 ans d’ici 2060.

 
Demography Report, 2010
16
Les projections EUROPOP2008, préparées par Eurostat et présentées dans le
précédent Rapport sur la démographie, indiquent que d’ici 2014, la
population active (20-64) commencera à se contracter alors que
d’importantes cohortes de « baby-boomers » nés immédiatement après la
Seconde Guerre atteignent désormais la soixantaine et prennent leur retraite.
Le nombre d’individus âgés de 60 ans et plus au sein de l’UE croît
actuellement de plus de deux millions chaque année, à peu près deux fois le
taux observé jusqu’il y a encore trois ans. La population active vieillit
également du fait de l’accroissement de la proportion des travailleurs plus
âgés en activité par rapport aux groupes de travailleurs plus jeunes. Chaque
année, environ 5 millions d’enfants voient le jour dans l’Europe des 27 et
plus de 2 millions de personnes immigrent de pays tiers. Les naissances
dépassent les décès de plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes chaque
année tandis que l’immigration nette est nettement supérieure à un million.
En conséquence, l’immigration représente la part la plus importante de la
croissance de la population de l’UE.
En 2008, l’espérance de vie pour l’Europe des 27 était de 76,4 ans pour les
hommes et de 82,4 ans pour les femmes. Les écarts parmi les États membres
sont toujours très significatifs, allant de presque 13 ans pour les hommes à 8
ans pour les femmes. La mortalité infantile en 2009 est aussi toujours
relativement élevée dans certains pays tels que la Roumanie (10,1 ‰) et la
Bulgarie (9,0 ‰), même si une baisse d’environ 50 % pour l’UE-27 a été
enregistrée au cours des 15 dernières années. Le statut socio-économique
semble jouer un rôle majeur, notamment dans certains pays d’Europe
centrale. Par conséquent, en améliorant l’espérance de vie des catégories
désavantagées, une hausse générale de l’espérance de vie globale devrait
également se profiler.
Une évolution possible serait l’amélioration de l’espérance de vie en bonne
santé, en retardant le moment auquel les conditions physiques commencent à
se détériorer rapidement, reportant de ce fait la mort à un âge ultérieur. . Ce
sujet important exige d’autres preuves et analyses.
Les politiques abordant le vieillissement de la population et la main-d’œuvre
visent à permettre aux travailleurs plus âgés de rester actifs et productifs
pendant une plus longue période de leur vie. L’un des avantages d’une
population vieillissante est qu’elle offre plus de possibilités en termes de
souplesse des dispositions au cours de la vie. Une plus longue vie active
permet des périodes prolongées ou périodiques en matière d’éducation ; une
plus grande flexibilité du temps de travail pendant les années d’effervescence
où la maternité et les engagements professionnels coïncident ; une
interruption de carrière temporaire quand il devient nécessaire de prendre
soin de membres de la famille ; et une retraite productive via le volontariat et
un engagement général dans la vie sociale.
1.2.
L’Europe en mouvement
L’immigration, notamment en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE,
pourrait fournir un sursis (provisoire) au vieillissement de la population,
puisque la plupart des personnes émigrent principalement lorsqu’elles sont de
jeunes adultes (25-34 ans). Alors que les groupes de jeunes étrangers entrent
progressivement dans les cohortes nationales plus âgées, l’ensemble de la
population rajeunit et la diversité s’accroît. Des niveaux sans précédent
d’immigration provenant tant de pays tiers que de l’UE-27 (mobilité
intracommunautaire) au cours de la dernière décennie ont sensiblement

 
Résumé
17
augmenté la part d'habitantseuropéens qui ne vivent pas dans leur propre pays
natal ou dans leur milieu culturel.
Les États membres de l’UE-27 accueillent environ 20 millions de
ressortissants ne provenant pas de l’UE. 10 autres millions de ressortissants
de l’UE vivent dans un autre État membre et environ 5 millions de
ressortissants tiers sont devenus citoyens européens depuis 2001. Étant donné
que la plupart des migrants sont relativement jeunes et sont arrivés assez
récemment, ils contribuent notablement à l’ampleur de la main-d’œuvre de
l’UE-27. À l’avenir, la main-d’œuvre comptera de plus en plus de personnes
provenant de l’immigration. Parmi les ressortissants de l’UE, outre le taux
approximatif de 8 % de personnes résidant dans l’UE et nées à l’étranger (
21
),
5 % supplémentaires ont au moins un parent né à l’étranger, et cette catégorie
continuera à croître. En 2060, les personnes de toute nationalité ayant au
moins un parent né à l’étranger devraient représenter près d’un tiers de la
population de l’UE-27. Un pourcentage encore plus important de la main-
d’œuvre sera d’origine étrangère.
Ces tendances impliquent que des efforts supplémentaires sont nécessaires
pour garantir que les immigrés aient l’opportunité de s’intégrer dans leur
société d’accueil et, fondamentalement, de leur permettre de contribuer au
marché du travail en utilisant pleinement leurs qualifications. Une population
mobile peut être perçue comme un atout par les pays d’accueil. Dans la
mesure où de plus en plus de gens recherchent une expérience à l’étranger, ils
peuvent contribuer à une économie plus efficace et productive tout en
renforçant leurs compétences personnelles.
2.
UNE POPULATION EUROPÉENNE DE PLUS EN PLUS DIVERSE
ET MOBILE
Alors que les flux migratoires en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE
et la mobilité entre États membres se sont intensifiés, une proportion
croissante de la population active (15 % en 2008) est née à l’étranger ou a au
moins un parent né à l’étranger.
L’évolution des schémas migratoires et de la mobilité en Europe rendent le
sentiment national relatif à l’appartenance à une nation particulière plus
diffus et complexe, en particulier dans le cas de la mobilité entre les États
membres de l’UE. Bien que l’immigration traditionnelle à long terme,
motivée par l’emploi, principalement masculine, soit toujours à l’ordre du
jour, les femmes immigrantes sont de plus de plus présentes et sont
désormais majoritaires dans certains États membres. Les flux de mobilité ont
également changé : certains des principaux États membres traditionnels
d’émigration sont devenus des pôles d’attraction pour les migrants.
La migration à grande échelle et le mélange des cultures ne sont évidemment
pas un nouveau phénomène dans l’histoire de l’UE. Les flux passés ont eu un
impact différent sur la taille et la structure de la population dans la plupart
des États membres de l’UE-27 et ils ont contribué à une perspective plus
européenne parmi ses citoyens. Les immigrés souhaitent souvent conserver
un attachement proche à leur pays d’origine, mais ces liens tendent à
s’amenuiser au fil du temps.
(
21
) L’expression « nées à l’étranger » inclut ici les personnes nées dans un État membre différent de celui dans lequel elles résident.

 
Demography Report, 2010
18
L’intégration des immigrés à travers les générations s’effectue plutôt
rapidement. Dans la plupart des pays disposant d’une proportion substantielle
d’immigrés de la seconde génération, ceux-ci réussissent nettement mieux sur
le plan de l’éducation tout comme sur le marché du travail que les immigrés
de la première génération et presque aussi bien que les individus sans origine
étrangère ; cela s’applique aux descendants des migrants provenant des autres
États membres et des immigrés en provenance des pays non membres de
l’UE. Néanmoins, même après trois générations, – le temps habituellement
nécessaire pour une intégration totale – les descendants des migrants
conservent un certain attachement aux pays de leurs ancêtres, par leur
connaissance des langues étrangères par exemple.
Parallèlement à l’immigration et à la mobilité traditionnelles, il existe de
nouvelles formes de mobilité. Les individus se déplacent à l’étranger,
principalement dans d’autres États membres, pour des périodes plus courtes
en vue de chercher du travail, de poursuivre leur formation ou pour toute
autre opportunité de vie. Ces individus mobiles tendent à être de jeunes
adultes instruits, dirigés vers l’extrémité supérieure de l’échelle
professionnelle. Cette forme de mobilité est basée de plus en plus sur des
préférences personnelles et des choix de vie, et pas seulement sur des
opportunités économiques. La propension accrue à la mobilité pourrait être
très bénéfique à l’UE en permettant une meilleure mise en adéquation des
qualifications et des capacités linguistiques avec les offres d’emploi. Les
résultats d’une enquête Eurobaromètre (
22
) mettent en évidence la présence
d’un nombre varié et croissant de jeunes gens mobiles caractérisés par un
intérêt commun pour ce qui se fait au-delà des frontières nationales.L’enquête
Eurobaromètre indique également qu’une personne sondée sur cinq de l’UE-
27 a étudié ou travaillé dans un autre pays à un moment donné, vécu avec un
conjoint d’un autre pays ou possède un bien immobilier à l’étranger. La
moitié de ces personnes sondées a des liens avec d’autres pays par
ascendance ; l’autre moitié est le plus souvent jeune et instruite et effectue
consciemment un choix de vie qui la met en contact avec d’autres pays. Ils
partagent une forte volonté, sinon une propension à se déplacer à l’étranger,
jusqu’à quatre fois plus que les personnes qui ne disposent d’aucune
connexion avec un autre pays. Étant donné que ce phénomène est susceptible
de devenir bien plus important à l’avenir, il est possible que les décideurs
politiques souhaitent tenir compte de ses implications dans la planification de
l’avenir socio-économique de la population européenne.
3. POLITIQUE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE AU COURS DE LA
RÉCESSION
Avant la récession économique, l’engagement des États membres de l’UE à
mettre en application les objectifs politiques inscrits dans le programme du
traité de Lisbonne avait commencé à donner des résultats sous la forme de
l’emploi des jeunes, des femmes, des travailleurs plus âgés et des migrants.
Quand la récession est survenue, les premiers groupes à être affectés ont été
les jeunes et les immigrés. Les gouvernements ont fait face à des difficultés
croissantes en équilibrant soutien aux familles, consolidation des budgets,
aide aux jeunes et aux immigrés sur un marché du travail en contraction, et en
finançant les régimes de retraite.
(
22
)
Eurobaromètre
EBS
346
sur
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf

 
Résumé
19
Il est trop tôt pour tirer toute conclusion définitive concernant l’impact de la
crise sur la fécondité et l’espérance de vie. L’expérience récente des
récessions passées indique que la fécondité et la mortalité peuvent baisser
légèrement dans un premier temps pour revenir à leurs niveaux antérieurs à la
récession peu de temps après la fin de la crise.
Les nouvelles données d’Eurostat sur les permis de séjour mettent en lumière
les raisons de l’immigration en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE.
Les données disponibles montrent que la baisse de l’immigration est en
grande partie due à une réduction de l’immigration pour des raisons
professionnelles et familiales, alors que le nombre de permis de séjour
délivrés pour les études et d’autres raisons a légèrement augmenté de 2008 à
2009.
4. MESURES PRISES
En juin 2010, le Conseil européen a adopté la nouvelle stratégie Europe2020
pour les dix ans à venir afin de créer davantage d’emplois et parvenir à une
croissance intelligente, durable et exhaustive (
23
). La stratégie définit une
réorientation des politiques existantes depuis la gestion de la crise jusqu’aux
objectifs à moyen et plus long terme pour favoriser la croissance et l’emploi
et pour assurer la durabilité future des finances publiques. Ce dernier point
est une condition préalable pour la cohésion sociale durable dans l’UE.
La récession n’a pas amenuisé l’engagement des États membres à relever le
défi démographique. Au contraire, cet engagement semble avoir été renforcé.
La stratégie adoptée pour aborder la mutation démographique semble
concorder avec la poussée globale de la nouvelle stratégie Europe 2020. Dans
le sillage de la récession, et en dépit des mornes perspectives pour les
finances publiques, la Commission européenne est convaincue que la
dimension démographique mérite d’être entièrement prise en considération
par les États membres lorsqu’ils formulent leurs stratégies de sortie de la
récession actuelle.
La nécessité de mobiliser les possibilités démographiques de l’UE a été déjà
soulignée en octobre 2006 dans la communication de la Commission sur
l’avenir démographique de l’Europe
(24)
. Cette communication a suggéré que
le problème de la faible fécondité devrait être abordé en créant de meilleures
conditions pour aider les familles et traiter le problème d’une contraction de
la main-d’œuvre en relevant les taux d’emploi et les niveaux de productivité,
en se fiant à l’immigration et à une meilleure intégration et, pour finir, en
préservant la capacité à répondre aux besoins futurs d’une société
vieillissante en créant des finances publiques durables. Il appartient aux États
membres de décider de quelle manière réaliser leur potentiel. La
communication a mis en évidence le type d’aide que l’UE peut apporter aux
États membres en termes de coordination des politiques existantes. À la
demande des États membres et avec l’appui du Parlement européen, ce
processus est complété par les activités organisées sous l’égide de l’Alliance
européenne pour les familles (
25
) et de l’Année européenne du vieillissement
actif désignée pour 2012 (
26
).
(
23
)
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_fr.htm
(
24
)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:FR:PDF
(
25
)
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=fr&id=1
(
26
)
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=fr&catId=89&newsId=860

Demography Report, 2010
20
Le succès de cette stratégie s’articule en grande partie autour de la capacité
de l’UE à faire face aux principales transformations démographiques de cette
prochaine décennie.
L’avenir de l’Europe dépend dans une large mesure de sa capacité à exploiter
le grand potentiel des deux segments augmentant le plus rapidement au sein
de sa population : les personnes âgées et les immigrés. Trois secteurs
semblent essentiels pour relancer la croissance économique et parvenir à une
plus grande cohésion sociale :
la promotion du vieillissement actif : les personnes âgées, et en
particulier les baby-boomers vieillissants, peuvent espérer vivre de plus
longues années en bonne santé, et détiennent des qualifications et des
expériences précieuses. Davantage d’opportunités en vue d’un vieillissement
actif leur permettront de continuer à apporter leur contribution à la société
même après la retraite.
l’intégration des immigrés et de leurs descendants : c’est primordial
pour l’Europe parce que les immigrés constitueront une part encore plus
importante de la main-d’œuvre européenne. Les faibles taux d’emploi des
immigrés sont socialement et financièrement très élevés.
la conciliation d’un travail rémunéré et d’obligations familiales : les
personnes ayant une charge familiale manquent toujours d’une aide adéquate
et de mesures appropriées pour combiner leurs différentes responsabilités. En
conséquence, la croissance économique est entravée, trop de personnes ne
pouvant pas mettre leur niveau élevé de qualifications et d’éducation à
disposition du marché du travail. Les femmes sont particulièrement touchées
en raison de la persistance des différences d’emploi selon le sexe et des écarts
de salaire.
Parallèlement, l’Europe doit trouver les moyens de maintenir une plus grande
productivité tout en se préparant à des niveaux croissants de dépenses liées au
vieillissement en dépit de l’assèchement des finances publiques consécutif à
la récession.

INTRODUCTION
21
The Commission's Europe 2020 Strategy has identified concern about population ageing, together with
globalisation, climate change, competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, as one of the key
challenges that the European Union needs to overcome.
Sixty years ago the number of births rose sharply and remained high for about 20 to 30 years. Now the
first of those baby-boomers, have reached the age of 60 and have started retiring. This marks a turning
point in the demographic development of the European Union and makes it all the more important to
consider the policy responses that are required by this major change. Population ageing, long discussed as
a looming prospect, has now become a reality.
This Report is the third in a series of biennial European Demography Reports to which the Commission
committed itself in its 2006 Communication 'The Demographic Future of Europe — From Challenge to
Opportunity'. This Communication showed that Europe has reasons to envisage its demographic future
with confidence. Population ageing is above all the result of economic, social and medical progress, as
well as greater control over the timing of births and the number of children that people have. The same
progress affords Europe significant opportunities for responding to the challenges of demographic
change, notably in five key areas:
better support for families;
– promotion of employment;
raising productivity and economic performance;
better support for immigration and the integration of migrants;
sustainable public finances.
Major reforms and decisive action are necessary to meet these challenges. The Communication stressed
that there is only a small window of opportunity, of about 10 years, during which further employment
growth remains possible. Increasing the number of highly productive and high quality jobs is the key to
ensuring that Europe's economy and societies will be able to meet the needs of ageing populations. The
current economic crisis has not invalidated the EU’s strategy; on the contrary, it has made the speedy
implementation of this strategy more urgent.
The 2006 Communication announced that every two years the Commission would hold a European
Forum on Demography to take stock of the latest demographic developments and to review where the
European Union and the Member States stand in responding to demographic change. The first Forum
took place on 30-31 October 2006, the second on 24-25 November 2008 and the third on 22-23
November 2010. The purpose of the present Demography Report is to provide the up-to-date facts and
figures that are needed for an informed debate with the stakeholders taking part in the Forum and, in
particular, with the group of government experts on demography, involved in the conception of this
report.
As far as possible, data are provided for all EU-27 Member States, allowing policy makers and
stakeholders to compare their own country’s situation with that of others, to understand the specific
characteristics of their country and, perhaps, to identify countries that provide interesting examples of
practice from which lessons could be learned. In so doing, the report responds to request from Member
States wishing to learn from the range of national experience across the European Union.
Comments and suggestions to help the Commission improve the Report will be gratefully received and
should be sent to:

Demography Report, 2010
22
Unit D4 (Demography, Migration, Social Innovation and Civil Society)
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities
European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
EMPL-D4-COURRIER@ec.europa.eu
Data sources and comments
Online data
codes
Most of the data in this publication come from Eurostat's data base. Individual data
tables used in the various figure (graph or table) are referenced by a code provided
under each figure. To find more complete, updated or detailed data, visit
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
and
insert the code(s) in the 'search in tree' textbox.
Where a code is not available, the data are not available as a standard table and were
obtained in answer to a special query.
Some data comes from Eurobarometer surveys. Two main surveys are used in this
publication, namely the November 2009 survey on mobility (EBS 337, from the EB
round 72.5, can be found at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_339_320_en.htm
and
the
report at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_337_en.pdf
)
and the
March 2010 survey on the 'New Europeans' (EBS 346, from the EB round 73.3,
survey at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_359_340_en.htm#346
and the
report
at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf
).
This publication made use of other more ad-hoc sources and their links can be found
in the text or in footnotes.
Comments
Comments and suggestions on this report will be gratefully received at
Unit D4
Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
European Commission
1049 Brussels – Belgium
EMPL-D4-unit@ec.europa.eu

 
Part I
Main Demographic Trends

 
1. INTRODUCTION
Table I.1.1:
Main demographic trends: Main findings
Life expectancy continues to rise, especially from gains at older ages. Since there are large
discrepancies among and within countries, there is scope for raising average life-spans for the less-
advantaged groups.
The most recent large wave of immigrants, that has swollen the cohorts of foreigners in mediterranean
countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, has abated in 2008.
Fertility is slightly on the rise. Lowest-low fertility, i.e. below 1.3 children per woman, has ended in every
Member State and the average is approaching 1.6 as of 2008.
The EU population ages at varying speed. Populations that are currently the oldest, such as Germany's
and Italy's, will age rapidly for the next twenty years, then stabilise. Some populations that are currently
younger, mainly in the East of the EU, will undergo ageing at increasing speed and by 2060 will have
the oldest populations in the EU.
Fertility indicators confirm the ongoing postponement of births to later ages in life. An adjustment for
this ‘tempo’ effect would raise the 2008 fertility rate in the EU to just over 1.7. This is still well below the
replacement rate of 2.1.
Not only people are living longer lives; they may be living longer healthy lives. There is evidence that the
process of ageing, during which people become progressively disabled until they die, is not becoming
slower; rather, it is progressively delayed. However, some data indicate that healthy life expectancy fell
from 2007 to 2009, and there is a need for more information on this subject.
Immigrants tend to be less-well educated and employed in jobs below their qualifications
25
As the 500-millionth person was born – or arrived
from abroad as an immigrant – EU-27 was, and
still is, undergoing major demographic changes.
These changes are slow, but they are very
significant.
Indicators observed just before the recession
suggest that fertility seems to be increasing again,
albeit only slowly. Life expectancy keeps rising.
The labour force keeps growing and EU-27 has
attracted large numbers of migrants.
When ten new countries joined the EU-27 in 2004,
most of them had known little economic migration.
Then, many of them experienced significant
emigration but, recently, some of them have
attracted migrants. Life expectancy in these
countries had not improved much in the 1990s, and
had even regressed in some countries, but in the
early 2000's, the figures started to catch up with
the 15 pre-2004 Member States.
In the meantime, EU-27 has developed some
peculiar demographic patterns. Across countries,
those where there are more marriages do not
necessarily report more births – on the contrary. A
younger average age at childbirth goes with lower
fertility rates. Wealth and life expectancy are not
strongly linked; some Member States are poorer
than others and yet their citizens live longer. There
may be signs that as countries become wealthier,
fertility increases.
Other patterns of change are less surprising in a
developed, ageing society. The population of
working age has been increasing less and will start
shrinking soon. The first decade of the 21
st
century
has seen large waves of immigrants come from
outside the EU. The first post-World War II ‘baby
boomers’ are entering their 60s, and are retiring.
From now on, the older population will keep
swelling.

 
2. FERTILITY
26
Fertility is increasing, albeit slightly. Most of the
increase is in countries that have experienced
extremely low fertility in the recent past, that is,
fertility below 1.3 children per woman. At the
same time, women are delaying motherhood,
giving birth much later in their lives.
2.1.
RECOVERY OF FERTILITY
In 2009, around 5.4 million children were born in
the EU-27, compared to about 7.5 million at the
beginning of the 1960s. The highest annual total
for the EU-27 was recorded in 1964, with 7.7
million live births. Over the past 30 years, the total
number of live births has been growing again,
albeit moderately, after reaching a low in 2002
(less than 5 million live births, see Graph I.2.1).
Graph I.2.1:
Number of live births in EU-27, 1980-2009
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
Million
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind),
The slowdown in population growth in the EU-27
is due partly to lower fertility.
The main indicator of fertility is the Total Fertility
Rate (TFR): this is the mean number of children
that would be born alive to a woman during her
lifetime if she were to pass through her
childbearing years conforming to the age-specific
fertility rates of a given year. A total fertility rate
of around 2.1 children per woman is considered to
be the replacement level, that is, the average
number of children per woman required to keep
the population size constant in the absence of
inward or outward migration. A TFR below 1.3
children per woman is described as ‘lowest-low
fertility’. TFR is used as an indicator for the
fertility level and is comparable across countries,
since it takes into account changes in the size and
structure of the population.
Table I.2.1 shows the TFR in the EU-27 and in all
Member States for selected years. The total
fertility rate declined steeply between 1980 and
2000-2003 in many Member States, falling far
below replacement level. In 2000, values had
fallen below 1.3 in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia and Slovakia. After
reaching a minimum between 2000 and 2003, in
the six years to 2009, the TFR had risen in most
Member States, and in 2009, all EU-27 countries
were displaying rates above 1.3.
Table I.2.1:
Total Fertility Rate (TFR), selected years
1980
1990
2000
2003
2009
EU-27
:
:
:
1.47
1.60
BE
1.68
1.62
1.67
1.66
1.84
BG
2.05
1.82
1.26
1.23
1.57
CZ
2.08
1.90
1.14
1.18
1.49
DK
1.55
1.67
1.77
1.76
1.84
DE
:
:
1.38
1.34
1.36
EE
:
2.05
1.38
1.37
1.62
IE
3.21
2.11
1.89
1.96
2.07
EL
2.23
1.40
1.26
1.28
1.52
ES
2.20
1.36
1.23
1.31
1.40
FR
1.95
1.78
1.87
1.87
1.98
IT
1.64
1.33
1.26
1.29
1.42
CY
:
2.41
1.64
1.50
1.51
LV
:
:
:
1.29
1.31
LT
1.99
2.03
1.39
1.26
1.55
LU
1.50
1.60
1.76
1.62
1.59
HU
1.91
1.87
1.32
1.27
1.32
MT
1.99
2.04
1.70
1.48
1.44
NL
1.60
1.62
1.72
1.75
1.79
AT
1.65
1.46
1.36
1.38
1.39
PL
:
2.06
1.35
1.22
1.40
PT
2.25
1.56
1.55
1.44
1.32
RO
2.43
1.83
1.31
1.27
1.38
SI
:
1.46
1.26
1.20
1.53
SK
2.32
2.09
1.30
1.20
1.41
FI
1.63
1.78
1.73
1.76
1.86
SE
1.68
2.13
1.54
1.71
1.94
UK
1.90
1.83
1.64
1.71
1.96
EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_find)
Over the past 30 years, total fertility rates in the
EU-27 Member States have been converging: in
1980, the disparity between the highest (Ireland)
and the lowest (Luxembourg) was 1.7. By 1990,
this difference had decreased to 1.1 (between

 
Part I
Main Demographic Trends
27
Cyprus and Italy); in 2009 it was down to 0.8, with
Ireland and Latvia representing the two extremes.
Among the countries for which 1980 data are
available, in eight Member States (Belgium,
Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the
2009 TFR is equal to or higher than that in 1980.
On the other hand, the TFR fell by more than 40
%
between 1980 and 2009 in Romania and Portugal.
In absolute terms, the decline in the total fertility
rate was steepest in Ireland, from 3.21 to 2.07.
Groups of countries with similar trends in TFR can
be identified in Table I.2.1. A steady increase in
TFR is found in Denmark, the Netherlands and, to
a lesser extent, Finland. A small group composed
of Cyprus, Malta and Portugal displays a steadily-
declining TFR since 1980. In other Member States,
the trend is more often in the form of a U-shaped
curve, with the TFR bottoming out around 2000 or
2003, and recovering by 2009. By contrast,
Germany, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and
Portugal had lower fertility in 2009 than in 2000.
The (slight) increase in fertility between 2000 and
2009 may be partly due to a catching-up process,
following postponement of the decision to have
children. When women give birth later in life, the
total fertility rate first decreases, then recovers.
While in 2003, EU-27 TFR was 1.47 children per
woman, by 2009 it had risen to 1.6. The lowest
value in 2009 was in Latvia (1.31 children per
woman), while rates in Belgium, Denmark,
Ireland, France, Finland, Sweden and the United
Kingdom were above 1.8.
2.2.
WOMEN STILL POSTPONING BIRTHS
Over the past 30 years, the timing of births has
also changed significantly: the mean age of women
at childbirth has been postponed (
27
). The highest
ages at childbirth in 2009, as shown in Table I.2.2,
were in Ireland (31.2 years) and Italy (31.1 years),
whereas the lowest were in Bulgaria (26.6 years)
and Romania (26.9 years). The difference between
the highest and the lowest mean age at childbirth
was 4.6 years. In 2009, women in the following 13
Member States tended to have their children when
they were aged 30 or over: Denmark, Germany,
(
27
)
A more appropriate indicator to measure birth
postponement would be the mean age of women at first
childbirth; however, this indicator cannot be produced for
all Member States due to lack of data.
Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland
and Sweden.
Table I.2.2 shows that in the past 30 years, mean
age at childbirth rose by as much as six years in
Luxembourg. The difference is striking between
Member States that joined the EU after 2004 and
the others: in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia, the mean
age rose relatively little (and in some cases even
fell) between 1980 and 1990, whereas the rise was
more marked in the other Member States.
However, since 1990, a catching-up is also taking
place in Member States that joined the EU after
2004. In fact, since 1990, while mean age at
childbirth has been rising most rapidly in countries
that joined the EU after 2004, the trend appears to
be gradually slowing down in the other Member
States.
Table I.2.2:
Mean age of women at childbirth, selected
years
1980
1990
2000
2003
2009
EU-27
:
:
:
29.3
29.7
BE
26.6
27.9
28.8
29.6
29.6
BG
23.9
23.9
25.0
25.5
26.6
CZ
25.0
24.8
27.2
28.1
29.4
DK
26.8
28.5
29.7
30.1
30.5
DE
:
:
28.8
29.2
30.2
EE
:
25.6
27.0
27.7
29.1
IE
29.7
29.9
30.4
30.8
31.2
EL
26.1
27.2
29.6
29.5
30.2
ES
28.2
28.9
30.7
30.8
31.0
FR
26.8
28.3
29.4
29.6
30.0
IT
27.5
28.9
30.4
30.8
31.1
CY
:
27.1
28.7
29.3
30.4
LV
:
:
:
27.2
28.4
LT
26.7
25.9
26.6
27.1
28.6
LU
24.4
28.4
29.3
29.6
30.7
HU
24.6
25.6
27.3
27.9
29.1
MT
28.8
28.9
27.9
28.8
29.2
NL
27.7
29.3
30.3
30.4
30.7
AT
26.3
27.2
28.2
28.8
29.7
PL
:
26.2
27.4
27.9
28.6
PT
27.2
27.3
28.6
29.0
29.7
RO
25.3
25.5
25.7
26.2
26.9
SI
:
25.9
28.2
28.9
30.0
SK
25.2
25.1
26.6
27.3
28.5
FI
27.7
28.9
29.6
29.8
30.1
SE
27.6
28.6
29.9
30.3
30.7
UK
26.9
27.7
28.5
28.9
29.3
EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_find)
Table I.2.3 summarises the TFR and the mean age
of women at childbirth for the EU-27 from 2002 to

Demography Report, 2010
Graph I.2.2:
Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth, 2009
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Mean age at childbirth
Total Fertility Rate
BG
RO
FR
IE
BE
CZ
DK
DE
EE
EL
ES
CY
IT
PL
LT
SK
LV
HU
MT
AT
PT
SI
LU
NL
SE
FI
UK
EU-27
EU-27, IT, UK, 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code demo_find)
28
2008, the only years for which information is
available for all 27 Member States composing the
EU aggregate. The total fertility rate rose slowly
but consistently from 1.45 children per woman in
2002 to 1.60 in 2008. The mean age of mothers at
childbirth also rose between 2003 and 2008, by 0.4
years, to reach 29.7 years in 2008.
Table I.2.3:
Total fertility rate and mean age of women at
childbirth in EU-27, 2002-2008
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
TFR
1.45
1.47
1.50
1.51
1.54
1.56
1.60
Mean age at
childbearing
: 29.3 29.4 29.5 29.6 29.7 29.7
TFR in 2002: EU-27 is estimated without BE
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_find)
The comparison among countries paints a different
picture.
Graph I.2.2 shows that many of the countries with
the highest total fertility rate also display a high
mean age for women at childbirth. Based on the
point representing the EU-27, four different groups
of Member States can be identified. One group is
composed of Denmark, Ireland, France, the
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, where both the
TFR and the mean age at childbirth are above the
EU-27 average. In the diagonally opposite
quadrant lie most of the countries that joined the
EU after 2004, plus Austria and Portugal. In these
Member States, both the TFR and the mean age of
mothers at childbirth are below the EU-27 values.
The third group of Member States shows mothers
with a higher age at childbirth and lower TFR as
compared to the EU-27 average: this is the case in
Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus,
Luxembourg and Slovenia. The fourth and last
group is composed of Belgium, Estonia and the
United Kingdom, countries for which the TFR is
higher than the EU-27 value, but where the mean
age of mothers is lower. However, the age at
childbirth is still above 29 in these countries.
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century,
women in the EU-27 appear to be having fewer
children while they are young, and more later.
While the fertility rates of women aged under 30
have declined since the 1980s, those of women
aged 30 and over have risen, which would seem to
confirm that the long-term decline in fertility rates
within the EU-27 is associated with the
postponement of childbirth.
Graph I.2.3 compares fertility rates of mothers
aged 30 and over between 2000 and 2009. The
proportion has increased in all the EU-27
countries. In the Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, the increase was
above 15 percentage points (p.p.) in the eight years

 
Part I
Main Demographic Trends
29
considered. At the other end of the scale, the
increase was smaller, but still positive, in Spain
and in the Netherlands (both +2 p.p.).
Graph I.2.3:
Fertility of mothers aged 30 and over, 2000
and 2009 (ordered by difference 2009-2000)
(%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
ES
NL
FI
IE
IT
UK
FR
EL
DK
BE
SE
LV
PT
RO
PL
DE
LU
AT
BG
LT
MT
EE
CY
SK
HU
SI
CZ
%
2000
2009
IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France ;LV:
2002 instead of 2000
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_frate)
In 2009, 51 % of the EU-27 fertility rate in was to
mothers aged under 30 and 49
% to mothers aged
30 and over. In Ireland, Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Cyprus and Finland, ‘young’
fertility, i.e. births to mothers aged below 30,
represents less than 50
% of the total fertility rates
in 2009 (Graph I.2.4). These Member States are
also found in Table I.2.2 to have the highest mean
age of women at childbirth. Ireland displays the
highest TFR in EU-27 in 2009, mainly due to the
high fertility rate among women aged 30 and over.
Conversely, in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,
Romania and Bulgaria, fertility of women aged
under 30 represents more than 60
% of the TFR,
and these are countries with low fertility rates.
Graph I.2.4:
Fertility by age group of mothers, 2009 (%)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
EU-27
IE
ES
IT
NL
LU
SE
DK
DE
EL
CY
FI
PT
FR
SI
AT
UK
CZ
MT
BE
HU
EE
SK
PL
LT
LV
RO
BG
< 30 years old
≥ 30 years old
EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_frate)
The postponement of births makes it difficult to
estimate ‘real’ total fertility rates: postponement
depresses the TFR until the process comes to an
end.
2.3.
REVISITING FERTILITY TRENDS
The postponement of births introduces a bias in
Total Fertility Rates, since fertility rates are
computed in a given year using information across
different cohorts of women. Postponement results
in the TFR being underestimated. Because it is
possible to estimate the postponement effect, the
TFR can be adjusted. The ‘tempo’ effect is one
such method of adjustment.

Demography Report, 2010
30
Table I.2.4:
Fertility rate differences (2006-2008) and
'tempo' adjustment
TFR
2006
TFR
2008
Tempo-
adjusted
TFR
Gap Diff. TFR
(a)
(b)
(c)
(c)-(a)
(b)-(a)
EU-27
1.54
1.60
1.72
0.18
0.07
BE
1.80
1.86
1.85
0.05
0.06
BG
1.38
1.48
1.73
0.35
0.10
CZ
1.33
1.50
1.79
0.47
0.17
DK
1.85
1.89
1.97
0.13
0.04
DE
1.33
1.38
1.62
0.29
0.05
EE
1.55
1.65
1.90
0.36
0.11
IE
1.93
2.10
2.08
0.15
0.17
EL
1.40
1.51
1.52
0.12
0.11
ES
1.38
1.46
1.40
0.02
0.08
FR
1.98
1.99
2.13
0.15
0.01
IT
1.35
1.42
1.47
0.12
0.07
CY
1.45
1.46
1.96
0.51
0.01
LV
1.35
1.44
1.61
0.26
0.10
LT
1.31
1.47
1.75
0.44
0.16
LU
1.65
1.61
2.05
0.40
-0.04
HU
1.34
1.35
1.65
0.31
0.01
MT
1.39
1.44
1.59
0.20
0.05
NL
1.72
1.77
1.79
0.07
0.05
AT
1.41
1.41
1.66
0.25
0.00
PL
1.27
1.39
1.50
0.23
0.12
PT
1.36
1.37
1.56
0.20
0.01
RO
1.32
1.35
1.55
0.23
0.04
SI
1.31
1.53
1.60
0.28
0.21
SK
1.24
1.32
1.66
0.42
0.08
FI
1.84
1.85
1.93
0.09
0.01
SE
1.85
1.91
1.94
0.09
0.05
UK
1.84
1.96
2.07
0.22
0.11
Tempo adjusted refers to the mean for 2005-2007 (IT: 2004-
2006); FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
(a) and (b): Eurostat (online data code:
demo_find); (c): VID, European Demographic Data Sheet
2010
Table I.2.4 compares the unadjusted total fertility
rate TFR with its adjusted version (
28
): the figures
reported suggest that actual fertility could
represent almost 0.2 children per woman more in
the EU-27 than the unadjusted TFR.
The adjustment seems to be smaller (fewer than
0.15 children per woman) in countries such as
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, indicating that,
in these countries, the postponement process seems
to be coming to an end. By contrast, the
adjustment is most marked in the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovakia,
where it is over 0.4 children per woman. These
findings suggest that, at least in these countries, the
unadjusted TFR indicator may significantly
underestimate actual fertility.
(
28
) The adjusted TFR is calculated by the Vienna Institute of
Demography (VID), for more information please refer to
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/datasheet/index.html.
Postponement does not bias fertility estimates for
ever. Eventually, even unadjusted TFR increases,
as more births are recorded for women at higher
ages. In fact, the difference between the 2008 and
2006 TFR is generally in the same direction and is
often proportional to the difference between the
tempo-adjusted and unadjusted TFR, thus lending
support to the tempo estimate.
An estimate of just over 1.7 children per woman in
the EU-27, as suggested by the tempo adjustment,
does not, however, result in a sustainable rate. A
large inflow of immigrants would still be required
to prevent the size of the population from
shrinking in the long run. This adjusted estimate is
much higher than the current 1.6, at which the
population would shrink naturally at a much faster
rate. If, in addition, socio-economic development
plays a positive role in increasing fertility (see Box
I.7.1), observed fertility might rise to a level above
the 1.7 children tempo estimate. Nonetheless, it
seems unlikely that the increase will reach the
replacement level of 2.1, or that the ageing of the
population in Europe will be reversed.

 
3. MORTALITY
31
Over the past 50 years, life expectancy at birth has
increased by about 10 years for both men and
women in the EU-27. Further gains will be
achieved mostly from the reduction in mortality at
older ages.
While life expectancy is rising in all Members
States, there are still major differences between
and within countries. In some cases, improvements
in education and standards of living have
contributed to longer life expectancy, suggesting
that it could be extended further in future.
3.1. MORTALITY TRENDS OVER THE PAST 30
YEARS
Since 1980, the annual number of deaths in the
EU-27 has remained fairly stable at around 4.9
million. A peak was reached in 1993, with about 5
million deaths.
Graph I.3.1:
Number of deaths in EU-27, 1980-2009
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
Million
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)
The total number of deaths depends on the size of
the cohorts reaching the end of their life cycle and
on mortality rates. A simple but very powerful way
of illustrating the trend in mortality is to consider
life expectancy at birth. Economic development
and the improvement of environmental conditions
and health systems across Europe have resulted in
a continuous rise in life expectancy at birth. This
process has been going on for longer in Europe
than in most other countries of the world, making
the EU-27 a world leader for life expectancy. The
gradual reduction in mortality is the most
important factor contributing to the ageing of the
population in the EU-27, in conjunction with the
reduction in fertility.
3.2.
RECENT GAINS IN LIFE EXPECTANCY
In the 16 years between 1993 and 2009 (see Table
I.3.1), the rise in life expectancy at birth for men in
the EU-27 Member States has ranged from a
minimum of 2.5 years (in Bulgaria) to a maximum
of 7.5 years (in Estonia); for women, the rise has
ranged from 2.3 years (in Bulgaria) to 6.2 years (in
Estonia).
Table I.3.1:
Life expectancy at birth by sex, 1993 and 2009
Country
1993
2009
1993
2009
EU-27
:
76.4
:
82.4
BE
73.0
77.3
79.9
82.8
BG
67.6
70.1
75.1
77.4
CZ
69.3
74.2
76.5
80.5
DK
72.6
76.9
77.8
81.1
DE
72.8
77.8
79.4
82.8
EE
62.3
69.8
74.0
80.2
IE
72.5
77.4
78.1
82.5
EL
75.0
77.8
79.8
82.7
ES
74.1
78.7
81.4
84.9
FR
73.4
78.0
81.7
85.0
IT
74.6
79.1
81.0
84.5
CY
74.7
78.6
79.8
83.6
LV
:
68.1
:
78.0
LT
63.1
67.5
75.0
78.7
LU
72.2
78.1
79.6
83.3
HU
64.7
70.3
74.0
78.4
MT
:
77.8
:
82.7
NL
74.0
78.7
80.1
82.9
AT
72.8
77.6
79.5
83.2
PL
67.2
71.5
75.9
80.1
PT
71.0
76.5
78.1
82.6
RO
65.9
69.8
73.4
77.4
SI
69.4
75.9
77.6
82.7
SK
67.8
71.4
76.3
79.1
FI
72.1
76.6
79.5
83.5
SE
75.5
79.4
80.9
83.5
UK
73.5
77.8
78.9
81.9
Men
Women
EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)
3.2.1. Life expectancy by Member State
Differences in life expectancy at birth throughout
the EU-27 Member States of remain significant
(Table I.3.1). For men, the lowest life expectancy
in 2009 was recorded in Lithuania (67.5 years) and
the highest in Sweden (79.4 years). For women,
the range was narrower, from a low of 77.4 years
in Bulgaria and Romania, to a high of 85.0 years in
France.
In 1993, the differences between the highest and
lowest life expectancies among EU Member States

 
Demography Report, 2010
32
amounted, respectively, to 13.2 years for men
(between Sweden and Estonia) and 8.3 for women
(between France and Romania). In 2009, the
differences were 11.9 years for men and 7.7 years
for women. Thus, while life expectancy has been
rising in all countries, it has gone up slightly more
in some of the countries where it was lower. There
has been some catching up.
3.2.1. Life expectancy by gender
In all EU-27 Member States, women live longer
than men, but the difference varies substantially
between countries (see Graph I.3.2). In 2009, the
gender gap in life expectancy at birth varied from
four years in the United Kingdom and Sweden to
over 11 years in Lithuania. In the Baltic States,
women can expect to live more than 10 years
longer than men; the difference is under five years
in six Member States (Denmark, Greece, Malta,
the Netherlands, Sweden and the United
Kingdom).
During the 16-year period, the gender gap
decreased, with the exception of Romania, where
the difference between the sexes increased by 0.1
years. The reduction in the gender gap was largest
in Luxembourg (7.4 years in 1993 and 5.2 years in
2009) and the Netherlands (6.1 years in 1993 and
4.2 years in 2009).
As people live longer, interest has shifted to the
older generations; Table I.3.2 shows life
expectancy at age 65 by sex.
Graph I.3.2:
The gender gap (women – men) in life
expectancy at birth, 1993 and 2009
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
EU-27
LT
EE
LV
PL
HU
SK
RO
BG
FR
FI
SI
CZ
ES
PT
AT
BE
IT
LU
IE
DE
CY
MT
EL
NL
DK
UK
SE
Years
1993
2009
EU-27, LV, MT: not available in 1993; EU-27, IT, UK: 2008
instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)
In 2009, once a man had reached the age of 65, he
could on average expect to live at least another
13.4 years, as in Latvia and in Lithuania, and a
maximum of 18.7 years, as in France. The life
expectancy of women at age 65 was higher. In
2009, it ranged from 17.0 years in Bulgaria to 23.2
years in France.

Part I
Main Demographic Trends
33
Table I.3.2:
Life expectancy at age 65 by sex, 1993 and
2009
1993
2009
1993
2009
EU-27
:
17.2
:
20.7
BE
14.5
17.5
18.9
21.1
BG
12.9
13.8
15.5
17.0
CZ
12.6
15.2
16.0
18.8
DK
14.0
16.8
17.6
19.5
DE
14.5
17.6
18.3
20.8
EE
11.7
14.0
15.7
19.2
IE
13.4
17.2
17.0
20.6
EL
15.9
18.1
18.1
20.2
ES
15.9
18.3
19.8
22.5
FR
16.0
18.7
20.6
23.2
IT
15.6
18.2
19.5
22.0
CY
15.7
18.1
18.0
20.9
LV
:
13.4
:
18.2
LT
12.6
13.4
16.6
18.4
LU
14.2
17.6
18.7
21.4
HU
11.9
14.0
15.7
18.2
MT
:
16.8
:
20.6
NL
14.4
17.6
18.9
21.0
AT
14.7
17.7
18.4
21.2
PL
12.5
14.8
16.2
19.2
PT
14.2
17.1
17.5
20.5
RO
12.8
14.0
15.2
17.2
SI
13.2
16.4
17.1
20.5
SK
12.4
14.1
16.2
18.0
FI
14.1
17.3
18.0
21.5
SE
15.6
18.2
19.3
21.2
UK
14.2
17.7
17.9
20.3
Men
Women
EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)
Table I.3.3 shows life expectancy at birth and at
age 65 for men and women for the EU-27 from
2002 to 2008: these are the only years for which
information is available for all 27 Member States
composing the EU aggregate.
Table I.3.3:
Life expectancy in EU-27 by age and sex,
2002-2008
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Men
At birth
74.5
74.6
75.2
75.4
75.8
76.1
76.4
Age 65
15.9
15.9
16.4
16.4
16.8
17.0
17.2
Women
At birth
80.9
80.8
81.5
81.5
82.0
82.2
82.4
Age 65
19.5
19.4
20.0
20.0
20.4
20.5
20.7
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)
In the six years between 2002 and 2008, life
expectancy at birth in the EU-27 rose by 1.9 years
for men and by 1.5 years for women. The rise for
men and women who had reached the age of 65
was, respectively, 1.3 and 1.2 years. The gender
gap at birth in the EU-27 decreased from 6.4 in
2002 to 6.0 in 2008. The gender gap at age 65 fell
to 3.5 years in 2008, down from 3.6 years in 2002.
Graph I.3.3:
The gender gap (women — men) in life
expectancy at age 65, 1993 and 2009
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
EU-27
EE
LT
LV
FR
PL
HU
FI
ES
SI
SK
MT
LU
IT
BE
CZ
AT
NL
PT
IE
RO
BG
DE
SE
CY
DK
UK
EL
Years
1993
2009
EU-27, LV, MT: not available in 1993; EU-27, IT, UK: 2008
instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)
Graph I.3.3 shows the changes in the gender gap in
life expectancy at age 65 between 1993 and 2009:
due to the faster rise in life expectancy for women
at older ages, the gender gap at age 65 widened in
about half of the EU-27 Member States over the
period. The largest rise in the gap was observed in
Estonia with +1.2 years between 1993 and 2009.
In the other Member States, the gender gap
narrowed over the period; the decrease was largest
(more than half a year) in Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
In 2009 the largest gaps in gender differences were
in the Baltic States, where women are expected to
live around five years longer than men; at the other
end of the scale, the smallest gap, two years, was
in Greece.

 
Demography Report, 2010
34
3.2.2. Gains in life expectancy at older ages
Improvements in life expectancy at birth are
achieved by lowering mortality throughout the life
cycle. Therefore, when analysing changes in life
expectancy at birth over time, it is useful to
estimate the contribution of specific age groups to
changes in life expectancy. Tables I.3.4 and I.3.5
report the percentage breakdown of changes in life
expectancy, known as the ‘Arriaga
decomposition’, for men and women between
1993 and 2009 by age groups, for each of the 27
Member States and the EU-27 aggregate.
Gains in life expectancy by age group (Arriaga
decomposition)
In Tables I.3.4 and I.3.5, , the last column is the absolute
difference between life expectancy at birth in 2009 and life
expectancy at birth in 1993 (according to available data).
The columns to its left represent the percentage
contribution from mortality decreases in the corresponding
age group to the total increase in life expectancy: positive
values indicate that mortality has decreased in that age
group, thus contributing to longer life expectancy.
For example, taking the row for EU-27, life expectancy for
men at birth increased in total by 1.9 years: 4.8 % of this
increase is due to lower infant mortality (deaths before the
first birthday), 2.0 % is due to lower mortality at ages 1-9,
and similarly for older age groups. Since the decomposition
is based on 2 years of data, results should be interpreted
with caution in countries recording a small number of
deaths.
In most countries, the decline in mortality was
particularly marked for men in their sixties and
seventies and for women aged over 60 years old.
In more detail, for men, more than 50
% of the rise
in life expectancy at birth is found to occur
between the ages of 60 and 79 in Denmark
(51.1
%), Ireland (63.0 %), Cyprus (56.0 %), the
Netherlands (53.0
%), Finland (51.2 %), Sweden
(51.6
%) and the United Kingdom (61.5 %).
For women, the age groups 60-79 explain more
than 50
% of the rise in life expectancy in the
Czech Republic (50.5
%), Ireland (53.6 %), Greece
(60.0
%), Cyprus (54.8 %), Malta (61.3 %),
Table I.3.4:
Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, men 1993 and 2009
Increase (in
years) in life
expectancy
0
1 - 9
10 - 19
20 - 29
30 - 39
40 - 49
50 - 59
60 - 69
70 - 79
80+
Total
at birth
EU-27
4.8
2.0
2.7
4.9
5.1
11.7
6.7
18.9
25.5
17.7
100%
1.9
BE
8.8
1.7
2.7
5.3
4.4
7.8
6.6
20.4
28.0
14.3
100%
4.1
BG
18.3
7.9
3.8
7.1
13.9
17.3
8.6
3.0
12.5
7.6
100%
2.5
CZ
10.0
2.6
2.6
4.2
5.6
11.2
16.8
20.4
20.2
6.3
100%
4.9
DK
5.2
2.2
2.7
2.8
8.0
9.0
10.0
25.9
25.2
9.0
100%
4.3
DE
4.1
1.6
2.9
4.9
7.0
8.9
11.6
23.0
23.0
13.1
100%
5.0
EE
11.4
4.0
5.9
9.3
12.3
18.3
15.3
13.8
6.1
3.5
100%
7.5
IE
4.5
1.7
1.1
0.5
-1.6
2.9
14.9
30.4
32.6
13.0
100%
4.8
EL
14.8
1.5
1.5
1.3
2.4
3.9
4.5
25.9
23.8
20.4
100%
2.9
ES
6.4
2.2
3.0
11.0
12.8
7.8
8.7
16.3
19.5
12.4
100%
4.6
FR
6.1
2.0
3.2
8.1
10.5
9.4
8.7
19.6
18.8
13.6
100%
4.5
IT
6.5
2.4
2.9
5.6
7.1
5.9
12.9
24.7
22.3
9.7
100%
4.6
CY
8.6
4.6
7.1
-0.5
0.9
7.8
11.1
25.7
30.3
4.2
100%
3.9
LV
6.5
5.1
1.8
12.3
16.2
21.0
18.3
10.1
4.7
4.0
100%
3.5
LT
16.7
5.0
3.3
11.5
13.8
23.5
14.9
3.8
6.5
0.9
100%
4.4
LU
6.9
2.5
4.2
9.9
7.6
7.3
9.3
21.4
24.4
6.4
100%
5.9
HU
10.3
2.3
1.7
5.8
17.5
21.3
13.9
13.5
9.2
4.5
100%
5.6
MT
22.9
4.0
5.8
1.3
1.5
8.1
12.8
21.2
15.2
7.2
100%
3.1
NL
5.0
1.6
2.6
2.8
4.1
6.1
11.7
25.3
27.6
13.0
100%
4.7
AT
5.4
1.5
3.8
6.4
6.0
8.6
11.8
21.6
22.6
12.2
100%
4.8
PL
19.0
2.7
2.0
3.8
7.1
11.1
13.7
18.1
15.6
7.0
100%
4.4
PT
8.2
4.9
5.8
11.2
8.7
4.1
9.3
18.9
18.8
10.1
100%
5.5
RO
25.6
10.9
2.6
5.7
12.2
12.4
8.4
7.4
8.8
5.9
100%
3.9
SI
6.8
0.9
2.9
7.1
8.8
10.9
17.3
21.9
15.7
7.8
100%
6.5
SK
10.7
1.3
2.4
4.1
8.0
16.3
18.5
19.9
14.0
4.8
100%
3.6
FI
4.0
2.4
1.2
3.0
4.7
8.4
12.0
22.5
28.7
13.1
100%
4.5
SE
5.6
0.9
1.4
0.9
4.9
7.6
12.3
23.3
28.3
14.7
100%
3.9
UK
3.2
1.4
2.0
2.2
0.3
2.3
12.2
29.5
32.0
14.9
100%
4.3
Age
EU-27: 2002-2008; IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; LV: 2002 instead of 1993; MT: 1995 instead of 1993. FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlifetable)

 
Part I
Main Demographic Trends
35
Slovakia (51.8 %), Finland (50.7 %) and the United
Kingdom (57.7
%). The ages 80 and above
contribute more than 25% to the rise in life
expectancy at birth for women in Belgium, Ireland,
Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden.
On the other the other hand, in some of the other
countries, lower infant mortality (defined as deaths
of children under one year of age) had a greater
impact on life expectancy at birth between the two
years analysed; above 20
% for men in Malta
(22.9
%) and Romania (25.6 %), and for women in
Romania (21.6
%). A few countries showed
smaller but still substantial (>10
%) gains from
lower infant mortality for men or for women:
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece,
Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
In several Member States, particularly for men, the
gains in life expectancy at birth from lower infant
mortality are much more significant in percentage
terms than the gains due to the older ages (80 and
above). This is the case in Bulgaria, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland and Romania and, to a lesser extent,
in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Hungary and Slovakia.
3.2.3. Falling infant mortality
Infant mortality rates (
29
) halved in the EU-27,
from 8.7 to 4.3 ‰ between 1993 and 2009 (see
Graph I.3.4). The fall in the Central and Eastern
Member States is greater than in other Member
States. Despite this progress, in some Member
States, the 2009 infant mortality rate was still
relatively high: Romania (10.1 ‰) and Bulgaria
(9.0 ‰). The lowest infant mortality rate within
the EU-27 in 2009 was in Slovenia (2.4 ‰).
(
29
) The rate is defined as the number of deaths of children
under one year of age per 1000 live births in a given year.
Table I.3.5:
Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, women 1993 and 2009
Increase (in
years) in life
expectancy
0
1 - 9
10 - 19
20 - 29
30 - 39
40 - 49
50 - 59
60 - 69
70 - 79
80+
Total
at birth
EU-27
5.6
1.8
1.6
2.2
3.1
6.7
4.9
12.4
27.9
33.9
100%
1.5
BE
9.4
1.8
1.7
3.3
2.3
5.4
3.2
13.5
28.8
30.7
100%
2.7
BG
15.2
7.0
2.8
4.4
3.5
1.3
4.4
19.0
25.6
16.8
100%
2.3
CZ
9.2
1.9
1.5
2.2
3.2
5.9
9.2
20.5
30.0
16.5
100%
4.0
DK
4.7
1.8
1.5
1.4
4.4
9.2
14.8
25.6
20.8
15.8
100%
3.3
DE
4.9
1.9
1.8
2.2
4.6
7.2
7.2
17.7
30.9
21.7
100%
3.4
EE
12.4
3.9
3.5
1.8
4.2
9.3
11.6
17.9
20.5
14.9
100%
6.2
IE
5.1
0.9
0.1
-0.2
0.7
2.7
9.1
22.4
31.1
28.0
100%
4.4
EL
13.3
1.3
1.9
0.8
1.0
3.8
5.2
23.9
36.1
12.9
100%
2.9
ES
6.8
2.7
1.6
3.9
4.6
2.7
5.0
14.5
27.3
30.8
100%
3.6
FR
5.5
2.0
2.6
4.6
4.5
3.8
4.0
11.7
22.4
38.9
100%
3.2
IT
7.6
3.3
1.5
3.1
4.3
4.2
7.1
15.1
27.3
26.5
100%
3.5
CY
11.9
0.7
1.8
4.1
0.6
1.7
4.7
18.5
36.3
19.8
100%
3.8
LV
6.2
7.8
5.1
0.9
5.5
6.9
15.2
12.8
18.6
21.0
100%
2.0
LT
18.4
5.9
2.1
3.7
4.1
9.6
11.3
13.3
20.6
11.0
100%
3.7
LU
4.0
2.0
4.7
4.9
5.0
8.0
6.7
10.8
26.4
27.5
100%
3.7
HU
10.7
2.2
1.3
3.1
10.5
11.5
8.1
16.6
20.0
16.0
100%
4.4
MT
3.0
-1.8
0.4
-3.9
-1.1
4.4
7.8
17.8
43.4
29.9
100%
3.2
NL
5.3
2.5
1.3
2.6
4.6
4.9
5.3
15.4
26.9
31.2
100%
2.8
AT
4.7
1.6
2.0
2.3
3.6
7.8
8.2
14.1
28.3
27.2
100%
3.7
PL
16.9
2.1
0.8
1.4
3.4
6.4
5.2
16.2
28.1
19.7
100%
4.3
PT
8.1
4.2
2.6
3.5
3.4
4.8
8.8
15.2
28.0
21.3
100%
4.4
RO
21.6
8.3
1.2
2.7
6.7
6.4
7.6
13.9
19.9
11.8
100%
4.0
SI
4.8
1.5
1.3
3.1
4.8
7.1
9.5
19.1
26.3
22.5
100%
5.0
SK
11.3
2.5
1.1
2.5
4.7
5.1
10.9
23.6
28.2
10.2
100%
2.8
FI
2.4
1.2
0.2
0.8
2.8
3.3
4.0
14.8
36.0
34.6
100%
3.9
SE
5.4
1.5
1.5
2.5
4.3
6.1
8.0
14.7
26.1
29.9
100%
2.6
UK
3.8
1.2
1.5
1.1
0.8
3.3
9.6
26.0
31.8
20.8
100%
3.0
Age
EU-27: 2002-2008; IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; LV: 2002 instead of 1993; MT: 1995 instead of 1993. FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlifetable)

 
Demography Report, 2010
36
Graph I.3.4:
Infant mortality rate, 1993 and 2009 (ranked
by size of reduction)
0
5
10
15
20
25
EU-27
RO
EE
LT
PL
LV
HU
BG
CZ
EL
CY
PT
SK
BE
SI
LU
ES
IT
IE
MT
FR
AT
NL
DK
SE
DE
UK
FI
1993
2009
The rate is defined as the number of deaths of children
under one year of age per 1000 live births.
FR: Metropolitan France
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_minfind)
3.2.4. Healthy life expectancy
The average number of healthy life years that a
newborn can expect to live is about 62 for a
woman and 61 for a man. The difference between
the sexes is smaller than for life expectancy; this
indicates that although women tend to live longer,
they also live longer with activity limitations.
There are large disparities among Member States
and there have been large variations in some
Member States between 2007 and 2009.
Table I.3.6:
Healthy life years at birth, by gender, 2007
and 2009
2007
2009
2007
2009
EU-27
62.3
62.0
61.5
60.9
BE
63.7
63.5
63.3
63.7
BG
73.8
65.6
67.0
61.9
CZ
63.2
62.5
61.3
60.9
DK
67.4
60.4
67.4
61.8
DE
58.3
57.7
58.8
56.7
EE
54.6
59.0
49.5
54.8
IE
65.3
65.2
62.7
63.7
EL
67.1
60.9
65.9
60.2
ES
62.9
61.9
63.2
62.6
FR
64.2
63.2
63.0
62.5
IT
61.9
61.2
62.8
62.4
CY
62.7
65.8
63.0
65.1
LV
53.7
55.8
50.9
52.6
LT
57.7
60.9
53.4
57.0
LU
64.6
65.7
62.2
65.1
HU
57.6
58.0
55.0
55.7
MT
70.6
70.6
68.9
69.1
NL
63.7
59.8
65.7
61.4
AT
61.1
60.6
58.4
59.2
PL
61.3
62.1
57.4
58.1
PT
57.3
55.9
58.3
58.0
RO
62.3
61.4
60.4
59.5
SI
62.3
61.5
58.6
60.6
SK
55.9
52.3
55.4
52.1
FI
58.0
58.4
56.7
58.1
SE
66.6
69.5
67.5
70.5
UK
66.1
66.3
64.9
65.0
women
men
EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009.
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: tsdph100)
3.2.5. Life expectancy among highly
educated men and women
Another important factor contributing to the
disparity in life expectancy is ‘socio-economic
status’. The inverse relationship between status
and mortality is well known, based on a number of
studies (
30
): the higher the status, the lower the
mortality rates and, consequently, the higher life
expectancy. There are significant inequalities in
the EU-27 Member States regarding socio-
economic status, with negative consequences for
health, social cohesion and economic
development. In all countries, mortality, health and
the age at which people die are strongly influenced
by socio-economic factors such as education,
employment and income.
(
30
)
For an overview, see for example Mackenbach J.P.,
Meerding W.J., Kunst A., 2007, Economic implications of
socio-economic inequalities in health in the European
Union, study supported by the European Commission, DG
SANCO, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/socio_economic
s/documents/socioeco_inequalities_en.pdf.

Part I
Main Demographic Trends
37
Box I.3.1:
Living longer healthy lives
In comparison with earlier generations, people
today spend longer in education, start working
later, start having children later and spend fewer
years of their life in family building; they die at a
later age; life expectancy has increased by about 2
years per decade
(1)
. People's lives are being
stretched out over an ever longer period.
The same analysis could be applied to frailty: the
period in a person's life when s/he starts to develop
a disabling condition that makes them dependent
and vulnerable, leading eventually to death. Life
expectancy has increased not because frailty lasts
longer, but rather because it starts at a later age; as
a result, healthy life expectancy has been increasing
at about the same rate as life expectancy (
2
).
Health problems that used to be characteristic at the
age of 70 are now characteristic of the age of 80,
and conditions that prevailed at age 80 now prevail
at age 90. The number of years spent in self-
perceived good health has been increasing in most
of the countries studied.
The findings about frailty need to be examined
further. Poor health is more difficult to measure
than death and is often reported unreliably.
The evidence about the severity of disabilities in
old age is mixed, especially for individuals over the
age 85: whereas some severe disabilities appear to
be declining, some less severe forms of disability
and certain illnesses seem to be increasing,
although this may be due to earlier diagnosis and
greater life expectancy..
Some detailed data are available from the Danish
Health Interview Survey (Table 1).
(3)
They show
not only that healthy life expectancy has been
increasing, but also that the proportion of the
remaining life expectancy in good health increased
between 1994 and 2005; healthy life expectancy
has thus been growing faster than overall life
expectancy.
(
1
) J. Oeppen and J. W. Vaupel, ‘Broken limits to life
expectancy,
Science
, 10 May 2002;.
(
2
) J.W. Vaupel, H. Lundström, ‘The future of mortality
at older ages in developed countries, in ‘W. Lutz
(ed.), The Future Population of the World. What can
we Assume Today?, 1994; and
J.W. Vaupel,
‘Biodemography of human ageing’, Nature 464, 25
March 2010, 536-542.
(
3
) see
http://www.si-
folkesundhed.dk/Forskning/Befolkningens%20sundh
edstilstand/Sundhed%20og%20sygelighed%20SUSY
.aspx?lang=en
Table 1:
Life expectancy at age 65, with and
without long-term, limiting illnesses,
Denmark; by sex and year
total
with long-
standing,
limiting
illnesses
years
years
years
%
Men
1994
14.1
6.2
7.9
56.2
2000
15.0
6.1
8.9
59.1
2005
16.0
5.4
10.5
66.0
Women
1994
17.6
9.4
8.2
46.6
2000
18.1
8.6
9.5
52.3
2005
19.0
7.9
11.1
58.4
Expected lifetime
without long-standing,
limiting illnesses
Source:
Danish Health Interview Survey
The connection between national wealth and health
are not well understood. Frailty is being delayed
due to advances in public health (treatment and
prevention) and living conditions. In principle,
prosperity makes better treatment possible; more
productive and prosperous populations also expect
to be healthier. However, two countries at the same
level of per capita income may have different
healthy life expectancies, and some countries with
modest standards of living perform as well as
wealthier ones; as examples in the EU, Spain and
Italy, as well as France and Sweden, have the
highest life expectancy.
Overall, most people in wealthier countries, and
increasingly in developing countries, can look
forward to relatively long, and mostly healthy,
lives. This prospect enables people to make fuller
use of their lives, for example by re-allocating their
time during their lives and planning their education,
employment and retirement over the life span.
Greater life expectancy does not necessarily entail
the collapse of the social system under the growing
mass of frail elderly people. Many older people are
in good health and can play an active part in the
labour force according to their condition and
abilities, contributing to the economy and allowing
younger people to extend their education.
In J.W. Vaupel's words: 'While the 20th century
was the century of redistribution of wealth, the 21st
century may be the century of the redistribution of
work to older age groups'.
.

Demography Report, 2010
38
Overall levels of mortality have been declining
across socio-economic groups. But differences in
life expectancy between higher and lower socio-
economic status groups have on the whole
remained unchanged. In some cases, the gap has
even widened.
For the first time, Eurostat has published estimates,
based on provisional data, of life expectancy in
2007-2008 by sex, age and educational attainment
level for a selected number of EU-27 Member
States (
31
). These results confirm the inverse
relationship between educational attainment as a
proxy for ‘socio-economic status’ and
mortality (
32
).
As reported in Table I.3.7, in most of the countries
examined, for both men and women, life
expectancy increases with educational attainment.
The more education people have, the longer they
are expected to live. Life expectancy for women at
a given educational attainment level is always
higher than that for men at the same level.
However, differences between the sexes decline as
educational attainment increases. Based on the
data in Table I.3.7, life expectancy ‘gaps’ or
mortality differentials between educational
attainment groups can be assessed. They are
generally larger among men than among women;
in many cases they are twice as large. Also, as can
be observed in Graph I.3.5, these gaps are larger
among young men.
Gaps in life expectancy between men with medium
and low educational attainment at any age in Table
I.3.7 are also much bigger than between men with
high and medium levels. For women at any age,
life expectancy gaps between those with high and
medium educational attainment and between those
with medium and low levels are less pronounced.
While life expectancy for women is consistently
higher than for men, the differences are smaller
(
31
) For details see
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_
details/publication?p_product_code=KS-SF-10-024
.
(
32
) Low educational attainment corresponds to pre-primary,
primary and lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0, 1,
2); medium corresponds to upper secondary and post
secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED levels 3 and 4);
high corresponds to tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and
6). The selection of countries is dependent on data
availability: to calculate the required indicator, detailed
data are needed broken down by sex, age and educational
attainment for both mortality and population stocks.
Although all countries can provide mortality data by sex
and age, only a few can provide data also by socio-
economic characteristics such as educational attainment.
between educational attainment groups for women
than for men.
Graph I.3.5:
Life expectancy gaps between high and low
educational attainment at selected ages, by
sex, 2008
Age 30, 2008
BG
CZ
DK
EE
IT
HU
MT
PL
RO
SI
FI
SE
Years
15105
5 1015
Men
Women
Age 60, 2008
BG
CZ
DK
EE
IT
HU
MT
PL
RO
SI
FI
SE
Years
15105
5 1015
Men
Women
IT: 2007 instead of 2008
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpecedu)
Large differences in life expectancy by educational
attainment level are evident among the Member
States examined, and particularly so for men in the
available Member States that joined the EU after
2004 — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania. Among the other
countries examined, differences are less
pronounced.
The published data highlight another important
‘mortality advantage’ that women have over men:
the life expectancy of men with higher education is
lower than the life expectancy of women with the
lowest level of educational attainment. In other
words, on average, all women live longer than
well-educated men. As can be observed in Table
I.3.7, this was true in 2008 at all ages for Italy,
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and
Sweden. For the other countries under study, this
was true in about 50
% of cases, mostly at ages 50,
60 and 70.

Part I
Main Demographic Trends
39
Consequently, by improving the life expectancy of
disadvantaged groups, a general increase in overall
life expectancy is also to be expected (
33
).
(
33
) The European Commission has raised the issue of health
inequalities in the Member States as well as the question of
disparities in life expectancy, especially for disadvantaged
people. A proposal to address the problem was outlined in
the October 2009 European Commission Communication
COM/2009/0567 ‘Solidarity in health: reducing health
inequalities in the EU’, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/health/social_determinants/policy/commissi
on_communication/index_en.htm
.
The EU is thus working directly, through EU policies, and
indirectly, through national authorities and stakeholders, to
reduce health inequalities.
Table I.3.7:
Life expectancy by sex and educational attainment at selected ages, 2008
Educational
attainment
Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 Age 70 Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 Age 70
Total
41.6
32.3
23.8
16.6
10.7
48.3
38.7
29.4
20.8
12.9
Low
33.9
25.9
19.6
14.7
10.3
44.1
35.4
27.4
19.7
12.5
Medium
44.5
34.9
25.9
18.0
11.1
49.7
40.0
30.5
21.6
13.3
High
47.4
37.6
28.0
19.2
11.6
51.4
41.5
31.8
22.6
13.8
Total
45.0
35.5
26.5
18.7
12.1
51.0
41.3
31.8
23.0
14.9
Low
38.0
29.5
21.8
15.5
10.9
51.4
42.0
32.7
23.7
15.2
Medium
44.8
35.3
26.3
18.6
12.2
50.3
40.5
31.1
22.4
14.6
High
51.4
41.5
31.8
22.4
13.5
54.5
44.5
34.7
25.1
15.8
Total
47.5
38.0
28.8
20.4
13.1
51.5
41.8
32.4
23.6
15.6
Low
44.0
35.3
26.8
19.3
12.6
49.0
39.8
30.9
22.7
15.3
Medium
47.8
38.1
28.9
20.5
13.2
52.2
42.5
33.0
24.1
15.8
High
50.4
40.6
31.0
22.0
13.9
53.6
43.8
34.1
24.9
16.3
Total
40.5
31.5
23.2
16.4
11.0
50.4
40.8
31.5
22.9
15.0
Low
30.7
23.3
17.0
13.0
9.3
45.0
35.8
28.3
21.4
14.5
Medium
41.2
32.1
24.0
17.2
11.4
49.5
39.9
30.8
22.7
15.0
High
47.7
38.1
28.7
20.0
12.4
54.0
44.1
34.3
24.7
15.7
Total
49.7
40.1
30.8
22.0
14.2
54.8
45.0
35.4
26.2
17.6
Low
48.0
38.6
29.7
21.4
14.1
54.0
44.3
34.9
26.0
17.5
Medium
52.9
43.1
33.4
24.1
15.2
56.6
46.8
37.0
27.5
18.2
High
53.1
43.2
33.5
24.1
15.1
56.7
46.8
37.0
27.4
18.1
Total
41.1
31.7
23.4
16.8
11.2
49.0
39.3
30.3
22.0
14.4
Low
34.0
25.2
18.4
13.7
10.8
46.3
37.0
28.7
21.2
14.3
Medium
43.7
34.2
25.8
19.2
12.0
50.6
40.9
31.7
23.2
14.9
High
47.1
37.3
28.0
19.6
12.3
51.1
41.2
31.7
22.7
14.4
Total
48.5
39.0
29.7
20.9
13.4
53.1
43.3
33.6
24.4
16.0
Low
48.0
38.7
29.5
20.8
13.3
53.0
43.2
33.5
24.3
15.9
Medium
49.4
39.5
29.9
21.8
13.8
53.5
43.5
33.6
25.1
16.3
High
51.0
41.2
31.6
21.9
13.8
54.6
44.6
35.2
25.3
16.3
Total
42.6
33.4
25.1
17.9
11.9
50.8
41.1
31.8
23.2
15.2
Low
36.5
28.6
22.3
16.7
11.4
48.6
39.3
31.0
22.8
15.1
Medium
43.1
33.9
25.3
18.0
12.0
51.0
41.3
31.9
23.3
15.4
High
48.7
38.9
29.5
20.8
13.0
53.2
43.3
33.7
24.4
15.8
Total
41.6
32.4
24.0
17.1
11.2
48.6
38.9
29.7
21.1
13.4
Low
35.3
26.9
20.6
15.9
10.8
46.4
37.1
28.7
20.8
13.3
Medium
44.5
35.1
26.5
19.0
12.0
50.7
40.9
31.5
22.5
14.0
High
43.4
33.7
24.8
17.1
11.0
48.7
39.0
29.7
21.0
13.4
Total
46.5
37.0
28.0
20.1
12.9
53.1
43.3
33.8
24.8
16.4
Low
42.7
33.6
25.3
18.2
12.3
51.8
42.3
33.0
24.4
16.2
Medium
47.0
37.4
28.4
20.4
13.1
53.6
43.8
34.2
25.2
16.6
High
50.0
40.2
30.7
21.9
13.7
54.3
44.5
34.8
25.6
16.7
Total
47.6
38.2
29.2
21.2
14.0
53.9
44.1
34.6
25.7
17.2
Low
44.8
36.2
27.9
20.5
13.8
51.8
42.5
33.7
25.3
17.1
Medium
47.5
38.0
29.2
21.2
14.0
54.0
44.3
34.8
25.8
17.3
High
50.8
41.1
31.5
22.7
14.5
55.2
45.3
35.6
26.3
17.4
Total
50.0
40.4
30.9
22.1
14.3
53.8
44.0
34.4
25.3
16.9
Low
48.1
38.9
29.9
21.5
14.1
52.2
42.6
33.4
24.7
16.7
Medium
50.1
40.4
31.0
22.2
14.3
53.8
44.0
34.4
25.3
16.9
High
51.9
42.1
32.4
23.1
14.6
55.0
45.1
35.5
26.1
17.2
FI
SE
MT
PL
RO
SI
DK
EE
IT
HU
Men
Women
BG
CZ
(1)IT: 2007 instead of 2008
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpecedu)

 
4. MIGRATION: TRENDS
40
Migration is the main driver of population growth
in the most of the EU-27 Member States.
Migratory movements are making the EU’s
population more diverse and creating new
challenges and opportunities for European
societies.
4.1. MIGRATION FLOWS
The first decade of the 21st century has seen large
waves of migration both within the EU and from
outside it. The highest inflow in that decade
appears to have peaked in 2007.
4.1.1. Migration as one of the key drivers of
population growth in EU Member States
Migration plays a significant role in the population
dynamics of European societies. In recent years,
the increase in the population of the EU-27
Member States has mainly been due to high net
migration rates
(
34
). The share of international
migration in total population growth in the EU has
varied.
From 2004 to 2008, the population of EU Member
States increased, on average, by 1.7 million per
year, solely because inflows outweighed outflows.
Although immigration to the EU-27 Member
States fell in 2008 and emigration increased, net
migration still contributed 71
% of the total
population increase.
In many EU-27 Member States, immigration is not
only increasing the total population, but also
bringing in a much younger population. The age
structure of the EU-27 Member States' total
population at 1 January 2009 and of immigrants to
EU Member States in 2008 is illustrated by the age
pyramid in Graph I.4.1.
(
34
) The expression ‘total net migration’ of the EU Member
States is to be distinguished from the expression ‘total net
migration to/from the EU as a whole’: the former also
includes international migration between the EU Member
States.
Graph I.4.1:
Age structure of the population on 1 January
2009 and of immigrants in 2008, EU-27
2%
1%
0%
1%
2%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85+
Men
Women
Solid colour: population
Bordered: immigrants
EU-27 immigration data excluding BE, EL, CY, RO and UK
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop2ctz,
migr_imm2ctz)
In 2008, 3.8 million people migrated to and
between the EU-27 Member States and at least 2.3
million emigrated from them, resulting in a net
gain of 1.5 million residents(
35
). In comparison to
2007(
36
), immigration decreased by 6 % (Graph
I.4.2) and emigration by 13
%.
Graph I.4.2:
Immigration, EU-27, 2004-2008
0
1
2
3
4
5
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Millions
Includes also migration between EU-27 Member States.
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz)
(
35
) Includes also migration between EU-27 Member States.
(
36
) 2007 migration data are not fully comparable with 2008,
since several EU-27 Member States changed methodology
and definitions to improve and harmonise the data. For
further details see the Eurostat Metadata page. Detailed
analysis of comparable data shows that these
methodological changes had a limited impact.

 
Part I
Main Demographic Trends
41
4.1.2. EU citizens are becoming more mobile
Immigrants to EU Member States are of a wide
variety of origins, especially since the
enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Larger numbers of
EU-27 citizens have been included in migration
flows. The number of EU-27 citizens migrating to
a Member State other than their own country of
citizenship increased on average by 12
% per year
during the period 2002-2008, and peaked in 2007
(see Graph I.4.3). In 2008, 36
% of migrants to
EU-27 Member States were citizens of another
Member State, 2 points lower than was observed in
2007 (38
%).
Graph I.4.3:
Relative change in migration inflows to EU
Member States by citizenship groups, EU-27,
2002-2008
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
%
All immigrants
Nationals
Other EU-27 citizens
Non-EU citizens
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and
Eurostat estimates
The percentage of immigrants with non-EU
citizenship has been growing at a somewhat slower
pace. In 2008, non-EU citizens accounted for 49
%
of all immigrants to EU-27 Member States (see
Graph I.4.4). When nationals moving to their
country of citizenship are excluded, 57
% of
immigrants are found to be citizens of countries
outside the EU.
Graph I.4.4:
Immigrants by citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008
Citizens of
non-EU
countries
48.8%
Nationals
14.6%
Unknow n
0.4%
Citizens of
other EU MS
36.3%
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and
Eurostat estimates
Slightly above 10 % of immigrants were returning
to their own country of birth (see Graph I.4.5). The
majority of immigrants were, however, born
outside the EU and were moving to it (52
%),
thereby exceeding the number of non-EU citizens
by almost 4
%.
Graph I.4.5:
Immigrants by groups of country of birth, EU-
27, 2008
Born outside
EU
52.3%
Unknow n
0.5%
Nativ e-born
11.6%
Born in EU
countries other
than home
country
35.6%
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm3ctb) and
Eurostat estimates
4.1.3. Origins of immigrants
It is estimated that more than half (55 %) of
immigrants to the EU in 2008 were previously
residing outside the EU, while 44
% of immigrants
had previously also been residing in an EU-27
Member State (other than the country of
immigration). Immigrants to the EU can be further
differentiated according to the level of
development of the country of previous residence.
The Human Development Index (HDI) was used to
reflect this structure (
37
).
According to this indicator, half of all immigrants
to the EU previously resided in medium developed
countries, slightly fewer in highly developed
countries (44
%) and only 6 % arrived from less
developed countries (Graph I.4.6).
This distribution is almost in line with the
distribution of the total population in those
countries, according to the level of development of
the countries in question. On the basis of the latest
(
37
) This index is calculated by the United Nations (UN) under
the UN Development Programme. It is a composite index
incorporating statistical measures of life expectancy,
literacy, educational attainment and GDP per capita. The
Eurostat list of countries by the level of development,
based on UN’s 2006 classification, was used in order to
reflect this structure. In this index countries are classified
as highly, medium and less developed. Since the countries
are evolving, each year they are classified, based on the
new values for the statistical indicators included in the
index
(for
details
see
the
UN
site
at:
http://hdr.undp.org/
).

Demography Report, 2010
42
available United Nations, Eurostat and national
data for the total population in these countries, it is
estimated that the share of the population living in
countries categorised as medium developed is
68
%, whereas the share of the total population in
highly developed countries is 22
%, with 10% for
less developed countries.
The noticeable difference is that immigrants from
highly developed countries were over-represented
by 22
% among immigrants to the EU-27 Member
States, compared to the share of the total
population living in countries classified as highly
developed.
Graph I.4.6:
Immigrants to EU-27 (from outside EU) by the
level of development of the country of
previous residence, EU-27, 2008
Highly
dev eloped
43.7%
Medium
dev eloped
49.9%
Less
dev eloped
6.3%
No detailed data for BE, HU and UK.
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm5prv) and
Eurostat estimates
In 2008, the EU-27 Member States received nearly
two millions migrants of other EU nationalities.
Romanians were the most mobile, followed by
Poles and Germans (note that these migrants were
not necessarily previously residing in their country
of citizenship). If returning nationals (see category
‘EU citizens (excluding nationals)’ in Table I.4.1)
are excluded from the analysis, Romanians still
ranked first, followed by Poles and Bulgarians.
The EU-27 Member States received 384,
000
Romanian citizens, 266,
000 Polish citizens,
Poland and 91,
000 Bulgarian citizens.
The remaining 1.8 million immigrants to EU-27
Member States were non-EU citizens. Among
them, Moroccans were the biggest group, the only
one exceeding 100
000, followed by citizens of
China, India, Albania and the Ukraine.
Most Moroccans migrating in 2008 went to Spain
(almost 94
000) or to Italy (37 000). In the same
year, Spain also received the largest share of all
Chinese immigrants (28
% or 27 000 in absolute
terms). The United Kingdom was the main
destination for citizens of India.
Table I.4.1:
Top ten citizenships of immigrants to EU-27
Member States, 2008
country of
citizenship
in
thousands
country of
citizenship
in
thousands
country of
citizenship
in
thousands
Romania
:
1)
Romania
384 Morocco
157
Poland 302Poland 266China 97
Germany 196Bulgaria 91India 93
United Kingdom
146 Germany
88
Albania
81
France
126 Italy
67 Ukraine
80
Italy
105 France
62 Brazil
62
Bulgaria
92 United Kingdom
61 United States
61
Netherlands 81Hungary 44Turkey 51
Spain
61 Netherlands
40 Russian Federation
50
Belgium
48 Portugal
38 Colombia
49
EU citizens
(including nationals)
EU citizens
(excluding nationals)
Non-EU citizens
(1) At least 384 000.
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and
Eurostat estimates
Graph I.4.7 suggests that the biggest group of non-
EU nationals migrating to one of the EU-27
Member States in 2008 was formed by citizens of
countries in Asia (29
%), followed by North,
Central and South America (24
%).
Graph I.4.7:
Non-EU immigrants by continent of country of
citizenship, EU-27, 2008
Asia
29.0%
Africa
21.9%
non-EU
Europe
23.0%
America
24.4%
Oceania
1.7%
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and
Eurostat estimates

Part I
Main Demographic Trends
43
Box I.4.1:
Where immigrants come from
Eurostat data on residence permits that were valid
at the end of 2009 can be broken down to show the
geographical origins of non-EU nationals
(1)
by
continent (Table 1).
The total of 16.7 million residence permit holders –
excluding Denmark, Luxembourg and the United
Kingdom – is spread unevenly among the
continents of origin. The numbers are roughly
proportional to the population of the continents of
origin, although Europe is over-represented
whereas Asia and North America are under-
represented.
Each of the five largest EU-27 Member States
attracts the majority of the people from a particular
continent: most Africans hold permits in France
(1.6 million), most Asians in Italy (1.1 million),
most Europeans in Germany (2.6 million), and
most South Americans in Spain (1.5 million).
(
1
) EU nationals still needing residence permits under
transitional measures are not included in the table
below; for the transitional measures see
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=
466
More permits were issued in 2009 in the United
Kingdom to immigrants from North America
and/or Oceania, than the total number of valid
permits at the end of 2009 in any other country.
The largest number of authorisations to reside in an
EU-27 Member State in 2009 was issued to the
citizens of India (190,000), followed by United
States (176,000), China (170,000) and Morocco
(156,000). These four countries accounted for
nearly 30% of all permits issued in EU-27 in 2009.
The largest proportion of Indians and Chinese
entered the EU for the purpose of education or
employment. Respectively 72,000 Chinese and
61,000 Indians were issued with education related
permits, whereas 51,000 Chinese and 63,000
Indians entered the EU for employment reasons. By
contrast, Moroccans were granted the highest
number of permits issued for family reasons in EU
(62,000), and only less than 5 per cent (7,000) were
granted permission to reside for education reasons.
The country ranking based on new permits is
similar to the one from other official sources (see
Table I.4.1), although there are some differences.
Table 1:
Valid residence permits at 31 December 2009, by issuing country and continent of origin, (in units)
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America South America
Oceania
other
total
EU-27
4,436,036
2,962,637
6,575,292
277,785
2,258,451
61,161
108,807 16,680,169
BE
160,021
70,910
86,322
21,081
16,340
2,127
8,138
364,939
BG
246
2,095
9,192
689
105
93
24
12,444
CZ
4,263
95,429
196,084
6,231
1,885
1,219
35
305,146
DE
210,150
647,296
2,622,613
83,124
85,386
17,987
28,588
3,695,144
EE
104
1,554
210,475
583
120
38
0
212,874
IE
34,252
64,829
12,119
9,237
9,229
4,062
424
134,152
EL
21,157
86,004
450,487
2,469
2,302
339
2,837
565,595
ES
1,000,602
307,849
162,178
25,151
1,486,214
2,028
8,470
2,992,492
FR
1,588,957
255,987
280,283
30,677
111,641
4,048
1,635
2,273,228
IT
1,071,553
899,489
1,206,788
41,241
365,362
3,220
0
3,587,653
KY
8,831
85,720
29,640
1,206
474
214
22
126,107
LV
112
1,896
382,340
601
133
241
0
385,323
LT
153
2,451
20,786
512
80
4,651
0
28,633
LU
HU
3,826
32,045
49,829
4,453
1,911
437
17
92,518
MT
719
1,862
1,667
191
112
51
6
4,608
NL
115,223
97,926
104,401
19,537
21,751
4,801
52,875
416,514
AT
13,007
35,434
383,038
5,588
7,484
1,251
188
445,990
PL
4,054
25,912
52,571
2,391
1,263
1,090
64
87,345
PT
122,032
30,315
82,418
2,994
122,210
293
60
360,322
RO
3,718
21,498
33,375
2,076
705
428
0
61,800
SI
170
1,603
86,336
350
422
89
109
89,079
SK
678
7,200
12,699
944
390
144
13
22,068
FI
16,165
36,432
47,343
4,004
2,770
1,877
4,323
112,914
SE
56,043
150,901
52,308
12,455
20,162
10,433
979
303,281
DK
2,056
15,644
5,937
4,187
1,440
985
6
30,255
UK
75,092
365,303
28,241
131,775
34,537
31,680
4,696
671,324
Residence permits issued in 2009 (only flow data available for the countries below)
No data available for Luxembourg; the EU-27 total was computed using the 24 available Member States
Source:
Eurostat (online data code migr_resvalid and (for DK and the UK) migr_resfirst)

 
Demography Report, 2010
44
4.1.4. Spain, Germany and the United
Kingdom reported the highest
immigration in EU in 2008
The as a whole is attractive for immigrants, but
Member States differ as to scale and patterns of
migration. The majority of EU-27 Member States
in 2008 reported more immigration than
emigration, but in Germany, Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria and the three Baltic States (Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia) emigrants outnumbered
immigrants.
In absolute terms, Spain, Germany and the United
Kingdom were the EU countries with the highest
immigration. They received more than half (53
%)
of all immigrants in 2008, but at the same time,
they also experienced high emigration.
Relative to the size of the resident population,
Luxembourg (with 36.3 immigrants per 1
000
inhabitants) had the highest immigration in the EU
in 2008, followed by Malta with 21.9 and Cyprus
with 17.8 (Graph I.4.8).
Luxembourg, the country with the highest
immigration per capita and one of the smallest
countries in the EU in terms of population size,
also reported the highest rate of emigration in
2008, with 20.6 emigrants per 1
000 inhabitants.
4.1.5. More men than women migrate
In 2008, there were more men than women in
migration flows to and from EU Member States in
general. Around 48
% of immigrants were women.
By contrast, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, France and
Ireland reported that women outnumbered men
among immigrants. In Cyprus, this was mainly due
to women with Filipino, Sri Lankan and
Vietnamese citizenship, whereas in Italy and Spain
women outnumbered men in the biggest group of
immigrants (with Romanian citizenship in the case
of Italy, and Moroccan citizenship in Spain). In
addition, among immigrants to Italy, women
outnumbered men among citizens of Ukraine,
Moldavia, Poland and Russia, while in Spain, the
same applied for citizens of Pakistan and Senegal.
4.1.6. Impact on the age structure of the EU
population
In 2008, immigrants to the EU-27 Member States
were, on average, younger than the population of
their country of destination. Whereas the median
age of the total population of all EU Member
States (calculated from five-year age groups) was
40.6 on 1 January 2009, the median age of
immigrants in 2008 was 28.4.
Graph I.4.9 compares the age of immigrants to
EU-27 Member States in 2008 by basic citizenship
groups.
Graph I.4.8:
Immigration (per 1 000 inhabitants), EU-27, 2008
0
10
20
30
40
LU MT CY ES BE
SI
IE
AT
SE DK
UK
IT
NL DE CZ
FI
HU FR SK PT
LT EE
LV
PL BG
Immigration
per 1 000 inhabitants
EU-27
Immigration data for EL and RO include non-nationals only and are therefore not included.
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind, migr_imm1ctz)

Part I
Main Demographic Trends
45
Graph I.4.9:
Age structure of immigrants by basic
citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008
2%
1%
0%
1%
2%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85+
Men
Women
Solid colour: nationals
Bordered: non-nationals
EU-27 excluding BE, EL, CY, RO and UK.
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm2ctz)
Among immigrants, there were noticeable
differences in the age of nationals, EU nationals
and non-EU nationals. Non-EU nationals were the
youngest, with a median age of 27.5 years,
followed by EU nationals at 29.3 years (see Table
I.4.2). Nationals were the oldest, with a median
age of 30.2 years. The share in the 15-64 age group
was highest among non-national men (87
%) and
lowest among women returning to the country of
their citizenship (71
%).
Table I.4.2:
Median age of the population (as of 1 January
2009) and immigrants by basic citizenship
groups, 2008
EU-27
40.6
p
28.4
s
30.2
s
28.2
s
29.3
s
27.5
s
BE
40.8
:
:
:
:
:
BG
41.1
32.6
32.4
35.2
52.5
35.0
CZ
39.2
28.4
33.4
28.3
30.8
27.5
DK
40.3
26.6
27.0
26.5
27.4
25.7
DE
43.7
29.8
31.2
29.6
31.5
27.7
EE
39.3
30.8
30.4
31.1
29.0
33.3
IE
33.8
26.7
26.7
26.7
26.7
26.7
EL
41.4
:
:
37.5
42.3
35.1
ES
39.5
28.3
32.9
28.2
29.9
27.7
FR
39.5
p
26.0
25.0
26.3
27.9
25.5
IT
42.8
29.1
34.5
28.8
29.3
28.5
CY
35.9
29.9
34.2
30.0
28.9
32.4
LV
39.8
29.4
4.0
33.3
32.0
36.1
LT
38.9
31.1
29.5
35.8
27.0
36.8
LU
38.7
29.7
29.8
29.7
29.8
29.1
HU
39.6
28.7
3.2
29.5
30.5
28.6
MT
39.0
30.3
29.1
30.6
35.9
27.0
NL
40.3
27.6
28.2
27.5
27.6
27.5
AT
41.3
28.8
35.6
28.2
29.5
26.3
PL
37.5
27.7
26.5
33.7
37.4
32.6
PT
40.4
24.8
18.8
28.2
32.1
27.5
RO
38.0
:
:
:
:
:
SI
41.2
31.1
32.5
31.1
37.6
30.6
SK
36.5
30.6
31.7
30.5
32.5
28.7
FI
41.8
28.0
29.1
27.7
29.6
26.7
SE
40.7
27.0
28.2
26.8
28.7
25.7
UK
39.4
p
:
: :
:
:
Total
Total
population
Non-EU
citizens
Citizens of
(other) EU MS
Total
Nationals
Foreigners
Immigrants
No detailed data by age available for BE, RO and UK.
Immigration data for EL include non-nationals only.
(s) Eurostat estimate; (p) provisional data
Source:
Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop1ctz,
migr_imm1ctz) and Eurostat estimates based on 5-year age
group data

 
5. MIGRATION: FOREIGN POPULATION
Table I.5.1:
Population by group of citizenship, 2009 (units and share of the resident population)
Total population
Foreigners
%
Citizens of other EU MS
%
Citizens of non-EU
countries
%
EU-27
499,703,311
31779900 s
6.4
11937200 s
2.4
19842700 s
4.0
BE
10,753,080
:
:
:
:
:
:
BG
7,606,551
23,838
0.3
3,532
0.0
20,306
0.3
CZ
10,467,542
407,541
3.9
145,814
1.4
261,727
2.5
DK
5,511,451
320,033
5.8
108,667
2.0
211,366
3.8
DE
82,002,356
7,185,921
8.8
2,530,706
3.1
4,655,215
5.7
EE
1,340,415
214,437
16.0
9,632
0.7
204,805
15.3
IE
4,450,030
441,059
9.9
364,847
8.2
76,212
1.7
EL
11,260,402
929,530
8.3
161,611
1.4
767,919
6.8
ES
45,828,172
5,650,968
12.3
2,274,158
5.0
3,376,810
7.4
FR
64,366,894
3,737,549
5.8
1,302,351
2.0
2,435,198
3.8
IT
60,045,068
3,891,295
6.5
1,131,767
1.9
2,759,528
4.6
CY
796,900
128,200
16.1
78,200
9.8
50,000
6.3
LV
2,261,294
404,013
17.9
9,406
0.4
394,607
17.5
LT
3,349,872
41,505
1.2
2,511
0.1
38,994
1.2
LU
493,500
214,848
43.5
185,354
37.6
29,494
6.0
HU
10,030,975
186,365
1.9
109,804
1.1
76,561
0.8
MT
413,607
18,128
4.4
8,245
2.0
9,883
2.4
NL
16,485,787
637,136
3.9
290,417
1.8
346,719
2.1
AT
8,355,260
864,397
10.3
316,995
3.8
547,402
6.6
PL
38,135,876
35933 p
0.1
10315 p
0.0
25618 p
0.1
PT
10,627,250
443,102
4.2
84,727
0.8
358,375
3.4
RO
21,498,616
31,354
0.1
6,041
0.0
25,313
0.1
SI
2,032,362
70,554
3.5
4,195
0.2
66,359
3.3
SK
5,412,254
52,545
1.0
32,709
0.6
19,836
0.4
FI
5,326,314
142,288
2.7
51,923
1.0
90,365
1.7
SE
9,256,347
547,664
5.9
255,571
2.8
292,093
3.2
UK 61,595,091 4,184,011 6.8 1,793,197 2.9 2,390,814 3.9