European Commission

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Demography Report

2010

DEMOGRAPHY REPORT

2010

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication is a joint effort by Commission services, mainly the Directorate General for

Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union. The

'in-house' contributors are as follows

Summary: DG EMPL (Emanuela Tassa);

Part I (Main Demographic Trends):

•

chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7: Eurostat (Veronica Corsini, Albane Gourdol, Katarzyna Kraszewska,

Monica Marcu, Apolonija Oblak Flander and Katya Vasileva);

•

end-parts of chapters 6 and 7 and the boxes: DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti);

Part II (Borderless Europeans): DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti)

Annex on Migration in the Recession: Eurostat (Piotr Juchno and Apolonija Oblak Flander) and DG

EMPL (Ettore Marchetti).

Country Annexe: DG EMPL (Ettore Marchetti)

The report could not have been prepared without contributions from

•

Giampaolo Lanzieri (Eurostat) for his populations projections by foreign background;

•

the organisations Gallup (

) and Clandestino

(

), for data on migration intentions and irregular

migration;

•

researchers at the NIDI institute (

), especially Gijs Beets, Jeannette Schoorl, Nico van Nimwegen and

Peter Ekamper, who provided analysis of 'Borderless Europeans';

•

researchers at the VID institute (

), especially Dimiter Philipov and Julia Schuster, who provided

analysis of the 'tempo effect' on fertility, long-term effects of migrants on national population

structures;

•

researchers at the MPI-Rostock (

), especially Sigrun Matthiesen, Jim Vaupel and Harald

Wilkoszewski, who provided the analysis of healthy life expectancy in the box;

•

Hans-Peter Kohler (University of Pennsylvania) for data and analysis on the relationship between

fertility and economic development;

•

members of the Demography Expert Group, who provided feedback on the country summaries.

(

)

http://www.gallup.com/

(

)

http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/

(

)

http://www.nidi.knaw.nl/smartsite.dws?lang=NL&ch=NID&id=2807

(

)

http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/

(

)

http://www.demogr.mpg.de/

Acknowledgements

Any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors in the European Commission.

CONTENTS

vii

Summary 1

Überblick 7

Résumé 14

Part I:

Main Demographic Trends

1. Introduction

2. Fertility

2.1.

Recovery of Fertility

2.2.

Women still postponing births

2.3.

Revisiting fertility trends

3. Mortality

3.1.

Mortality Trends over the Past 30 years

3.2.

Recent gains in life expectancy

4. Migration: Trends

4.1. Migration flows

Migration: Foreign Population

5.1.

Non-nationals in the EU

5.2.

Acquiring citizenship of EU Member State

5.3. Foreign-born population

5.4.

Education levels of the foreign-born

5.5.

Non-nationals younger on average than nationals

Population Change and Structure

6.1. Population growth

6.2. Population ageing

7. Families

7.1.

Fewer marriages, more divorces

7.2.

A rise in births outside marriage

7.3.

Fertility and the family

7.4.

Changing household structure

Part II:

Borderless Europeans

1. Introduction

Migrants across Generations

2.1.

How migrants shape the structure of EU-27 populations

2.2.

Integration of migrants and their descendants across generations

2.3.

How migrants can shape future EU populations

Moving into and across the EU

3.1.

Ancestry and Life choices

3.2.

Connectedness and Attitudes

Further Ways of Connecting to Other Countries

4.1.

Commuting across borders

4.2.

Personal and cultural connections across borders

viii

Part III:

Annex - Demography and the Recession

1. Introduction

Migration in the recession

100

2.1.

How the recession affected migration

100

Country Annex

107

1. The European Union

108

1. Belgium

110

2. Bulgaria

112

The Czech Republic

114

4. Denmark

116

5. Germany

118

6. Estonia

120

7. Ireland

122

8. Greece

124

9. Spain

126

10. France

128

11. Italy

130

12. Cyprus

132

13. Latvia

134

14. Lithuania

136

15. Luxembourg

138

16. Hungary

140

17. Malta

142

18. The Netherlands

144

19. Austria

146

20. Poland

148

21. Portugal

150

22. Romania

152

23. Slovenia

154

24. Slovakia

156

25. Finland

158

26. Sweden

160

27. The United Kingdom

162

1. Country Indicator Sources

164

LIST OF TABLES

I.1.1.

Main demographic trends: Main findings

I.2.1.

Total Fertility Rate (TFR), selected years

I.2.2.

Mean age of women at childbirth, selected years

I.2.3.

Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth in

EU-27, 2002-2008

I.2.4.

Fertility rate differences (2006-2008) and 'tempo' adjustment

I.3.1.

Life expectancy at birth by sex, 1993 and 2009

I.3.2.

Life expectancy at age 65 by sex, 1993 and 2009

I.3.3.

Life expectancy in EU-27 by age and sex, 2002-2008

I.3.4.

Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, men

1993 and 2009

I.3.5.

Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group,

women 1993 and 2009

I.3.6.

Healthy life years at birth, by gender, 2007 and 2009

I.3.7.

Life expectancy by sex and educational attainment at

selected ages, 2008

I.4.1.

Top ten citizenships of immigrants to EU-27 Member States,

2008 42

I.4.2.

Median age of the population (as of 1 January 2009) and

immigrants by basic citizenship groups, 2008

I.5.1.

Population by group of citizenship, 2009 (units and share of

the resident population)

I.5.2.

Acquisitions of citizenship, 2001-2008 (in thousands)

I.5.3.

Population by group of country of birth, 2009 (units and

share of the resident population)

I.5.4.

Main countries of birth of foreign-born residents, for selected

EU-27 Member States, 2009

I.5.5.

Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by group

of country of birth, 2009 (%)

I.5.6.

Population aged 25-54 with high educational level having a

medium or low skilled job as a proportion of persons with

high educational level respective population by group of

country of birth, 2009 (%)

I.5.7.

Median age of the population by group of citizenship, 2009

I.6.1.

Demographic balance for EU-27 in 2009

I.6.2.

EU-27 Member States by contribution of natural change and

net migration (1) to population growth/decline in 2009

I.6.3.

Crude rates of population change in 2000, 2008 and 2009

I.6.4. Population age structure by major age groups, on 1st

January 1990 and 2010

I.6.5.

Median age and age dependency ratios, 1st January 2010,

by country

I.7.1.

Crude marriage rate, by country, 1960-2009, (in marriages

per 1000 residents)

I.7.2.

Crude divorce rate, by country, 1960-2009, (in divorces per

1000 residents)

I.7.3.

Live births outside marriage, as proportion of total live births

(%), by country, 1960-2009

I.7.4.

Young adults living with at least one parent and no

spouse/partner, by sex and age group, 2009, (%)

II.1.1.

Borderless Europeans: main findings

II.2.1.

Differences between actual 2007 population and 2007

population based on projections that exclude migration

from 1960, age 0-79 (thousands and % of actual population)

II.2.2.

Unemployment rates of women aged 25-54 by place of

birth, own and of parents, 2008

II.2.3.

Unemployment rates of men aged 25-54 by place of birth,

own and of parents, 2008

II.2.4.

Employment rates of women aged 25-54 by place of birth,

own and of parents, 2008

II.2.5.

Employment rates of men aged 25-54 by place of birth, own

and of parents, 2008

II.2.6.

Women aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of education, by

place of birth, own and of parents, 2008 (%)

II.2.7.

Men aged 25-49 with ISCED 0-2 level of education, by place

of birth, own and of parents, 2008 (%)

II.2.8.

Employment rates of women aged 25-49 by place of birth,

own and of parents, 2008

II.2.9.

Employment rates of men aged 25-49 by place of birth, own

and of parents, 2008

II.2.10.

EU nationals feeling that they belong to minority or majority

groups, by ancestry, 2010 (%)

II.2.11.

Foreign-born population by world area of residence (millions

and %)

II.3.1.

Attachment to specific foreign countries, by ancestry and

life-choices, 2010 (%)

II.3.2.

Attachment to the EU, by ancestry and life-choices, 2010 (%) 92

II.3.3.

Likelihood of moving abroad in the future, by ancestry and

life choices, 2010 (%)

II.4.1.

EU nationals with foreign friends or relatives, by ancestry,

2010 (%)

II.4.2.

EU nationals with cultural links to other countries, by

connectedness (ancestry and life-choices), 2010 (%)

III.2.1.

New residence permits issued and valid permits at the end

of the year, 2008 and 2009

105

LIST OF GRAPHS

I.2.1.

Number of live births in EU-27, 1980-2009

I.2.2.

Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth,

2009 28

I.2.3.

Fertility of mothers aged 30 and over, 2000 and 2009

(ordered by difference 2009-2000) (%)

I.2.4.

Fertility by age group of mothers, 2009 (%)

I.3.1.

Number of deaths in EU-27, 1980-2009

I.3.2.

The gender gap (women – men) in life expectancy at birth,

1993 and 2009

I.3.3.

The gender gap (women — men) in life expectancy at age

65, 1993 and 2009

I.3.4.

Infant mortality rate, 1993 and 2009 (ranked by size of

reduction) 36

I.3.5.

Life expectancy gaps between high and low educational

attainment at selected ages, by sex, 2008

I.4.1.

Age structure of the population on 1 January 2009 and of

immigrants in 2008, EU-27

I.4.2.

Immigration, EU-27, 2004-2008

I.4.3.

Relative change in migration inflows to EU Member States by

citizenship groups, EU-27, 2002-2008

I.4.4.

Immigrants by citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008

I.4.5.

Immigrants by groups of country of birth, EU-27, 2008

I.4.6.

Immigrants to EU-27 (from outside EU) by the level of

development of the country of previous residence, EU-27,

2008 42

I.4.7.

Non-EU immigrants by continent of country of citizenship, EU-

27, 2008

I.4.8.

Immigration (per 1 000 inhabitants), EU-27, 2008

I.4.9.

Age structure of immigrants by basic citizenship groups, EU-

27, 2008

I.5.1.

Non-nationals in the EU by country of residence, EU-27, 2009

I.5.2. Distribution of non-nationals by EU/non-EU citizenship, as a

percentage of the usually resident population, 2009

I.5.3.

Ten most numerous groups of foreign citizens usually resident

in the EU-27, in millions and as a % of the EU total foreign

population, 2009

I.5.4.

Acquisitions of citizenship per thousand non-nationals, 2008

I.5.5.

Main previous citizenship of persons acquiring citizenship of

an EU-27 Member States, 2008

I.5.6.

Share of foreign-born and non-nationals of the total

population, 2009

I.5.7.

Educational attainment of population aged 25-54 by sex

and group of country of birth, EU-27, 2009 (%)

I.5.8.

Educational attainment of non-nationals aged 25-54, 2009

(%) 53

I.5.9.

Foreign-born aged 25-54 with high educational level having

a medium or low skilled job as a share of persons with high

educational level respective population by sex, 2009 (%)

I.5.10.

Non-nationals aged 25-54 with high educational level

having a medium or low skilled job as a share of persons

with high educational level respective population, 2009 (%)

I.5.11.

Age pyramid of the national and foreign population, EU-27,

2009 55

I.6.1.

Population on 1 January, EU-27, 1960-2010

I.6.2.

Population change by component, EU-27, 1961-2009

I.6.3.

Live births and deaths in EU-27, 1961-2009

I.6.4.

Population pyramids, EU-27, 1990 and 2010

I.6.5.

Proportion of population aged 65 years or over, %

increase/decrease 1990-2010

I.6.6.

Median age of the total population, EU-27, 1990-2010

I.6.7.

Median age of population

I.6.8. Population age structure by major age groups, EU-27(1) 63

I.6.9.

Population pyramids, EU-27, 2010 and 2060

I.6.10.

Percentage of 65+ in the EU, Sweden , Germany and

Slovakia, 2010-2060

I.7.1.

Proportion of live births outside marriage and total fertility

rate, 2009

I.7.2.

Employment rate of women aged 25-49 and total fertility

rate, 2009

I.7.3.

Childcare provision for children aged 0-2 and total fertility

rate, 2009

I.7.4.

Households with children by type (1), 2009 (%)

I.7.5.

Single parents among women aged 15-24, 2009, (%)

I.7.6.

Percentage of young adults who live with at least one

parent and no spouse/partner, by sex and age group, EU-

27, 2009, (%)

II.2.1.

France, population without migration since 1960 and

migration effect, including non-nationals, by age group,

2007 (millions)

II.2.2.

Spain, population without migration since 1960 and

migration effect, including non-nationals, by age group,

2007 (millions)

II.2.3.

Ireland, population without migration since 1960 and

migration effect, by age group, 2007 (100,000s)

xii

II.2.4.

Portugal, actual population, including non-nationals, and

population without migration since 1960, by age group, 2007

(100,000s) 80

II.2.5. Lithuania, population without migration since 1960 and

migration effect, by age group, 2007 (100,000s)

II.2.6.

Resident population aged 25-49 born in EU-27, by birth-

place of parents, 2008 (%)

II.2.7.

Projected foreign-born population and their descendants,

2061 (%)

II.2.8.

Theoretical net migration (% of the population aged 15+)

II.3.1.

EU nationals who have lived and worked abroad in the past,

by age, 2009 (%)

II.3.2.

EU nationals who have lived and worked abroad in the past,

by age at end of full-time education, 2009 (%)

II.3.3. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life choices/no

ancestry by sex, EU, 2010 (%)

II.3.4. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no

ancestry by age group, 2010, (%)

II.3.5. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no

ancestry by age at end of full-time education, EU 2010 (%)

II.3.6. Borderless Europeans by ancestry and life-choices/no

ancestry by occupation, EU, 2010 (%)

II.4.1.

Workers residing in another Member State and residents

working in another Member State, among workers, 2009 (%)

II.4.2.

EU nationals who have close friends who live abroad, 2010

(%) 94

II.4.3.

EU nationals who speak at least one other language (than

that of the interview) (%)

II.4.4.

EU nationals who spend regularly holidays in another

country, 2010 (%)

III.2.1.

Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States (Spain,

Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy), 2003-2009

(thousands) 100

III.2.2.

Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27 Member States

(Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) by citizenship groups,

2008-2009 (thousands)

100

III.2.3.

Immigration to selected EU-27 Member States (Belgium, the

Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009

(thousands) 101

III.2.4.

Structure of immigrants to selected EU-27 Member States

(France, Austria and Sweden) by citizenship groups, 2008-

2009 (thousands)

101

III.2.5.

Structure of immigrants to Ireland by citizenship groups,

2007-2009 (thousands)

101

III.2.6.

Emigration from selected EU-27 Member States (Germany,

the United Kingdom Spain and Italy), 2003-2009 (thousands) 102

III.2.7.

Structure of emigrants from selected EU-27 Member States

(Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom) by citizenship groups,

2008-2009 (thousands)

102

III.2.8.

Emigration from selected EU-27 Member States (Belgium, the

Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Ireland), 2003-2009

(thousands) 103

III.2.9.

New residence permits issued, by reason, EU-27, 2008 and

2009 104

xiii

LIST OF BOXES

I.3.1.

Living longer healthy lives

I.4.1.

Where immigrants come from

I.7.1.

Does wealth increase fertility in developed countries?

II.1.1.

Cross-border Migration, Mobility and Marriages

II.2.1.

Are there many irregular migrants?

SUMMARY

Since the last 2008 Demography Report was published in 2008, the EU

population has passed the 500 million mark while continuing to develop

along lines that were already discernible two years ago. The EU’s

demographic picture has become clearer: growth is fuelled mainly by

immigration, whereas the population is becoming older and more diverse.

The impact of the economic crisis is still difficult to assess.

In its October 2006 Communication entitled ‘The Demographic Future of

Europe — from Challenge to Opportunity’

(6)

, the Commission presented its

views on the demographic challenges the EU was facing and on options for

tackling them. The Communication expressed confidence in Europe’s ability

to cope with demographic change and an ageing population in particular, but

also stressed the need to act in five key policy areas: demographic renewal,

employment, productivity, integration of migrants and sustainable public

finances.

This third Demographic Report aims to provide the latest facts and figures

that are needed for an informed debate on these issues. In addition to the EU-

level overview, data are provided as far as possible for each EU-27 Member

State, enabling policy makers and stakeholders to compare their own

country's situation with that of other Member States, to understand the

specific characteristics of their country and, possibly, to identify other

countries that could provide interesting experiences from which to learn.

This year the report is a joint undertaking between the Directorate General

for ‘Employment, social affairs and inclusion’ and Eurostat, and draws on

Eurostat's experience in demographic analysis. It consists of two parts, a

short annex on migration in the recession and a country annex.

Part I looks at historical and recent trends in fertility, life expectancy and

migration - the three drivers of population change. It includes a review of

population structure by age and family composition.

Part II explores an increasingly important phenomenon that was identified in

a recent Eurobarometer survey: the increasing number of European citizens

who seek opportunities across national borders for study, work, life

experience and inspiration, resulting in different forms of international

connectedness across national borders.

MORE, OLDER AND MORE DIVERSE EUROPEANS

1.1.

New patterns lead to slight increases in fertility

Gradual but nonetheless major changes are affecting the population of

Europe. Two main positive trends are emerging: a slight increase in fertility

and greater life expectancy. Lowest-low fertility – below 1.3 children per

woman – has ended in all Member State and the most recent figure for EU-27

was 1.6 and could rise to over 1.7 if adjustments for the postponement of

births (the so-called ‘tempo effect’) are taken into account. This small

adjustment does not make up for the shortfall in relation to the replacement

(

) COM(2006) 571, adopted on 12 October 2006.

Demography Report, 2010

ratio of 2.1, but it could contribute to a slower rate of population decline in

the medium/longer term, in conjunction with a possible increase in fertility as

EU Member States become wealthier.

The modest increase in fertility results from somewhat new family building

patterns: countries with fewer marriages, more cohabitation, more divorces

and an older average age of women at childbirth tend to have higher fertility

rates. Changing social perceptions of the role of marriage and greater fragility

of relationships have resulted in more extramarital births, including to lone

parents, or in childlessness.

The impact of family policies on these trends is difficult to assess since

cultural factors play an important role. However, the data suggest that

postponement of childbearing to a later age is accompanied in some countries

(France, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands for instance) by higher

fertility rates and relatively generous public support for parents. At the other

end of the scale, in countries such as Romania, Slovakia and Hungary, a

lower age at childbirth is not associated with a high fertility rate.. This would

also be consistent with the first indications that fertility rises again with

wealth, after decades of decaying fertility as countries grew richer. The

emerging evidence reinforces the case for having better policies that can help

parents to cope with the constraints of a modern society.

1.2.

An "ageing" population structure

Although it is difficult to predict the impact of policies, an analysis of the

impact of changes in population structure is more straightforward. Low

fertility rates are only one side of the coin, the other being a decline in the

number of deaths or, in more positive terms, an increase in life expectancy. In

2009, the median age of the population was 40.6, and it is projected to reach

47.9 years by 2060.

The EUROPOP2008 projections prepared by Eurostat and presented in the

previous Demography Report indicate that by 2014 the working age

population (20-64) will start to shrink, as the large baby-boom cohorts born

immediately after World War II are now entering their sixties and retiring.

The number of people aged 60 and above in the EU is now rising by more

than two million every year, roughly twice the rate observed until about three

years ago. The working population is also ageing, as the proportion of older

workers in employment increases compared to the cohorts made up of

younger workers. Every year about 5 million children are born in the EU-27

and over 2 million people immigrate from third countries. Births outnumber

deaths by several hundred thousand persons each year, whereas net migration

is well over a million. As a result, migration accounts for the largest

proportion of the EU's population growth.

In 2008 life expectancy for the EU-27 was 76.4 for men and 82.4 for women.

Differences among Member States are still very significant, ranging from

almost 13 years for men to 8 for women. Infant mortality in 2009 was also

still relatively high in some countries like Romania (10.1 ‰) and Bulgaria

(9.0 ‰), even though a reduction of about 50% for EU-27 has been achieved

over the last 15 years. Socio-economic status appears to play a major role,

especially in some Central European countries. Consequently, by improving

the life expectancy of disadvantaged groups, a general increase in overall life

expectancy is also to be expected.

Summary

A possible development is the improvement in healthy life expectancy by

delaying the stage at which physical condition starts to deteriorate rapidly,

thereby postponing death to a later age. More evidence and analysis is

required on this important subject.

Policies which address the ageing of the population and the work force focus

on enabling older workers to remain active and productive for a longer

proportion of their life span. One of the benefits of an ageing population is

that it offers more opportunities for flexible arrangements during the life

course. A longer active life allows for extended or recurring periods in

education; greater working-time flexibility during the intense years when

childbearing and career commitments coincide; occasional career breaks

when it becomes necessary to take care of family members; and productive

retirement through volunteering and general engagement in the civil society.

1.3.

Europe on the move

Migration, especially from non-EU countries, could provide a (temporary)

respite from population ageing, since most people migrate primarily as young

adults (aged 25-34). As young cohorts of foreigners feed progressively into

the older national cohorts, the total population is rejuvenated and diversity

increases. Unprecedented levels of immigration both from third countries and

within the EU-27 (intra-EU mobility) over the past decade have substantially

increased the proportion of European inhabitants who do not live in their own

native country or culture.

EU-27 Member States are host to some 20 million non-EU-nationals. A

further 10 million EU nationals are living in another Member State, and

about 5 million non-nationals have acquired EU citizenship since 2001. As

most migrants are relatively young and have arrived quite recently, they

contribute to the size of the EU-27 labour force. In the future, the labour

force will increasingly include people with a migration background. Among

EU nationals, in addition to the approximately 8% of foreign-born (

) people

residing in the EU, a further 5% have at least one foreign-born parent, and

this category will continue to grow. By 2060, persons of all nationalities with

at least one foreign-born parent are expected to account for close to a third of

the EU-27 population. An even larger percentage of the work-force will be of

foreign descent.

These trends imply that additional efforts are needed to ensure that

immigrants have the opportunity to integrate into their host society and,

crucially, to enable them to contribute to the labour market by making full

use of their education. A mobile population can be seen as an asset to the host

countries. As more people seek experience abroad, they can contribute to a

more efficient and productive economy, while also enhancing their personal

skills.

AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE AND MOBILE EU POPULATION

As the flows of migration from non-EU countries and mobility between

Member States have intensified, a growing proportion of the working-age

population (15% in 2008) was either born abroad or has at least one parent

who was born abroad.

(

) Here foreign-born includes those who were born in a different Member State than the one in which they reside.

Demography Report, 2010

Changing patterns of migration and mobility in Europe are making national

sentiments and feelings about belonging to a particular nation more diffuse

and complex, especially in the case of mobility between EU Member States.

Although traditional long-term, employment-driven, male-dominated

migration still takes place, other forms of migration and mobility are

emerging. Mobility flows have also changed: some of the major traditional

emigration Member States have become poles of attraction for migrants.

Large-scale migration and mixing of cultures are clearly not new phenomena

in the history of the EU. Past flows have had a different impact on the size

and structure of the population in most EU-27 Member States, and they have

contributed to a more European outlook among its citizens. Immigrants often

want to maintain a close attachment to their country of origin, but these

linkages tend to weaken over time.

The integration of immigrants across generations occurs rather rapidly. In

most countries with a substantial proportion of second-generation

immigrants, these fare far better in education and on the labour market than

first-generation immigrants and almost as well as those of no foreign descent;

this applies to descendants of mobile people from other Member States and

of immigrants from non-EU countries. Nevertheless, even after three

generations – the time it usually takes for full integration – descendants of

migrants maintain some attachment to the countries of their ancestors,

through their knowledge of foreign languages, for example.

Alongside traditional migration and mobility, new forms of mobility are

taking place. People are moving abroad for shorter periods, mainly to other

Member States, to seek work, pursue their education or other life

opportunities. These mobile people tend to be well-educated young adults,

towards the higher end of the occupational scale. Increasingly, this form of

mobility is based on personal preferences and life choices, and not only on

economic opportunities. The increased propensity to be mobile could be of

great benefit to the EU by enabling a better matching of skills and language

ability with job opportunities. The results of a Eurobarometer survey (

) point

to the presence of a diverse, growing number of mobile young people

characterised by a common interest in looking beyond national borders.

The Eurobarometer survey also indicates that around one in five of the EU-27

respondents has either worked or studied in another country at some point,

lived with a partner from another country or owns a property abroad. Half of

these respondents have ties to other countries by ancestry; the other half are

most often young and well educated and consciously making a life choice

that brings them into contact with other countries. They share a strong

willingness, if not propensity, to move abroad, up to four times greater than

those who do not have any connections with another country. Given that this

phenomenon is likely to become even more important in the future, policy

makers may want to consider its implications in planning for the socio-

economic future of the European population.

DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY IN THE RECESSION

Before the economic recession, EU Member States' commitment to

implementing the policy goals in the Lisbon agenda had begun to show

results in the form of employment for young people, women, older workers

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf

Summary

and migrants. When the recession struck, the first groups to be affected were

younger people and immigrants. Governments faced increasing difficulties in

balancing support for families, consolidation of budgets, assistance for young

people and immigrants in a shrinking labour market, and funding for

retirement schemes.

It is too early to draw any firm conclusions about the effect of the crisis on

fertility and life expectancy. Recent experience with past recessions indicates

that both fertility and mortality may initially decrease slightly, only to return

to their pre-recession levels shortly after the crisis has ended.

New Eurostat data on residence permits throws light on the reasons for

migration from non-EU countries. The available data show that the decline in

migration is largely due to a reduction in migration for employment and

family reasons, while the number of residence permits issued for education

and other reasons increased slightly from 2008 to 2009.

WHAT IS BEING DONE

In June 2010 the European Council adopted the new 10-year Europe 2020

strategy for more jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (

). The

strategy sets out to reorientate existing policies from crisis management to

medium- and longer-term goals to promote growth and employment and

ensure the future sustainability of public finances. The latter is a precondition

for sustainable social cohesion in the EU.

The recession has not diminished the commitment of Member States to

respond to the demographic challenge; on the contrary, the commitment

appears to have been reinforced. The strategy adopted in addressing

demographic change seems to dovetail with the overall thrust of the new

Europe 2020 strategy. In the wake of the recession, and despite the bleak

outlook for public finances, the European Commission is convinced that the

demographic dimension deserves to be taken fully into account by Member

States when they are formulating their exit strategies from the current

recession.

The need to mobilise the EU’s demographic potential was already

highlighted in October 2006 in the Commission Communication on Europe’s

Demographic Future

(10)

. This Communication suggested that the problem of

low fertility should be addressed by creating better conditions for families to

deal with the problem of a shrinking labour force by raising employment

rates and productivity levels, by relying on immigration and better integration

and, finally, by preserving the ability to meet the future needs of an ageing

society by creating sustainable public finances. Member States are

responsible for deciding how they realise their potential. The Communication

highlighted the type of support that the EU can offer to Member States in

terms of existing policy coordination. At the request of the Member States,

and with the support of the European Parliament, this process is

complemented by the activities organised under the umbrella of the European

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm

(

)

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:EN:PDF

Demography Report, 2010

Alliance for Families (

) and the planned European Year 2012 for Active

Ageing (

The success of the strategy hinges largely on the EU’s ability to face up to

the major demographic transformations of this coming decade.

Europe’s future depends to a great extent on its capacity to tap the strong

potential of the two fastest growing segments in its population: older people

and immigrants. Three policy areas appear crucial to boost economic growth

and achieve greater social cohesion:

–

The promotion of active ageing: older people, and in particular ageing

baby-boomers, can look forward to many more years of healthy life, and they

possess valuable skills and experience. More opportunities for active ageing

will allow them to continue to contribute to society, even after retirement.

–

The integration of migrants and their descendants: this is crucial for

Europe because migrants will make up an even larger share of Europe’s

labour force. The low employment rate of migrants is both socially and

financially unaffordable.

–

The reconciliation of paid work and family commitments: people

with caring responsibilities still lack adequate support and suitable

arrangements for combining their different responsibilities. As a result,

economic growth is hampered because too many people are not able to

exploit their high level of skills and education on the labour market. Women

are particularly affected because of the persistent gender–employment and

pay gaps.

At the same time, Europe needs to find ways of maintaining greater

productivity while preparing for increasing levels of ageing-related

expenditure, despite the demise of public finances as a result of the recession.

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=860

ÜBERBLICK

Seit der Veröffentlichung des letzten Demografieberichts im Jahr 2008 hat

die EU-Bevölkerung die 500-Millionen-Marke überschritten und sich weiter

in die bereits vor zwei Jahren erkennbare Richtung entwickelt. Mittlerweile

liegt ein klareres Bild der demografischen Situation in der EU vor: Das

Wachstum wird hauptsächlich durch Immigration genährt, während die

Bevölkerung immer älter und vielfältiger wird. Überdies sind die

Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftskrise noch schwierig abzuschätzen.

Im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission die Mitteilung ‘Die demografische

Zukunft Europas – Von der Herausforderung zur Chance’

(13)

herausgegeben

und ihre Ansichten zu den demografischen Herausforderungen der EU und

den möglichen Herangehensweisen vorgestellt. In der Mitteilung wurde zum

Ausdruck gebracht, dass man darauf vertraue, Europa werde mit dem

demografischem Wandel und insbesondere der alternden Bevölkerung

zurechtkommen, aber es wurde auch Handlungsbedarf in fünf politischen

Schlüsselbereichen ermittelt: demografische Erneuerung, Beschäftigung,

Produktivität, Integration von Migranten und zukunftsfähige öffentliche

Finanzen.

Mit diesem dritten Demografiebericht sollen die aktuellen Fakten und Zahlen

vorgelegt werden, die für eine fundierte Debatte über diese Punkte vonnöten

sind. Neben dem EU-weiten Überblick werden soweit möglich Daten für alle

27 Mitgliedstaaten der EU vorgelegt, die politische Entscheidungsträger und

Interessenvertreter nutzen können, um die Situation ihres Landes mit der

anderer Mitgliedstaaten zu vergleichen, um die besonderen Merkmale ihres

Landes zu verstehen und um etwaige andere Länder zu ermitteln, die über

interessante Erfahrungen berichten, von denen man lernen kann.

Der diesjährige Bericht ist das Ergebnis eines Gemeinschaftsprojekts

zwischen DG ‘Beschäftigung, Soziales und Integration’ und Eurostat und

stützt sich auf die Erfahrung von Eurostat im Bereich demografischer

Untersuchungen. Er besteht aus zwei Teilen, einem kurzen Anhang zur

Abwanderung in Zeiten der Rezession und einem Länderanhang.

Teil I befasst sich mit den früheren und aktuellen Entwicklungstrends in

puncto Geburtenhäufigkeit, Lebenserwartung und Migration, den drei

Faktoren, die Bevölkerungsveränderungen auslösen. Darin enthalten ist ein

Überblick über die Bevölkerungsstruktur nach Alter und

Familienzusammensetzung.

In Teil II wird ein zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnendes Phänomen

untersucht, das in einer kürzlich durchgeführten Eurobarometer-Studie

ermittelt wurde. Die Studie war der steigenden Zahl europäischer Bürger

gewidmet, die sich ins Ausland begeben, um dort zu studieren, zu arbeiten,

Lebenserfahrung zu sammeln oder nach Anregungen suchen, was zu

unterschiedlichen Formen internationaler Verbundenheit über Staatsgrenzen

hinweg führt.

(

) KOM(2006) 571, angenommen am 12. Oktober 2006.

Demography Report, 2010

VERMEHRT ÄLTERE UND VIELFÄLTIGERE EUROPÄER

1.1. Neue Lebensweisen führen zu geringfügiger Steigerung

der Geburtenhäufigkeit

Die Bevölkerung Europas ist von allmählichen Veränderungen betroffen, die

jedoch beträchtliche Ausmaße erreichen. Es sind zwei positive Haupttrends

auszumachen: ein leichter Anstieg der Geburtenrate und eine höhere

Lebenserwartung. Die Geburtenrate befindet sich in keinem Mitgliedstaat

mehr auf niedrigstem Niveau (weniger als 1,3 Kinder pro Frau). Neuesten

Zahlen für die EU-27 zufolge lag sie bei 1,6 und könnte bei Bereinigung um

die Geburtenverschiebung (der sogenannte ‘Tempoeffekt’) auf über 1,7

steigen. Diese kleine Anpassung kann das Defizit in Bezug auf die Ersatzrate

von 2,1 nicht ausgleichen. Sie könnte jedoch zusammen mit einer möglichen

Zunahme der Geburtenrate bei zunehmendem Wohlstand in den EU-

Mitgliedstaaten mittel- bis längerfristig zu einem langsameren

Bevölkerungsrückgang beitragen.

Der mäßige Anstieg der Geburtenzahlen ergibt sich aus ziemlich neuen

Mustern der Familienzusammensetzung: In Ländern, in denen weniger

geheiratet wird, mehr eheähnliche Gemeinschaften bestehen, es mehr

Scheidungen gibt und Frauen, die Kinder gebären, ein höheres

Durchschnittsalter haben, liegt die Geburtenrate tendenziell höher. Die sich

verändernde gesellschaftliche Wahrnehmung der Bedeutung des Heiratens

und die geringere Dauerhaftigkeit von Beziehungen haben zu mehr

außerehelichen Geburten, auch alleinerziehender Eltern, bzw. Kinderlosigkeit

geführt.

Es ist schwierig, den Einfluss der Familienpolitik auf diese Trends zu

ermitteln, da eine wichtige Rolle kulturellen Faktoren zukommt. Die Daten

lassen allerdings darauf schließen, dass das spätere Kinderkriegen in einigen

Ländern (z. B. Frankreich, Dänemark, Finnland und die Niederlande) mit

höheren Geburtenraten und relativ großzügiger staatlicher Unterstützung für

die Eltern einhergeht. Auf der anderen Seite besteht für Eltern in Ländern,

wie z. B. Rumänien, die Slowakei und Ungarn, die ein niedrigeres Alter bei

Geburt der Kinder aufweisen kein Zusammenhang mit einer hohen

Geburtenrate herstellen.,. Dies würde auch mit den ersten Anzeichen

übereinstimmen, die darauf hindeuten, dass die Geburtenraten mit

steigendem Wohlstand auch wieder steigen, nachdem zuvor jahrzehntelang

genau das Gegenteil der Fall gewesen war. Aus den vorliegenden

Anhaltspunkten geht hervor, dass wir eine bessere Politik benötigen, die

Eltern dabei unterstützt, mit den Zwängen einer modernen Gesellschaft

zurechtzukommen.

1.2.

Eine „alternde“ Bevölkerungsstruktur

Es ist schwierig, die Auswirkungen politischer Maßnahmen vorherzusagen.

Eine Analyse der Konsequenzen einer sich verändernden

Bevölkerungsstruktur ist da einfacher. Niedrige Geburtenraten sind nur die

eine Seite, auf der anderen steht ein Rückgang der Sterblichkeitsziffer oder

positiv ausgedrückt eine längere Lebenserwartung. 2009 betrug das

durchschnittliche Bevölkerungsalter 40,6. Hochrechnungen zufolge wird es

2060 bei 47,9 Jahren liegen.

Überblick

Laut den Eurostat-Projektionen EUROPOP2008, die im vorangegangenen

Demografiebericht enthalten waren, wird sich ab 2014 ein Rückgang der

Erwerbsbevölkerung (20–64) bemerkbar machen, da die Babyboomer, die

direkt nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg geboren wurden, jetzt Anfang 60 sind

und in Rente gehen. Die Zahl der 60- und Über-60-Jährigen in der EU steigt

gegenwärtig um über 2 Millionen jedes Jahr, rund doppelt so schnell wie

noch vor drei Jahren. Auch die Erwerbsbevölkerung altert, da der Anteil

älterer Arbeitnehmer in Arbeit verglichen mit den jüngeren

Arbeitnehmergruppen zunimmt. Jedes Jahr werden rund 5 Millionen Kinder

in der EU-27 geboren und wandern über 2 Millionen Menschen aus

Drittländern ein. Jedes Jahr werden mehr Geburten als Sterbefälle gezählt,

wobei die Differenz mehrere Hunderttausend beträgt, und werden unter dem

Strich weit über eine Million Einwanderer verzeichnet. Die Zuwanderung

trägt folglich am meisten zum Wachstum der EU-Bevölkerung bei.

2008 lag die Lebenserwartung von Männern in der EU-27 bei 76,4 und von

Frauen bei 82,4 Jahren. Es gibt nach wie vor signifikante Unterschiede

zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten, die von knapp 13 Jahren für Männer bis zu 8

bei Frauen reichen. Außerdem war die Säuglingssterblichkeit 2009 in einigen

Ländern wie Rumänien (10,1 ‰) und Bulgarien (9,0 ‰) noch immer relativ

hoch, auch wenn in den vergangenen 15 Jahren ein Rückgang von um die

50 % in der EU-27 erreicht wurde. Eine größere Rolle scheint dabei der

sozioökonomische Status zu spielen, insbesondere in einigen

mitteleuropäischen Ländern. Infolgedessen darf eine Erhöhung der

Lebenserwartung insgesamt erwartet werden, wenn die Lebenserwartung von

benachteiligten Gruppen verbessert wird.

Eine mögliche Entwicklung ist die Verbesserung der gesunden

Lebenserwartung, durch Verzögerung des Stadiums, in dem der

Gesundheitszustand sich rasch zu verschlechtern beginnt, und dadurch die

Verschiebung hin zu einem höheren Sterbealter. Zu dieser Frage sind weitere

Belege und Untersuchungen nötig.

Programme, die sich mit der alternden Bevölkerung und Erwerbsbevölkerung

befassen, sorgen schwerpunktmäßig dafür, dass ältere Arbeitnehmer länger

im aktiven und produktiven Erwerbsleben bleiben können. Einer der Vorteile

einer alternden Bevölkerung liegt darin, dass sich mehr Möglichkeiten für

flexible Vereinbarungen im Laufe des Lebens bieten. Ein längeres aktives

Leben ermöglicht ausgedehnte oder wiederkehrende Weiterbildungsphasen,

eine höhere Arbeitszeitflexibilität während der Jahre, in denen Kinder und

berufliche Verpflichtungen nur schwer miteinander vereinbart werden

können, die Unterbrechung der beruflichen Laufbahn, wenn man sich um

Familienangehörige kümmern muss, und ein produktives Ausscheiden aus

dem Arbeitsleben durch ehrenamtliche Mitarbeit und allgemeines

gesellschaftliches Engagement.

1.3.

Europa in Bewegung

Die Migration, insbesondere aus Nicht-EU-Staaten, könnte die Überalterung

der Bevölkerung (vorübergehend) stoppen, da in erster Linie junge

Erwachsene (im Alter von 25–34) in andere Länder abwandern. Durch die

jüngeren ausländischen Personengruppen, die zunehmend zu den älteren

nationalen Personengruppen hinzukommen, verjüngt sich die

Gesamtbevölkerung und erhöht sich die Vielfalt. Aufgrund der

Einwanderung sowohl aus Drittländern als auch aus der EU-27

(innereuropäische Mobilität) in bislang unbekanntem Ausmaß während des

Demography Report, 2010

vergangenen Jahrzehnts hat sich der Anteil der Europäer, die nicht in ihrem

Heimatland oder Kulturkreis leben, beträchtlich erhöht.

In den Mitgliedstaaten der EU-27 leben rund 20 Millionen Nicht-EU-

Staatsbürger. Weitere 10 Millionen EU-Staatsbürger leben in einem anderen

Mitgliedstaat und etwa 5 Millionen Menschen haben seit 2001 die EU-

Staatsbürgerschaft erworben. Da die meisten Einwanderer relativ jung sind

und erst vor recht kurzer Zeit in die EU gekommen sind, leisten sie einen

großen Beitrag zur Erwerbsbevölkerung der EU-27. In der Zukunft wird sich

die erwerbstätige Bevölkerung zunehmend aus Menschen mit

Migrationshintergrund zusammensetzen. Von den EU-Staatsbürgern haben

neben den rund 8 % der EU-Ansässigen ausländischer Herkunft(

) weitere

5 % mindestens ein im Ausland geborenes Elternteil, und dieser Anteil wird

weiter wachsen. Man geht davon aus, dass der Anteil der Personen aller

Staatsangehörigkeiten mit mindestens einem im Ausland geborenen Elternteil

bis zum Jahr 2060 knapp ein Drittel der Bevölkerung der EU-27 betragen

wird. Bei der Erwerbsbevölkerung wird ein noch größerer Teil ausländischer

Abstammung sein.

Diese Trends erfordern, dass zusätzliche Anstrengungen unternommen

werden, um sicherzustellen, dass Immigranten die Möglichkeit haben, sich in

die Gesellschaft ihres Gastlandes zu integrieren. Noch wichtiger ist es, ihnen

zu ermöglichen, sich ihrem Bildungsniveau entsprechend am Arbeitsmarkt zu

beteiligen. Eine mobile Bevölkerung kann eine Bereicherung für die

Gastländer sein. Immer mehr Menschen möchten Auslandserfahrung machen.

Dadurch können sie zu einer effizienteren und produktiveren Wirtschaft

beitragen und außerdem ihre persönlichen Kompetenzen verbessern.

2. EINE ZUNEHMEND VIELFÄLTIGE UND MOBILE EU-

BEVÖLKERUNG

Da die Zuwanderung aus Drittländern und die Mobilität zwischen den

Mitgliedstaaten zunimmt, stammt ein wachsender Teil der

Erwerbsbevölkerung (15 % im Jahr 2008) aus dem Ausland oder verfügt über

mindestens ein Elternteil, das im Ausland geboren wurde.

Durch die sich verändernden Muster der Zuwanderung und Mobilität

innerhalb Europas wird das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten

Nation diffuser und komplexer, insbesondere im Falle der Freizügigkeit

zwischen den EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Wenngleich die traditionelle langfristige,

beschäftigungsbedingte und männerdominierte Zuwanderung nach wie vor

existiert, immigrieren zunehmend auch Frauen und bilden mittlerweile in

einigen Mitgliedstaaten die Mehrheit. Auch die Richtung der Mobilität hat

sich geändert: Einige der Mitgliedstaaten, aus denen traditionell viele

Auswanderer stammten, sind mittlerweile sehr beliebte

Einwanderungsländer.

Es ist definitiv kein neues geschichtliches Phänomen, dass die Bürger der EU

in andere Länder abwandern und die Kulturen sich vermischen. Frühere

Migrationsströme haben sich unterschiedlich auf die Größe und Struktur der

Bevölkerung in den meisten EU-27-Mitgliedstaaten ausgewirkt und bei den

Bürgern zu einer verstärkt europäischen Perspektive beigetragen.

Einwanderer möchten häufig eine enge Bindung zu ihrem Herkunftsland

(

) Zur Gruppe der im Ausland Geborenen zählen hier Personen, die in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat geboren sind als dem, in dem

sie wohnen.

Überblick

aufrechterhalten, diese Verknüpfungen nehmen jedoch mit der Zeit

tendenziell ab.

Die generationsübergreifende Integration von Einwanderern erfolgt recht

zügig. In den meisten Ländern, in denen ein beträchtlicher Anteil an

Einwanderern der zweiten Generation lebt, schneiden diese in der Schule und

im Berufsleben deutlich besser als die erste Generation und fast so gut wie

die Einwohner ohne ausländische Wurzeln ab. Dies gilt sowohl für

Nachkömmlinge von Migranten aus anderen Mitgliedstaaten als auch für

diejenigen aus Drittländern. Trotz allem sind die Nachkommen von

Migranten auch noch in der dritten Generation – der üblichen Dauer bis zu

vollständigen Integration – in gewisser Weise mit dem Herkunftsland ihrer

Vorfahren verbunden, beispielsweise in Form von

Fremdsprachenkenntnissen.

Neben der traditionellen Migration und Mobilität sind auch neue Formen der

Mobilität zu erkennen. Umzüge ins Ausland finden hauptsächlich innerhalb

der Mitgliedstaaten und für kürzere Zeiträume auf der Suche nach Arbeit, im

Rahmen der Ausbildung oder zwecks Wahrnehmung sonstiger Möglichkeiten

statt. Bei diesem mobilen Teil der Bevölkerung handelt es sich in der Regel

um gut ausgebildete junge Menschen, die eher am oberen Ende der

Berufsskala angesiedelt sind. Diese Form der Mobilität basiert zunehmend

auf persönlichen Präferenzen und der Wahl eines bestimmten Lebensstils,

und nicht ausschließlich auf wirtschaftlichen Gründen. Die erhöhte

Mobilitätsneigung könnte für die EU von großem Nutzen sein, da so ein

besserer Abgleich von Kompetenzen und Sprachkenntnissen mit

Stellenangeboten möglich wird. Die Ergebnisse einer Eurobarometer-Studie

(

) deuten auf das Vorhandensein einer vielfältigen und wachsenden Anzahl

mobiler junger Menschen hin, die sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie allesamt

gerne einen Blick über die eigenen Landesgrenzen hinweg werfen möchten.

Der Eurobarometer-Studie ist ferner zu entnehmen, dass ungefähr ein Fünftel

der Teilnehmer aus den 27 EU-Ländern irgendwann im Laufe des Lebens

entweder im Ausland gearbeitet oder studiert hat, mit einem Partner aus

einem anderen Land liiert war oder Immobilien im Ausland besitzt. Bei der

Hälfte dieser Befragten sind Vorfahren aus anderen Ländern der Grund für

die Verbindung, bei der anderen Hälfte handelt es sich meistens um junge

und gut ausgebildete Menschen, die sich bewusst für eine bestimmte

Lebensform entscheiden, um andere Länder kennenzulernen. Ihre

Bereitschaft, wenn nicht gar Lust, auszuwandern, ist bis zu viermal höher als

bei Personen, die keinerlei Verbindungen zu einem anderen Land haben. Da

dieses Phänomen künftig wahrscheinlich noch stärker an Bedeutung gewinnt,

sollte die Politik die damit verbundenen Konsequenzen in die Planung der

sozioökonomischen Zukunft der europäischen Bevölkerung mit einbeziehen.

BEVÖLKERUNGSPOLITIK WÄHREND DER REZESSION

Vor Beginn der Rezession hatte das Engagement der EU-Mitgliedstaaten im

Hinblick auf die Umsetzung der politischen Zielsetzungen des Vertrags von

Lissabon bereits erste Ergebnisse in Form von Beschäftigung für junge

Menschen, Frauen, ältere Arbeitnehmer und Einwanderer gezeigt. Die ersten,

die die Rezession zu spüren bekamen, waren jüngere Menschen und

Einwanderer. Den Regierungen fiel es zunehmend schwer, die Unterstützung

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf

Demography Report, 2010

für Familien, die Konsolidierung der Haushalte, die Leistungen für junge

Menschen und Einwanderer sowie die Finanzierung der Rentensysteme vor

dem Hintergrund eines schrumpfenden Arbeitsmarktes miteinander zu

vereinbaren.

Es ist noch zu früh für sichere Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf die

Auswirkungen der Krise auf die Geburtenhäufigkeit und Lebenserwartung.

Die in vergangenen Rezessionsperioden gemachte Erfahrung zeigt, dass

sowohl die Geburtenrate als auch die Sterblichkeit anfangs leicht

zurückgehen, aber dann kurz nach Ende der Krise wieder auf den Stand vor

der Krise steigen.

Neue Wohnsitzdaten von Eurostat lassen Rückschlüsse auf die Gründe für

die Einwanderung aus Drittländern zu. Den verfügbaren Daten ist zu

entnehmen, dass der Zuwanderungsrückgang hauptsächlich darauf

zurückzuführen ist, dass weniger Menschen aus beruflichen und familiären

Gründen auswandern, während die Zahl der zu Studien- und sonstigen

Zwecken ausgestellten Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen zwischen 2008 und 2009

leicht angestiegen ist.

WAS WIRD UNTERNOMMEN?

Im Juni 2010 verabschiedete der Europarat die neue zehnjährige Strategie

Europa 2020 für mehr Beschäftigung und intelligentes, nachhaltiges und

integratives Wachstum (

). Die Strategie dient der Neuausrichtung

vorhandener politischer Maßnahmen weg vom Krisenmanagement hinzu

mittel- bis längerfristigen Zielsetzungen zur Förderung von Wachstum und

Beschäftigung sowie zur Sicherstellung der zukünftigen Tragfähigkeit

öffentlicher Finanzen. Letzteres ist eine Grundvoraussetzung für den sozialen

Zusammenhalt in der EU.

Die Rezession hat das Engagement der Mitgliedstaaten, sich den

demografischen Herausforderungen zu stellen, nicht geschmälert. Die

Mitgliedstaaten scheinen im Gegenteil noch stärker dazu entschlossen zu

sein. Die Strategie, mit der man den demografischen Veränderungen

begegnen wollte, stimmt anscheinend genau mit dem Grundtenor der neuen

Strategie Europa 2020 überein. Als Folge der Rezession – und trotz der

trüben Aussichten für die öffentlichen Haushalte – ist die Europäische

Kommission davon überzeugt, dass der demografische Aspekt von den

Mitgliedstaaten bei der Ausarbeitung ihrer Strategien zur Überwindung der

derzeitigen Rezession umfassend berücksichtigt werden muss.

Bereits im Oktober 2006 hat die Kommission in ihrer Mitteilung zur

demografischen Zukunft Europas

(17)

hervorgehoben, dass sich die EU die

demografischen Möglichkeiten zunutze machen sollte. In der Mitteilung hieß

es, man solle das Problem der niedrigen Geburtenraten durch Schaffung

besserer Bedingungen für Familien angehen, damit das Problem der

schrumpfenden Erwerbsbevölkerung gelöst würde, indem man die

Beschäftigungsquote und Produktivitätsrate erhöht, sich auf Zuwanderung

und bessere Integration stützt und letztendlich auch die zukünftigen

Bedürfnisse einer alternden Gesellschaft durch Schaffung tragfähiger

öffentlicher Haushalte erfüllt. Es liege in der Verantwortung der

Mitgliedstaaten, zu entscheiden, wie sie ihr Potenzial verwirklichen. In der

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_de.htm

(

)

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:DE:PDF

Überblick

Mitteilung wurde die Art der Unterstützung hervorgehoben, welche die EU

den Mitgliedstaaten im Hinblick auf die Koordinierung der bestehenden

politischen Maßnahmen anbieten kann. Auf Ersuchen der Mitgliedstaaten

und mit Unterstützung des Europäischen Parlaments wird dieser Prozess

durch die Aktivitäten ergänzt, die unter dem Dach der Europäischen Allianz

für Familien (

) und des geplanten Europäischen Jahres für aktives

Altern 2012 (

) organisiert werden.

Der Erfolg der Strategie ist weitgehend an die Fähigkeit der EU gebunden,

sich den großen demografischen Veränderungen des kommenden Jahrzehnts

zu stellen.

Die Zukunft Europas hängt in hohem Maße davon ab, ob das hohe Potenzial

der beiden am schnellsten wachsenden Bevölkerungsteile genutzt werden

kann: ältere Menschen und Einwanderer. Es lassen sich drei politische

Bereiche ausmachen, die für die Förderung des Wirtschaftswachstums und

die Schaffung eines stärkeren sozialen Zusammenhalts entscheidend sein

dürften:

– Die Förderung des aktiven Alterns: Ältere Menschen und

insbesondere die älter werdende Generation der Babyboomer können sich auf

ein langes gesundes Leben freuen und verfügen über wertvolle Kompetenzen

und Erfahrungen. Durch ein größeres Angebot an Möglichkeiten des aktiven

Alterns können diese Personengruppen auch nach ihrer Pensionierung noch

einen sozialen Beitrag leisten.

–

Die Integration von Migranten und deren Nachkommen: Dieser Punkt

ist für Europa von entscheidender Bedeutung, da Migranten sogar einen noch

größeren Teil der Erwerbsbevölkerung ausmachen werden. Die niedrigen

Beschäftigungsquoten von Migranten sind sowohl in sozialer als auch

finanzieller Hinsicht nicht tragbar.

– Die Vereinbarkeit von bezahlter Arbeit und familiären

Verpflichtungen: Personen mit Betreuungsverantwortung erhalten immer

noch keine angemessene Unterstützung und geeignete Optionen, um ihre

unterschiedlichen Pflichten miteinander zu vereinbaren. Als Folge davon

wird das Wirtschaftswachstum blockiert, weil zu viele Menschen ihre

erstklassigen Kompetenzen und erworbenen Kenntnisse auf dem

Arbeitsmarkt nicht in vollem Umfang nutzen können. Besonders Frauen sind

aufgrund der hartnäckigen geschlechterbezogenen Kluft in Bezug auf Beruf

und Gehalt betroffen.

Gleichzeitig müssen in Europa aber auch Wege gefunden werden, wie eine

höhere Produktivität aufrechterhalten werden kann, während man sich auf

steigende Kosten in Verbindung mit einer alternden Gesellschaft einstellen

muss, und das vor dem Hintergrund schrumpfender öffentlicher Haushalte

infolge der Rezession.

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=de&id=1

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=de&catId=89&newsId=860

RÉSUMÉ

Depuis le dernier Rapport 2008 sur la démographie, publié la même année, la

population de l’UE a franchi le seuil des 500 millions d’individus tout en

continuant à se développer conformément à l’évolution déjà perceptible il y a

deux ans. Le tableau démographique de l’UE a gagné en précision : la

croissance est principalement alimentée par l’immigration, tandis que la

population vieillit et se diversifie. L’influence de la crise économique est

toujours difficile à évaluer.

En octobre 2006, dans sa communication intitulée

«L’avenir démographique

de l’Europe, transformer un défi en opportunité»

(20)

la Commission a

présenté ses points de vue sur les défis démographiques rencontrés par l’UE

et sur les options pour les relever. La communication a exprimé sa confiance

en la capacité de l’Europe à faire face aux changements démographiques et

au vieillissement de la population en particulier, mais a également souligné la

nécessité d’agir dans cinq secteurs clés : le renouveau démographique,

l’emploi, la productivité, l’intégration des migrants et les finances publiques

soutenables

Ce troisième Rapport sur la démographie vise à fournir les derniers chiffres et

données nécessaires pour un débat éclairé sur ces questions. Outre la vue

d’ensemble au niveau communautaire, les chiffres sont donnés, dans la

mesure du possible, pour l’ensemble des 27 États membres de l’UE,

permettant aux décideurs politiques et aux parties prenantes de comparer la

situation de leur propre pays avec celle des autres États membres, de

comprendre les caractéristiques spécifiques de leur pays et, si possible,

d’identifier d’autres pays qui pourraient apporter d’intéressantes expériences

dont on pourrait s’instruire.

Cette année, le rapport est réalisé en collaboration avec la Direction Générale

Emploi, affaires sociales et inclusion

et Eurostat, et tire parti de

l’expérience d'Eurostat en matière d’analyse démographique. Il se compose

de deux parties, d’une brève annexe sur la migration au cours de la récession

et d’une annexe contenant des fiches par pays.

La partie I est consacrée aux tendances historiques et récentes concernant la

fécondité, l’espérance de vie et la migration, qui sont les trois facteurs clés de

l’évolution de la population. Elle inclut un examen de la structure de la

population par âge et composition familiale.

La partie II se penche sur un phénomène de plus en plus important qui a été

identifié dans une récente enquête Eurobaromètre : un nombre croissant de

citoyens européens recherchent des opportunités au-delà des frontières de

leur pays pour étudier, travailler, puiser leur inspiration et vivre des

expériences, ce qui conduit à la création de différentes formes de liens par-

delà les frontières nationales.

(

) COM(2006) 571, adoptée le 12 octobre 2006.

Résumé

1. DES EUROPÉENS PLUS NOMBREUX, PLUS ÂGÉS, VIVANT

DANS UNE PLUS GRANDE DIVERSITÉ

1.1. Des modèles nouveaux entraînent une légère

augmentation de la fécondité

Des changements progressifs, mais néanmoins significatifs, touchent la

population en Europe. Deux tendances positives principales émergent : une

légère augmentation de la fécondité et une plus grande espérance de vie. La

très faible fécondité – inférieure à 1,3 enfant par femme – n’est plus de mise

dans l’ensemble des États membres. Le chiffre le plus récent pour l’Europe

des 27 s’est élevé à 1,6 et pourrait grimper à plus d’1,7 si les ajustements

pour le report des naissances (les dénommés « effets de tempo ») sont pris en

considération. Ce petit ajustement ne compense pas le déficit par rapport au

seuil de renouvellement de 2,1, mais pourrait contribuer à un ralentissement

du taux de la baisse de la population à moyen/plus long terme, parallèlement

à une possible augmentation de la fécondité à mesure d’un enrichissement

des États membres de l’UE.

La progression modeste de la fécondité est le résultat de modèles quelque peu

nouveaux en termes de schéma familial : des pays avec moins de mariages,

davantage de concubinage, plus de divorces et une moyenne plus élevée de

l’âge des femmes au moment de l’accouchement tendent à engendrer une

fécondité plus élevée. Le changement des perceptions sociales quant au rôle

du mariage et une plus grande fragilité des relations sont à l’origine d’un

nombre plus élevé de naissances extraconjugales, y compris dans les familles

monoparentales, ou d’une infécondité.

L’impact des politiques familiales sur ces tendances est difficile à évaluer

dans la mesure où les facteurs culturels jouent un rôle important. Cependant,

les données suggèrent que l’ajournement de la maternité à un âge plus avancé

s’accompagne dans quelques pays (France, Danemark, Finlande et Pays-Bas

par exemple) de taux de fécondité plus élevés et d’aides publiques

relativement généreuses pour les parents. À l’autre extrémité de l’échelle,

dans des pays comme la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et la Hongrie, un âge

inférieur à l’accouchement n’est pas associé à un taux de fécondité élevé.

Cette situation serait également en phase avec les premiers éléments

indiquant que la fécondité s’accroît encore avec la richesse, après des

décennies de fécondité en berne alors que les pays s’enrichissaient.

Cette évidence émergente étaie la thèse selon laquelle il est nécessaire de

disposer de meilleures politiques pouvant aider les parents à faire face aux

contraintes d’une société moderne.

1.1.

Une structure de la population « vieillissante »

Bien qu’il soit difficile de prédire l’influence des politiques, une analyse de

l’impact des changements dans la structure de la population est plus simple.

Les faibles taux de fécondité ne constituent qu’un des deux aspects du

phénomène, l’autre aspect étant une baisse du nombre des décès, ou en

termes plus positifs, d’une hausse de l’espérance de vie. En 2009, l’âge

moyen de la population était de 40,6 et il devrait atteindre, selon les

prévisions, 47,9 ans d’ici 2060.

Demography Report, 2010

Les projections EUROPOP2008, préparées par Eurostat et présentées dans le

précédent Rapport sur la démographie, indiquent que d’ici 2014, la

population active (20-64) commencera à se contracter alors que

d’importantes cohortes de « baby-boomers » nés immédiatement après la

Seconde Guerre atteignent désormais la soixantaine et prennent leur retraite.

Le nombre d’individus âgés de 60 ans et plus au sein de l’UE croît

actuellement de plus de deux millions chaque année, à peu près deux fois le

taux observé jusqu’il y a encore trois ans. La population active vieillit

également du fait de l’accroissement de la proportion des travailleurs plus

âgés en activité par rapport aux groupes de travailleurs plus jeunes. Chaque

année, environ 5 millions d’enfants voient le jour dans l’Europe des 27 et

plus de 2 millions de personnes immigrent de pays tiers. Les naissances

dépassent les décès de plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes chaque

année tandis que l’immigration nette est nettement supérieure à un million.

En conséquence, l’immigration représente la part la plus importante de la

croissance de la population de l’UE.

En 2008, l’espérance de vie pour l’Europe des 27 était de 76,4 ans pour les

hommes et de 82,4 ans pour les femmes. Les écarts parmi les États membres

sont toujours très significatifs, allant de presque 13 ans pour les hommes à 8

ans pour les femmes. La mortalité infantile en 2009 est aussi toujours

relativement élevée dans certains pays tels que la Roumanie (10,1 ‰) et la

Bulgarie (9,0 ‰), même si une baisse d’environ 50 % pour l’UE-27 a été

enregistrée au cours des 15 dernières années. Le statut socio-économique

semble jouer un rôle majeur, notamment dans certains pays d’Europe

centrale. Par conséquent, en améliorant l’espérance de vie des catégories

désavantagées, une hausse générale de l’espérance de vie globale devrait

également se profiler.

Une évolution possible serait l’amélioration de l’espérance de vie en bonne

santé, en retardant le moment auquel les conditions physiques commencent à

se détériorer rapidement, reportant de ce fait la mort à un âge ultérieur. . Ce

sujet important exige d’autres preuves et analyses.

Les politiques abordant le vieillissement de la population et la main-d’œuvre

visent à permettre aux travailleurs plus âgés de rester actifs et productifs

pendant une plus longue période de leur vie. L’un des avantages d’une

population vieillissante est qu’elle offre plus de possibilités en termes de

souplesse des dispositions au cours de la vie. Une plus longue vie active

permet des périodes prolongées ou périodiques en matière d’éducation ; une

plus grande flexibilité du temps de travail pendant les années d’effervescence

où la maternité et les engagements professionnels coïncident ; une

interruption de carrière temporaire quand il devient nécessaire de prendre

soin de membres de la famille ; et une retraite productive via le volontariat et

un engagement général dans la vie sociale.

1.2.

L’Europe en mouvement

L’immigration, notamment en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE,

pourrait fournir un sursis (provisoire) au vieillissement de la population,

puisque la plupart des personnes émigrent principalement lorsqu’elles sont de

jeunes adultes (25-34 ans). Alors que les groupes de jeunes étrangers entrent

progressivement dans les cohortes nationales plus âgées, l’ensemble de la

population rajeunit et la diversité s’accroît. Des niveaux sans précédent

d’immigration provenant tant de pays tiers que de l’UE-27 (mobilité

intracommunautaire) au cours de la dernière décennie ont sensiblement

Résumé

augmenté la part d'habitantseuropéens qui ne vivent pas dans leur propre pays

natal ou dans leur milieu culturel.

Les États membres de l’UE-27 accueillent environ 20 millions de

ressortissants ne provenant pas de l’UE. 10 autres millions de ressortissants

de l’UE vivent dans un autre État membre et environ 5 millions de

ressortissants tiers sont devenus citoyens européens depuis 2001. Étant donné

que la plupart des migrants sont relativement jeunes et sont arrivés assez

récemment, ils contribuent notablement à l’ampleur de la main-d’œuvre de

l’UE-27. À l’avenir, la main-d’œuvre comptera de plus en plus de personnes

provenant de l’immigration. Parmi les ressortissants de l’UE, outre le taux

approximatif de 8 % de personnes résidant dans l’UE et nées à l’étranger (

5 % supplémentaires ont au moins un parent né à l’étranger, et cette catégorie

continuera à croître. En 2060, les personnes de toute nationalité ayant au

moins un parent né à l’étranger devraient représenter près d’un tiers de la

population de l’UE-27. Un pourcentage encore plus important de la main-

d’œuvre sera d’origine étrangère.

Ces tendances impliquent que des efforts supplémentaires sont nécessaires

pour garantir que les immigrés aient l’opportunité de s’intégrer dans leur

société d’accueil et, fondamentalement, de leur permettre de contribuer au

marché du travail en utilisant pleinement leurs qualifications. Une population

mobile peut être perçue comme un atout par les pays d’accueil. Dans la

mesure où de plus en plus de gens recherchent une expérience à l’étranger, ils

peuvent contribuer à une économie plus efficace et productive tout en

renforçant leurs compétences personnelles.

UNE POPULATION EUROPÉENNE DE PLUS EN PLUS DIVERSE

ET MOBILE

Alors que les flux migratoires en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE

et la mobilité entre États membres se sont intensifiés, une proportion

croissante de la population active (15 % en 2008) est née à l’étranger ou a au

moins un parent né à l’étranger.

L’évolution des schémas migratoires et de la mobilité en Europe rendent le

sentiment national relatif à l’appartenance à une nation particulière plus

diffus et complexe, en particulier dans le cas de la mobilité entre les États

membres de l’UE. Bien que l’immigration traditionnelle à long terme,

motivée par l’emploi, principalement masculine, soit toujours à l’ordre du

jour, les femmes immigrantes sont de plus de plus présentes et sont

désormais majoritaires dans certains États membres. Les flux de mobilité ont

également changé : certains des principaux États membres traditionnels

d’émigration sont devenus des pôles d’attraction pour les migrants.

La migration à grande échelle et le mélange des cultures ne sont évidemment

pas un nouveau phénomène dans l’histoire de l’UE. Les flux passés ont eu un

impact différent sur la taille et la structure de la population dans la plupart

des États membres de l’UE-27 et ils ont contribué à une perspective plus

européenne parmi ses citoyens. Les immigrés souhaitent souvent conserver

un attachement proche à leur pays d’origine, mais ces liens tendent à

s’amenuiser au fil du temps.

(

) L’expression « nées à l’étranger » inclut ici les personnes nées dans un État membre différent de celui dans lequel elles résident.

Demography Report, 2010

L’intégration des immigrés à travers les générations s’effectue plutôt

rapidement. Dans la plupart des pays disposant d’une proportion substantielle

d’immigrés de la seconde génération, ceux-ci réussissent nettement mieux sur

le plan de l’éducation tout comme sur le marché du travail que les immigrés

de la première génération et presque aussi bien que les individus sans origine

étrangère ; cela s’applique aux descendants des migrants provenant des autres

États membres et des immigrés en provenance des pays non membres de

l’UE. Néanmoins, même après trois générations, – le temps habituellement

nécessaire pour une intégration totale – les descendants des migrants

conservent un certain attachement aux pays de leurs ancêtres, par leur

connaissance des langues étrangères par exemple.

Parallèlement à l’immigration et à la mobilité traditionnelles, il existe de

nouvelles formes de mobilité. Les individus se déplacent à l’étranger,

principalement dans d’autres États membres, pour des périodes plus courtes

en vue de chercher du travail, de poursuivre leur formation ou pour toute

autre opportunité de vie. Ces individus mobiles tendent à être de jeunes

adultes instruits, dirigés vers l’extrémité supérieure de l’échelle

professionnelle. Cette forme de mobilité est basée de plus en plus sur des

préférences personnelles et des choix de vie, et pas seulement sur des

opportunités économiques. La propension accrue à la mobilité pourrait être

très bénéfique à l’UE en permettant une meilleure mise en adéquation des

qualifications et des capacités linguistiques avec les offres d’emploi. Les

résultats d’une enquête Eurobaromètre (

) mettent en évidence la présence

d’un nombre varié et croissant de jeunes gens mobiles caractérisés par un

intérêt commun pour ce qui se fait au-delà des frontières nationales.L’enquête

Eurobaromètre indique également qu’une personne sondée sur cinq de l’UE-

27 a étudié ou travaillé dans un autre pays à un moment donné, vécu avec un

conjoint d’un autre pays ou possède un bien immobilier à l’étranger. La

moitié de ces personnes sondées a des liens avec d’autres pays par

ascendance ; l’autre moitié est le plus souvent jeune et instruite et effectue

consciemment un choix de vie qui la met en contact avec d’autres pays. Ils

partagent une forte volonté, sinon une propension à se déplacer à l’étranger,

jusqu’à quatre fois plus que les personnes qui ne disposent d’aucune

connexion avec un autre pays. Étant donné que ce phénomène est susceptible

de devenir bien plus important à l’avenir, il est possible que les décideurs

politiques souhaitent tenir compte de ses implications dans la planification de

l’avenir socio-économique de la population européenne.

3. POLITIQUE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE AU COURS DE LA

RÉCESSION

Avant la récession économique, l’engagement des États membres de l’UE à

mettre en application les objectifs politiques inscrits dans le programme du

traité de Lisbonne avait commencé à donner des résultats sous la forme de

l’emploi des jeunes, des femmes, des travailleurs plus âgés et des migrants.

Quand la récession est survenue, les premiers groupes à être affectés ont été

les jeunes et les immigrés. Les gouvernements ont fait face à des difficultés

croissantes en équilibrant soutien aux familles, consolidation des budgets,

aide aux jeunes et aux immigrés sur un marché du travail en contraction, et en

finançant les régimes de retraite.

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf

Résumé

Il est trop tôt pour tirer toute conclusion définitive concernant l’impact de la

crise sur la fécondité et l’espérance de vie. L’expérience récente des

récessions passées indique que la fécondité et la mortalité peuvent baisser

légèrement dans un premier temps pour revenir à leurs niveaux antérieurs à la

récession peu de temps après la fin de la crise.

Les nouvelles données d’Eurostat sur les permis de séjour mettent en lumière

les raisons de l’immigration en provenance des pays non membres de l’UE.

Les données disponibles montrent que la baisse de l’immigration est en

grande partie due à une réduction de l’immigration pour des raisons

professionnelles et familiales, alors que le nombre de permis de séjour

délivrés pour les études et d’autres raisons a légèrement augmenté de 2008 à

2009.

4. MESURES PRISES

En juin 2010, le Conseil européen a adopté la nouvelle stratégie Europe2020

pour les dix ans à venir afin de créer davantage d’emplois et parvenir à une

croissance intelligente, durable et exhaustive (

). La stratégie définit une

réorientation des politiques existantes depuis la gestion de la crise jusqu’aux

objectifs à moyen et plus long terme pour favoriser la croissance et l’emploi

et pour assurer la durabilité future des finances publiques. Ce dernier point

est une condition préalable pour la cohésion sociale durable dans l’UE.

La récession n’a pas amenuisé l’engagement des États membres à relever le

défi démographique. Au contraire, cet engagement semble avoir été renforcé.

La stratégie adoptée pour aborder la mutation démographique semble

concorder avec la poussée globale de la nouvelle stratégie Europe 2020. Dans

le sillage de la récession, et en dépit des mornes perspectives pour les

finances publiques, la Commission européenne est convaincue que la

dimension démographique mérite d’être entièrement prise en considération

par les États membres lorsqu’ils formulent leurs stratégies de sortie de la

récession actuelle.

La nécessité de mobiliser les possibilités démographiques de l’UE a été déjà

soulignée en octobre 2006 dans la communication de la Commission sur

l’avenir démographique de l’Europe

(24)

. Cette communication a suggéré que

le problème de la faible fécondité devrait être abordé en créant de meilleures

conditions pour aider les familles et traiter le problème d’une contraction de

la main-d’œuvre en relevant les taux d’emploi et les niveaux de productivité,

en se fiant à l’immigration et à une meilleure intégration et, pour finir, en

préservant la capacité à répondre aux besoins futurs d’une société

vieillissante en créant des finances publiques durables. Il appartient aux États

membres de décider de quelle manière réaliser leur potentiel. La

communication a mis en évidence le type d’aide que l’UE peut apporter aux

États membres en termes de coordination des politiques existantes. À la

demande des États membres et avec l’appui du Parlement européen, ce

processus est complété par les activités organisées sous l’égide de l’Alliance

européenne pour les familles (

) et de l’Année européenne du vieillissement

actif désignée pour 2012 (

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_fr.htm

(

)

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0571:FIN:FR:PDF

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/families/index.cfm?langId=fr&id=1

(

)

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=fr&catId=89&newsId=860

Demography Report, 2010

Le succès de cette stratégie s’articule en grande partie autour de la capacité

de l’UE à faire face aux principales transformations démographiques de cette

prochaine décennie.

L’avenir de l’Europe dépend dans une large mesure de sa capacité à exploiter

le grand potentiel des deux segments augmentant le plus rapidement au sein

de sa population : les personnes âgées et les immigrés. Trois secteurs

semblent essentiels pour relancer la croissance économique et parvenir à une

plus grande cohésion sociale :

–

la promotion du vieillissement actif : les personnes âgées, et en

particulier les baby-boomers vieillissants, peuvent espérer vivre de plus

longues années en bonne santé, et détiennent des qualifications et des

expériences précieuses. Davantage d’opportunités en vue d’un vieillissement

actif leur permettront de continuer à apporter leur contribution à la société

même après la retraite.

–

l’intégration des immigrés et de leurs descendants : c’est primordial

pour l’Europe parce que les immigrés constitueront une part encore plus

importante de la main-d’œuvre européenne. Les faibles taux d’emploi des

immigrés sont socialement et financièrement très élevés.

–

la conciliation d’un travail rémunéré et d’obligations familiales : les

personnes ayant une charge familiale manquent toujours d’une aide adéquate

et de mesures appropriées pour combiner leurs différentes responsabilités. En

conséquence, la croissance économique est entravée, trop de personnes ne

pouvant pas mettre leur niveau élevé de qualifications et d’éducation à

disposition du marché du travail. Les femmes sont particulièrement touchées

en raison de la persistance des différences d’emploi selon le sexe et des écarts

de salaire.

Parallèlement, l’Europe doit trouver les moyens de maintenir une plus grande

productivité tout en se préparant à des niveaux croissants de dépenses liées au

vieillissement en dépit de l’assèchement des finances publiques consécutif à

la récession.

INTRODUCTION

The Commission's Europe 2020 Strategy has identified concern about population ageing, together with

globalisation, climate change, competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, as one of the key

challenges that the European Union needs to overcome.

Sixty years ago the number of births rose sharply and remained high for about 20 to 30 years. Now the

first of those baby-boomers, have reached the age of 60 and have started retiring. This marks a turning

point in the demographic development of the European Union and makes it all the more important to

consider the policy responses that are required by this major change. Population ageing, long discussed as

a looming prospect, has now become a reality.

This Report is the third in a series of biennial European Demography Reports to which the Commission

committed itself in its 2006 Communication 'The Demographic Future of Europe — From Challenge to

Opportunity'. This Communication showed that Europe has reasons to envisage its demographic future

with confidence. Population ageing is above all the result of economic, social and medical progress, as

well as greater control over the timing of births and the number of children that people have. The same

progress affords Europe significant opportunities for responding to the challenges of demographic

change, notably in five key areas:

–

better support for families;

– promotion of employment;

–

raising productivity and economic performance;

–

better support for immigration and the integration of migrants;

–

sustainable public finances.

Major reforms and decisive action are necessary to meet these challenges. The Communication stressed

that there is only a small window of opportunity, of about 10 years, during which further employment

growth remains possible. Increasing the number of highly productive and high quality jobs is the key to

ensuring that Europe's economy and societies will be able to meet the needs of ageing populations. The

current economic crisis has not invalidated the EU’s strategy; on the contrary, it has made the speedy

implementation of this strategy more urgent.

The 2006 Communication announced that every two years the Commission would hold a European

Forum on Demography to take stock of the latest demographic developments and to review where the

European Union and the Member States stand in responding to demographic change. The first Forum

took place on 30-31 October 2006, the second on 24-25 November 2008 and the third on 22-23

November 2010. The purpose of the present Demography Report is to provide the up-to-date facts and

figures that are needed for an informed debate with the stakeholders taking part in the Forum and, in

particular, with the group of government experts on demography, involved in the conception of this

report.

As far as possible, data are provided for all EU-27 Member States, allowing policy makers and

stakeholders to compare their own country’s situation with that of others, to understand the specific

characteristics of their country and, perhaps, to identify countries that provide interesting examples of

practice from which lessons could be learned. In so doing, the report responds to request from Member

States wishing to learn from the range of national experience across the European Union.

Comments and suggestions to help the Commission improve the Report will be gratefully received and

should be sent to:

Demography Report, 2010

Unit D4 (Demography, Migration, Social Innovation and Civil Society)

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities

European Commission

B-1049 Brussels

EMPL-D4-COURRIER@ec.europa.eu

Data sources and comments

Online data

codes

Most of the data in this publication come from Eurostat's data base. Individual data

tables used in the various figure (graph or table) are referenced by a code provided

under each figure. To find more complete, updated or detailed data, visit

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

and

insert the code(s) in the 'search in tree' textbox.

Where a code is not available, the data are not available as a standard table and were

obtained in answer to a special query.

Some data comes from Eurobarometer surveys. Two main surveys are used in this

publication, namely the November 2009 survey on mobility (EBS 337, from the EB

round 72.5, can be found at

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_339_320_en.htm

and

the

report at

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_337_en.pdf

)

and the

March 2010 survey on the 'New Europeans' (EBS 346, from the EB round 73.3,

survey at

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_359_340_en.htm#346

and the

report

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_346_en.pdf

This publication made use of other more ad-hoc sources and their links can be found

in the text or in footnotes.

Comments

Comments and suggestions on this report will be gratefully received at

Unit D4

Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

European Commission

1049 Brussels – Belgium

EMPL-D4-unit@ec.europa.eu

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

1. INTRODUCTION

Table I.1.1:

Main demographic trends: Main findings

Life expectancy continues to rise, especially from gains at older ages. Since there are large

discrepancies among and within countries, there is scope for raising average life-spans for the less-

advantaged groups.

The most recent large wave of immigrants, that has swollen the cohorts of foreigners in mediterranean

countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, has abated in 2008.

Fertility is slightly on the rise. Lowest-low fertility, i.e. below 1.3 children per woman, has ended in every

Member State and the average is approaching 1.6 as of 2008.

The EU population ages at varying speed. Populations that are currently the oldest, such as Germany's

and Italy's, will age rapidly for the next twenty years, then stabilise. Some populations that are currently

younger, mainly in the East of the EU, will undergo ageing at increasing speed and by 2060 will have

the oldest populations in the EU.

Fertility indicators confirm the ongoing postponement of births to later ages in life. An adjustment for

this ‘tempo’ effect would raise the 2008 fertility rate in the EU to just over 1.7. This is still well below the

replacement rate of 2.1.

Not only people are living longer lives; they may be living longer healthy lives. There is evidence that the

process of ageing, during which people become progressively disabled until they die, is not becoming

slower; rather, it is progressively delayed. However, some data indicate that healthy life expectancy fell

from 2007 to 2009, and there is a need for more information on this subject.

Immigrants tend to be less-well educated and employed in jobs below their qualifications

As the 500-millionth person was born – or arrived

from abroad as an immigrant – EU-27 was, and

still is, undergoing major demographic changes.

These changes are slow, but they are very

significant.

Indicators observed just before the recession

suggest that fertility seems to be increasing again,

albeit only slowly. Life expectancy keeps rising.

The labour force keeps growing and EU-27 has

attracted large numbers of migrants.

When ten new countries joined the EU-27 in 2004,

most of them had known little economic migration.

Then, many of them experienced significant

emigration but, recently, some of them have

attracted migrants. Life expectancy in these

countries had not improved much in the 1990s, and

had even regressed in some countries, but in the

early 2000's, the figures started to catch up with

the 15 pre-2004 Member States.

In the meantime, EU-27 has developed some

peculiar demographic patterns. Across countries,

those where there are more marriages do not

necessarily report more births – on the contrary. A

younger average age at childbirth goes with lower

fertility rates. Wealth and life expectancy are not

strongly linked; some Member States are poorer

than others and yet their citizens live longer. There

may be signs that as countries become wealthier,

fertility increases.

Other patterns of change are less surprising in a

developed, ageing society. The population of

working age has been increasing less and will start

shrinking soon. The first decade of the 21

century

has seen large waves of immigrants come from

outside the EU. The first post-World War II ‘baby

boomers’ are entering their 60s, and are retiring.

From now on, the older population will keep

swelling.

2. FERTILITY

Fertility is increasing, albeit slightly. Most of the

increase is in countries that have experienced

extremely low fertility in the recent past, that is,

fertility below 1.3 children per woman. At the

same time, women are delaying motherhood,

giving birth much later in their lives.

2.1.

RECOVERY OF FERTILITY

In 2009, around 5.4 million children were born in

the EU-27, compared to about 7.5 million at the

beginning of the 1960s. The highest annual total

for the EU-27 was recorded in 1964, with 7.7

million live births. Over the past 30 years, the total

number of live births has been growing again,

albeit moderately, after reaching a low in 2002

(less than 5 million live births, see Graph I.2.1).

Graph I.2.1:

Number of live births in EU-27, 1980-2009

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

Million

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind),

The slowdown in population growth in the EU-27

is due partly to lower fertility.

The main indicator of fertility is the Total Fertility

Rate (TFR): this is the mean number of children

that would be born alive to a woman during her

lifetime if she were to pass through her

childbearing years conforming to the age-specific

fertility rates of a given year. A total fertility rate

of around 2.1 children per woman is considered to

be the replacement level, that is, the average

number of children per woman required to keep

the population size constant in the absence of

inward or outward migration. A TFR below 1.3

children per woman is described as ‘lowest-low

fertility’. TFR is used as an indicator for the

fertility level and is comparable across countries,

since it takes into account changes in the size and

structure of the population.

Table I.2.1 shows the TFR in the EU-27 and in all

Member States for selected years. The total

fertility rate declined steeply between 1980 and

2000-2003 in many Member States, falling far

below replacement level. In 2000, values had

fallen below 1.3 in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,

Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia and Slovakia. After

reaching a minimum between 2000 and 2003, in

the six years to 2009, the TFR had risen in most

Member States, and in 2009, all EU-27 countries

were displaying rates above 1.3.

Table I.2.1:

Total Fertility Rate (TFR), selected years

1980

1990

2000

2003

2009

EU-27

1.47

1.60

1.68

1.62

1.67

1.66

1.84

2.05

1.82

1.26

1.23

1.57

2.08

1.90

1.14

1.18

1.49

1.55

1.67

1.77

1.76

1.84

1.38

1.34

1.36

2.05

1.38

1.37

1.62

3.21

2.11

1.89

1.96

2.07

2.23

1.40

1.26

1.28

1.52

2.20

1.36

1.23

1.31

1.40

1.95

1.78

1.87

1.98

1.64

1.33

1.26

1.29

1.42

2.41

1.64

1.50

1.51

1.29

1.31

1.99

2.03

1.39

1.26

1.55

1.50

1.60

1.76

1.62

1.59

1.91

1.87

1.32

1.27

1.32

1.99

2.04

1.70

1.48

1.44

1.60

1.62

1.72

1.75

1.79

1.65

1.46

1.36

1.38

1.39

2.06

1.35

1.22

1.40

2.25

1.56

1.55

1.44

1.32

2.43

1.83

1.31

1.27

1.38

1.46

1.26

1.20

1.53

2.32

2.09

1.30

1.20

1.41

1.63

1.78

1.73

1.76

1.86

1.68

2.13

1.54

1.71

1.94

1.90

1.83

1.64

1.71

1.96

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_find)

Over the past 30 years, total fertility rates in the

EU-27 Member States have been converging: in

1980, the disparity between the highest (Ireland)

and the lowest (Luxembourg) was 1.7. By 1990,

this difference had decreased to 1.1 (between

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

Cyprus and Italy); in 2009 it was down to 0.8, with

Ireland and Latvia representing the two extremes.

Among the countries for which 1980 data are

available, in eight Member States (Belgium,

Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the

2009 TFR is equal to or higher than that in 1980.

On the other hand, the TFR fell by more than 40

between 1980 and 2009 in Romania and Portugal.

In absolute terms, the decline in the total fertility

rate was steepest in Ireland, from 3.21 to 2.07.

Groups of countries with similar trends in TFR can

be identified in Table I.2.1. A steady increase in

TFR is found in Denmark, the Netherlands and, to

a lesser extent, Finland. A small group composed

of Cyprus, Malta and Portugal displays a steadily-

declining TFR since 1980. In other Member States,

the trend is more often in the form of a U-shaped

curve, with the TFR bottoming out around 2000 or

2003, and recovering by 2009. By contrast,

Germany, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and

Portugal had lower fertility in 2009 than in 2000.

The (slight) increase in fertility between 2000 and

2009 may be partly due to a catching-up process,

following postponement of the decision to have

children. When women give birth later in life, the

total fertility rate first decreases, then recovers.

While in 2003, EU-27 TFR was 1.47 children per

woman, by 2009 it had risen to 1.6. The lowest

value in 2009 was in Latvia (1.31 children per

woman), while rates in Belgium, Denmark,

Ireland, France, Finland, Sweden and the United

Kingdom were above 1.8.

2.2.

WOMEN STILL POSTPONING BIRTHS

Over the past 30 years, the timing of births has

also changed significantly: the mean age of women

at childbirth has been postponed (

). The highest

ages at childbirth in 2009, as shown in Table I.2.2,

were in Ireland (31.2 years) and Italy (31.1 years),

whereas the lowest were in Bulgaria (26.6 years)

and Romania (26.9 years). The difference between

the highest and the lowest mean age at childbirth

was 4.6 years. In 2009, women in the following 13

Member States tended to have their children when

they were aged 30 or over: Denmark, Germany,

(

)

A more appropriate indicator to measure birth

postponement would be the mean age of women at first

childbirth; however, this indicator cannot be produced for

all Member States due to lack of data.

Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland

and Sweden.

Table I.2.2 shows that in the past 30 years, mean

age at childbirth rose by as much as six years in

Luxembourg. The difference is striking between

Member States that joined the EU after 2004 and

the others: in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,

Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia, the mean

age rose relatively little (and in some cases even

fell) between 1980 and 1990, whereas the rise was

more marked in the other Member States.

However, since 1990, a catching-up is also taking

place in Member States that joined the EU after

2004. In fact, since 1990, while mean age at

childbirth has been rising most rapidly in countries

that joined the EU after 2004, the trend appears to

be gradually slowing down in the other Member

States.

Table I.2.2:

Mean age of women at childbirth, selected

years

1980

1990

2000

2003

2009

EU-27

29.3

29.7

26.6

27.9

28.8

29.6

23.9

25.0

25.5

26.6

25.0

24.8

27.2

28.1

29.4

26.8

28.5

29.7

30.1

30.5

28.8

29.2

30.2

25.6

27.0

27.7

29.1

29.7

29.9

30.4

30.8

31.2

26.1

27.2

29.6

29.5

30.2

28.2

28.9

30.7

30.8

31.0

26.8

28.3

29.4

29.6

30.0

27.5

28.9

30.4

30.8

31.1

27.1

28.7

29.3

30.4

27.2

28.4

26.7

25.9

26.6

27.1

28.6

24.4

28.4

29.3

29.6

30.7

24.6

25.6

27.3

27.9

29.1

28.8

28.9

27.9

28.8

29.2

27.7

29.3

30.3

30.4

30.7

26.3

27.2

28.2

28.8

29.7

26.2

27.4

27.9

28.6

27.2

27.3

28.6

29.0

29.7

25.3

25.5

25.7

26.2

26.9

25.9

28.2

28.9

30.0

25.2

25.1

26.6

27.3

28.5

27.7

28.9

29.6

29.8

30.1

27.6

28.6

29.9

30.3

30.7

26.9

27.7

28.5

28.9

29.3

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_find)

Table I.2.3 summarises the TFR and the mean age

of women at childbirth for the EU-27 from 2002 to

Demography Report, 2010

Graph I.2.2:

Total fertility rate and mean age of women at childbirth, 2009

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

Mean age at childbirth

Total Fertility Rate

EU-27

EU-27, IT, UK, 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code demo_find)

2008, the only years for which information is

available for all 27 Member States composing the

EU aggregate. The total fertility rate rose slowly

but consistently from 1.45 children per woman in

2002 to 1.60 in 2008. The mean age of mothers at

childbirth also rose between 2003 and 2008, by 0.4

years, to reach 29.7 years in 2008.

Table I.2.3:

Total fertility rate and mean age of women at

childbirth in EU-27, 2002-2008

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

TFR

1.45

1.47

1.50

1.51

1.54

1.56

1.60

Mean age at

childbearing

: 29.3 29.4 29.5 29.6 29.7 29.7

TFR in 2002: EU-27 is estimated without BE

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_find)

The comparison among countries paints a different

picture.

Graph I.2.2 shows that many of the countries with

the highest total fertility rate also display a high

mean age for women at childbirth. Based on the

point representing the EU-27, four different groups

of Member States can be identified. One group is

composed of Denmark, Ireland, France, the

Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, where both the

TFR and the mean age at childbirth are above the

EU-27 average. In the diagonally opposite

quadrant lie most of the countries that joined the

EU after 2004, plus Austria and Portugal. In these

Member States, both the TFR and the mean age of

mothers at childbirth are below the EU-27 values.

The third group of Member States shows mothers

with a higher age at childbirth and lower TFR as

compared to the EU-27 average: this is the case in

Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus,

Luxembourg and Slovenia. The fourth and last

group is composed of Belgium, Estonia and the

United Kingdom, countries for which the TFR is

higher than the EU-27 value, but where the mean

age of mothers is lower. However, the age at

childbirth is still above 29 in these countries.

At the end of the first decade of the 21st century,

women in the EU-27 appear to be having fewer

children while they are young, and more later.

While the fertility rates of women aged under 30

have declined since the 1980s, those of women

aged 30 and over have risen, which would seem to

confirm that the long-term decline in fertility rates

within the EU-27 is associated with the

postponement of childbirth.

Graph I.2.3 compares fertility rates of mothers

aged 30 and over between 2000 and 2009. The

proportion has increased in all the EU-27

countries. In the Czech Republic, Cyprus,

Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, the increase was

above 15 percentage points (p.p.) in the eight years

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

considered. At the other end of the scale, the

increase was smaller, but still positive, in Spain

and in the Netherlands (both +2 p.p.).

Graph I.2.3:

Fertility of mothers aged 30 and over, 2000

and 2009 (ordered by difference 2009-2000)

(%)

100

2000

2009

IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France ;LV:

2002 instead of 2000

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_frate)

In 2009, 51 % of the EU-27 fertility rate in was to

mothers aged under 30 and 49

% to mothers aged

30 and over. In Ireland, Spain, Italy, the

Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark,

Germany, Greece, Cyprus and Finland, ‘young’

fertility, i.e. births to mothers aged below 30,

represents less than 50

% of the total fertility rates

in 2009 (Graph I.2.4). These Member States are

also found in Table I.2.2 to have the highest mean

age of women at childbirth. Ireland displays the

highest TFR in EU-27 in 2009, mainly due to the

high fertility rate among women aged 30 and over.

Conversely, in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,

Romania and Bulgaria, fertility of women aged

under 30 represents more than 60

% of the TFR,

and these are countries with low fertility rates.

Graph I.2.4:

Fertility by age group of mothers, 2009 (%)

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

EU-27

< 30 years old

≥ 30 years old

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_frate)

The postponement of births makes it difficult to

estimate ‘real’ total fertility rates: postponement

depresses the TFR until the process comes to an

end.

2.3.

REVISITING FERTILITY TRENDS

The postponement of births introduces a bias in

Total Fertility Rates, since fertility rates are

computed in a given year using information across

different cohorts of women. Postponement results

in the TFR being underestimated. Because it is

possible to estimate the postponement effect, the

TFR can be adjusted. The ‘tempo’ effect is one

such method of adjustment.

Demography Report, 2010

Table I.2.4:

Fertility rate differences (2006-2008) and

'tempo' adjustment

TFR

2006

TFR

2008

Tempo-

adjusted

TFR

Gap Diff. TFR

(a)

(b)

(c)

(c)-(a)

(b)-(a)

EU-27

1.54

1.60

1.72

0.18

0.07

1.80

1.86

1.85

0.05

0.06

1.38

1.48

1.73

0.35

0.10

1.33

1.50

1.79

0.47

0.17

1.85

1.89

1.97

0.13

0.04

1.33

1.38

1.62

0.29

0.05

1.55

1.65

1.90

0.36

0.11

1.93

2.10

2.08

0.15

0.17

1.40

1.51

1.52

0.12

0.11

1.38

1.46

1.40

0.02

0.08

1.98

1.99

2.13

0.15

0.01

1.35

1.42

1.47

0.12

0.07

1.45

1.46

1.96

0.51

0.01

1.35

1.44

1.61

0.26

0.10

1.31

1.47

1.75

0.44

0.16

1.65

1.61

2.05

0.40

-0.04

1.34

1.35

1.65

0.31

0.01

1.39

1.44

1.59

0.20

0.05

1.72

1.77

1.79

0.07

0.05

1.41

1.66

0.25

0.00

1.27

1.39

1.50

0.23

0.12

1.36

1.37

1.56

0.20

0.01

1.32

1.35

1.55

0.23

0.04

1.31

1.53

1.60

0.28

0.21

1.24

1.32

1.66

0.42

0.08

1.84

1.85

1.93

0.09

0.01

1.85

1.91

1.94

0.09

0.05

1.84

1.96

2.07

0.22

0.11

Tempo adjusted refers to the mean for 2005-2007 (IT: 2004-

2006); FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

(a) and (b): Eurostat (online data code:

demo_find); (c): VID, European Demographic Data Sheet

2010

Table I.2.4 compares the unadjusted total fertility

rate TFR with its adjusted version (

): the figures

reported suggest that actual fertility could

represent almost 0.2 children per woman more in

the EU-27 than the unadjusted TFR.

The adjustment seems to be smaller (fewer than

0.15 children per woman) in countries such as

Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy, the

Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, indicating that,

in these countries, the postponement process seems

to be coming to an end. By contrast, the

adjustment is most marked in the Czech Republic,

Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovakia,

where it is over 0.4 children per woman. These

findings suggest that, at least in these countries, the

unadjusted TFR indicator may significantly

underestimate actual fertility.

(

) The adjusted TFR is calculated by the Vienna Institute of

Demography (VID), for more information please refer to

http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/datasheet/index.html.

Postponement does not bias fertility estimates for

ever. Eventually, even unadjusted TFR increases,

as more births are recorded for women at higher

ages. In fact, the difference between the 2008 and

2006 TFR is generally in the same direction and is

often proportional to the difference between the

tempo-adjusted and unadjusted TFR, thus lending

support to the tempo estimate.

An estimate of just over 1.7 children per woman in

the EU-27, as suggested by the tempo adjustment,

does not, however, result in a sustainable rate. A

large inflow of immigrants would still be required

to prevent the size of the population from

shrinking in the long run. This adjusted estimate is

much higher than the current 1.6, at which the

population would shrink naturally at a much faster

rate. If, in addition, socio-economic development

plays a positive role in increasing fertility (see Box

I.7.1), observed fertility might rise to a level above

the 1.7 children tempo estimate. Nonetheless, it

seems unlikely that the increase will reach the

replacement level of 2.1, or that the ageing of the

population in Europe will be reversed.

3. MORTALITY

Over the past 50 years, life expectancy at birth has

increased by about 10 years for both men and

women in the EU-27. Further gains will be

achieved mostly from the reduction in mortality at

older ages.

While life expectancy is rising in all Members

States, there are still major differences between

and within countries. In some cases, improvements

in education and standards of living have

contributed to longer life expectancy, suggesting

that it could be extended further in future.

3.1. MORTALITY TRENDS OVER THE PAST 30

YEARS

Since 1980, the annual number of deaths in the

EU-27 has remained fairly stable at around 4.9

million. A peak was reached in 1993, with about 5

million deaths.

Graph I.3.1:

Number of deaths in EU-27, 1980-2009

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

Million

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)

The total number of deaths depends on the size of

the cohorts reaching the end of their life cycle and

on mortality rates. A simple but very powerful way

of illustrating the trend in mortality is to consider

life expectancy at birth. Economic development

and the improvement of environmental conditions

and health systems across Europe have resulted in

a continuous rise in life expectancy at birth. This

process has been going on for longer in Europe

than in most other countries of the world, making

the EU-27 a world leader for life expectancy. The

gradual reduction in mortality is the most

important factor contributing to the ageing of the

population in the EU-27, in conjunction with the

reduction in fertility.

3.2.

RECENT GAINS IN LIFE EXPECTANCY

In the 16 years between 1993 and 2009 (see Table

I.3.1), the rise in life expectancy at birth for men in

the EU-27 Member States has ranged from a

minimum of 2.5 years (in Bulgaria) to a maximum

of 7.5 years (in Estonia); for women, the rise has

ranged from 2.3 years (in Bulgaria) to 6.2 years (in

Estonia).

Table I.3.1:

Life expectancy at birth by sex, 1993 and 2009

Country

1993

2009

1993

2009

EU-27

76.4

82.4

73.0

77.3

79.9

82.8

67.6

70.1

75.1

77.4

69.3

74.2

76.5

80.5

72.6

76.9

77.8

81.1

72.8

77.8

79.4

82.8

62.3

69.8

74.0

80.2

72.5

77.4

78.1

82.5

75.0

77.8

79.8

82.7

74.1

78.7

81.4

84.9

73.4

78.0

81.7

85.0

74.6

79.1

81.0

84.5

74.7

78.6

79.8

83.6

68.1

78.0

63.1

67.5

75.0

78.7

72.2

78.1

79.6

83.3

64.7

70.3

74.0

78.4

77.8

82.7

74.0

78.7

80.1

82.9

72.8

77.6

79.5

83.2

67.2

71.5

75.9

80.1

71.0

76.5

78.1

82.6

65.9

69.8

73.4

77.4

69.4

75.9

77.6

82.7

67.8

71.4

76.3

79.1

72.1

76.6

79.5

83.5

75.5

79.4

80.9

83.5

73.5

77.8

78.9

81.9

Men

Women

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)

3.2.1. Life expectancy by Member State

Differences in life expectancy at birth throughout

the EU-27 Member States of remain significant

(Table I.3.1). For men, the lowest life expectancy

in 2009 was recorded in Lithuania (67.5 years) and

the highest in Sweden (79.4 years). For women,

the range was narrower, from a low of 77.4 years

in Bulgaria and Romania, to a high of 85.0 years in

France.

In 1993, the differences between the highest and

lowest life expectancies among EU Member States

Demography Report, 2010

amounted, respectively, to 13.2 years for men

(between Sweden and Estonia) and 8.3 for women

(between France and Romania). In 2009, the

differences were 11.9 years for men and 7.7 years

for women. Thus, while life expectancy has been

rising in all countries, it has gone up slightly more

in some of the countries where it was lower. There

has been some catching up.

3.2.1. Life expectancy by gender

In all EU-27 Member States, women live longer

than men, but the difference varies substantially

between countries (see Graph I.3.2). In 2009, the

gender gap in life expectancy at birth varied from

four years in the United Kingdom and Sweden to

over 11 years in Lithuania. In the Baltic States,

women can expect to live more than 10 years

longer than men; the difference is under five years

in six Member States (Denmark, Greece, Malta,

the Netherlands, Sweden and the United

Kingdom).

During the 16-year period, the gender gap

decreased, with the exception of Romania, where

the difference between the sexes increased by 0.1

years. The reduction in the gender gap was largest

in Luxembourg (7.4 years in 1993 and 5.2 years in

2009) and the Netherlands (6.1 years in 1993 and

4.2 years in 2009).

As people live longer, interest has shifted to the

older generations; Table I.3.2 shows life

expectancy at age 65 by sex.

Graph I.3.2:

The gender gap (women – men) in life

expectancy at birth, 1993 and 2009

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

EU-27

Years

1993

2009

EU-27, LV, MT: not available in 1993; EU-27, IT, UK: 2008

instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)

In 2009, once a man had reached the age of 65, he

could on average expect to live at least another

13.4 years, as in Latvia and in Lithuania, and a

maximum of 18.7 years, as in France. The life

expectancy of women at age 65 was higher. In

2009, it ranged from 17.0 years in Bulgaria to 23.2

years in France.

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

Table I.3.2:

Life expectancy at age 65 by sex, 1993 and

2009

1993

2009

1993

2009

EU-27

17.2

20.7

14.5

17.5

18.9

21.1

12.9

13.8

15.5

17.0

12.6

15.2

16.0

18.8

14.0

16.8

17.6

19.5

14.5

17.6

18.3

20.8

11.7

14.0

15.7

19.2

13.4

17.2

17.0

20.6

15.9

18.1

20.2

15.9

18.3

19.8

22.5

16.0

18.7

20.6

23.2

15.6

18.2

19.5

22.0

15.7

18.1

18.0

20.9

13.4

18.2

12.6

13.4

16.6

18.4

14.2

17.6

18.7

21.4

11.9

14.0

15.7

18.2

16.8

20.6

14.4

17.6

18.9

21.0

14.7

17.7

18.4

21.2

12.5

14.8

16.2

19.2

14.2

17.1

17.5

20.5

12.8

14.0

15.2

17.2

13.2

16.4

17.1

20.5

12.4

14.1

16.2

18.0

14.1

17.3

18.0

21.5

15.6

18.2

19.3

21.2

14.2

17.7

17.9

20.3

Men

Women

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)

Table I.3.3 shows life expectancy at birth and at

age 65 for men and women for the EU-27 from

2002 to 2008: these are the only years for which

information is available for all 27 Member States

composing the EU aggregate.

Table I.3.3:

Life expectancy in EU-27 by age and sex,

2002-2008

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Men

At birth

74.5

74.6

75.2

75.4

75.8

76.1

76.4

Age 65

15.9

16.4

16.8

17.0

17.2

Women

At birth

80.9

80.8

81.5

82.0

82.2

82.4

Age 65

19.5

19.4

20.0

20.4

20.5

20.7

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)

In the six years between 2002 and 2008, life

expectancy at birth in the EU-27 rose by 1.9 years

for men and by 1.5 years for women. The rise for

men and women who had reached the age of 65

was, respectively, 1.3 and 1.2 years. The gender

gap at birth in the EU-27 decreased from 6.4 in

2002 to 6.0 in 2008. The gender gap at age 65 fell

to 3.5 years in 2008, down from 3.6 years in 2002.

Graph I.3.3:

The gender gap (women — men) in life

expectancy at age 65, 1993 and 2009

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

EU-27

Years

1993

2009

EU-27, LV, MT: not available in 1993; EU-27, IT, UK: 2008

instead of 2009; FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpec)

Graph I.3.3 shows the changes in the gender gap in

life expectancy at age 65 between 1993 and 2009:

due to the faster rise in life expectancy for women

at older ages, the gender gap at age 65 widened in

about half of the EU-27 Member States over the

period. The largest rise in the gap was observed in

Estonia with +1.2 years between 1993 and 2009.

In the other Member States, the gender gap

narrowed over the period; the decrease was largest

(more than half a year) in Belgium, Denmark,

Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden

and the United Kingdom.

In 2009 the largest gaps in gender differences were

in the Baltic States, where women are expected to

live around five years longer than men; at the other

end of the scale, the smallest gap, two years, was

in Greece.

Demography Report, 2010

3.2.2. Gains in life expectancy at older ages

Improvements in life expectancy at birth are

achieved by lowering mortality throughout the life

cycle. Therefore, when analysing changes in life

expectancy at birth over time, it is useful to

estimate the contribution of specific age groups to

changes in life expectancy. Tables I.3.4 and I.3.5

report the percentage breakdown of changes in life

expectancy, known as the ‘Arriaga

decomposition’, for men and women between

1993 and 2009 by age groups, for each of the 27

Member States and the EU-27 aggregate.

Gains in life expectancy by age group (Arriaga

decomposition)

In Tables I.3.4 and I.3.5, , the last column is the absolute

difference between life expectancy at birth in 2009 and life

expectancy at birth in 1993 (according to available data).

The columns to its left represent the percentage

contribution from mortality decreases in the corresponding

age group to the total increase in life expectancy: positive

values indicate that mortality has decreased in that age

group, thus contributing to longer life expectancy.

For example, taking the row for EU-27, life expectancy for

men at birth increased in total by 1.9 years: 4.8 % of this

increase is due to lower infant mortality (deaths before the

first birthday), 2.0 % is due to lower mortality at ages 1-9,

and similarly for older age groups. Since the decomposition

is based on 2 years of data, results should be interpreted

with caution in countries recording a small number of

deaths.

In most countries, the decline in mortality was

particularly marked for men in their sixties and

seventies and for women aged over 60 years old.

In more detail, for men, more than 50

% of the rise

in life expectancy at birth is found to occur

between the ages of 60 and 79 in Denmark

(51.1

%), Ireland (63.0 %), Cyprus (56.0 %), the

Netherlands (53.0

%), Finland (51.2 %), Sweden

(51.6

%) and the United Kingdom (61.5 %).

For women, the age groups 60-79 explain more

than 50

% of the rise in life expectancy in the

Czech Republic (50.5

%), Ireland (53.6 %), Greece

(60.0

%), Cyprus (54.8 %), Malta (61.3 %),

Table I.3.4:

Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, men 1993 and 2009

Increase (in

years) in life

expectancy

1 - 9

10 - 19

20 - 29

30 - 39

40 - 49

50 - 59

60 - 69

70 - 79

80+

Total

at birth

EU-27

4.8

2.0

2.7

4.9

5.1

11.7

6.7

18.9

25.5

17.7

100%

1.9

8.8

1.7

2.7

5.3

4.4

7.8

6.6

20.4

28.0

14.3

100%

4.1

18.3

7.9

3.8

7.1

13.9

17.3

8.6

3.0

12.5

7.6

100%

2.5

10.0

2.6

4.2

5.6

11.2

16.8

20.4

20.2

6.3

100%

4.9

5.2

2.2

2.7

2.8

8.0

9.0

10.0

25.9

25.2

9.0

100%

4.3

4.1

1.6

2.9

4.9

7.0

8.9

11.6

23.0

13.1

100%

5.0

11.4

4.0

5.9

9.3

12.3

18.3

15.3

13.8

6.1

3.5

100%

7.5

4.5

1.7

1.1

0.5

-1.6

2.9

14.9

30.4

32.6

13.0

100%

4.8

14.8

1.5

1.3

2.4

3.9

4.5

25.9

23.8

20.4

100%

2.9

6.4

2.2

3.0

11.0

12.8

7.8

8.7

16.3

19.5

12.4

100%

4.6

6.1

2.0

3.2

8.1

10.5

9.4

8.7

19.6

18.8

13.6

100%

4.5

6.5

2.4

2.9

5.6

7.1

5.9

12.9

24.7

22.3

9.7

100%

4.6

8.6

4.6

7.1

-0.5

0.9

7.8

11.1

25.7

30.3

4.2

100%

3.9

6.5

5.1

1.8

12.3

16.2

21.0

18.3

10.1

4.7

4.0

100%

3.5

16.7

5.0

3.3

11.5

13.8

23.5

14.9

3.8

6.5

0.9

100%

4.4

6.9

2.5

4.2

9.9

7.6

7.3

9.3

21.4

24.4

6.4

100%

5.9

10.3

2.3

1.7

5.8

17.5

21.3

13.9

13.5

9.2

4.5

100%

5.6

22.9

4.0

5.8

1.3

1.5

8.1

12.8

21.2

15.2

7.2

100%

3.1

5.0

1.6

2.6

2.8

4.1

6.1

11.7

25.3

27.6

13.0

100%

4.7

5.4

1.5

3.8

6.4

6.0

8.6

11.8

21.6

22.6

12.2

100%

4.8

19.0

2.7

2.0

3.8

7.1

11.1

13.7

18.1

15.6

7.0

100%

4.4

8.2

4.9

5.8

11.2

8.7

4.1

9.3

18.9

18.8

10.1

100%

5.5

25.6

10.9

2.6

5.7

12.2

12.4

8.4

7.4

8.8

5.9

100%

3.9

6.8

0.9

2.9

7.1

8.8

10.9

17.3

21.9

15.7

7.8

100%

6.5

10.7

1.3

2.4

4.1

8.0

16.3

18.5

19.9

14.0

4.8

100%

3.6

4.0

2.4

1.2

3.0

4.7

8.4

12.0

22.5

28.7

13.1

100%

4.5

5.6

0.9

1.4

0.9

4.9

7.6

12.3

23.3

28.3

14.7

100%

3.9

3.2

1.4

2.0

2.2

0.3

2.3

12.2

29.5

32.0

14.9

100%

4.3

Age

EU-27: 2002-2008; IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; LV: 2002 instead of 1993; MT: 1995 instead of 1993. FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlifetable)

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

Slovakia (51.8 %), Finland (50.7 %) and the United

Kingdom (57.7

%). The ages 80 and above

contribute more than 25% to the rise in life

expectancy at birth for women in Belgium, Ireland,

Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the

Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden.

On the other the other hand, in some of the other

countries, lower infant mortality (defined as deaths

of children under one year of age) had a greater

impact on life expectancy at birth between the two

years analysed; above 20

% for men in Malta

(22.9

%) and Romania (25.6 %), and for women in

Romania (21.6

%). A few countries showed

smaller but still substantial (>10

%) gains from

lower infant mortality for men or for women:

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece,

Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

In several Member States, particularly for men, the

gains in life expectancy at birth from lower infant

mortality are much more significant in percentage

terms than the gains due to the older ages (80 and

above). This is the case in Bulgaria, Lithuania,

Malta, Poland and Romania and, to a lesser extent,

in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,

Hungary and Slovakia.

3.2.3. Falling infant mortality

Infant mortality rates (

) halved in the EU-27,

from 8.7 to 4.3 ‰ between 1993 and 2009 (see

Graph I.3.4). The fall in the Central and Eastern

Member States is greater than in other Member

States. Despite this progress, in some Member

States, the 2009 infant mortality rate was still

relatively high: Romania (10.1 ‰) and Bulgaria

(9.0 ‰). The lowest infant mortality rate within

the EU-27 in 2009 was in Slovenia (2.4 ‰).

(

) The rate is defined as the number of deaths of children

under one year of age per 1000 live births in a given year.

Table I.3.5:

Distribution of gains in life expectancy by age group, women 1993 and 2009

Increase (in

years) in life

expectancy

1 - 9

10 - 19

20 - 29

30 - 39

40 - 49

50 - 59

60 - 69

70 - 79

80+

Total

at birth

EU-27

5.6

1.8

1.6

2.2

3.1

6.7

4.9

12.4

27.9

33.9

100%

1.5

9.4

1.8

1.7

3.3

2.3

5.4

3.2

13.5

28.8

30.7

100%

2.7

15.2

7.0

2.8

4.4

3.5

1.3

4.4

19.0

25.6

16.8

100%

2.3

9.2

1.9

1.5

2.2

3.2

5.9

9.2

20.5

30.0

16.5

100%

4.0

4.7

1.8

1.5

1.4

4.4

9.2

14.8

25.6

20.8

15.8

100%

3.3

4.9

1.9

1.8

2.2

4.6

7.2

17.7

30.9

21.7

100%

3.4

12.4

3.9

3.5

1.8

4.2

9.3

11.6

17.9

20.5

14.9

100%

6.2

5.1

0.9

0.1

-0.2

0.7

2.7

9.1

22.4

31.1

28.0

100%

4.4

13.3

1.3

1.9

0.8

1.0

3.8

5.2

23.9

36.1

12.9

100%

2.9

6.8

2.7

1.6

3.9

4.6

2.7

5.0

14.5

27.3

30.8

100%

3.6

5.5

2.0

2.6

4.6

4.5

3.8

4.0

11.7

22.4

38.9

100%

3.2

7.6

3.3

1.5

3.1

4.3

4.2

7.1

15.1

27.3

26.5

100%

3.5

11.9

0.7

1.8

4.1

0.6

1.7

4.7

18.5

36.3

19.8

100%

3.8

6.2

7.8

5.1

0.9

5.5

6.9

15.2

12.8

18.6

21.0

100%

2.0

18.4

5.9

2.1

3.7

4.1

9.6

11.3

13.3

20.6

11.0

100%

3.7

4.0

2.0

4.7

4.9

5.0

8.0

6.7

10.8

26.4

27.5

100%

3.7

10.7

2.2

1.3

3.1

10.5

11.5

8.1

16.6

20.0

16.0

100%

4.4

3.0

-1.8

0.4

-3.9

-1.1

4.4

7.8

17.8

43.4

29.9

100%

3.2

5.3

2.5

1.3

2.6

4.6

4.9

5.3

15.4

26.9

31.2

100%

2.8

4.7

1.6

2.0

2.3

3.6

7.8

8.2

14.1

28.3

27.2

100%

3.7

16.9

2.1

0.8

1.4

3.4

6.4

5.2

16.2

28.1

19.7

100%

4.3

8.1

4.2

2.6

3.5

3.4

4.8

8.8

15.2

28.0

21.3

100%

4.4

21.6

8.3

1.2

2.7

6.7

6.4

7.6

13.9

19.9

11.8

100%

4.0

4.8

1.5

1.3

3.1

4.8

7.1

9.5

19.1

26.3

22.5

100%

5.0

11.3

2.5

1.1

2.5

4.7

5.1

10.9

23.6

28.2

10.2

100%

2.8

2.4

1.2

0.2

0.8

2.8

3.3

4.0

14.8

36.0

34.6

100%

3.9

5.4

1.5

2.5

4.3

6.1

8.0

14.7

26.1

29.9

100%

2.6

3.8

1.2

1.5

1.1

0.8

3.3

9.6

26.0

31.8

20.8

100%

3.0

Age

EU-27: 2002-2008; IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009; LV: 2002 instead of 1993; MT: 1995 instead of 1993. FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlifetable)

Demography Report, 2010

Graph I.3.4:

Infant mortality rate, 1993 and 2009 (ranked

by size of reduction)

EU-27

1993

2009

The rate is defined as the number of deaths of children

under one year of age per 1000 live births.

FR: Metropolitan France

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_minfind)

3.2.4. Healthy life expectancy

The average number of healthy life years that a

newborn can expect to live is about 62 for a

woman and 61 for a man. The difference between

the sexes is smaller than for life expectancy; this

indicates that although women tend to live longer,

they also live longer with activity limitations.

There are large disparities among Member States

and there have been large variations in some

Member States between 2007 and 2009.

Table I.3.6:

Healthy life years at birth, by gender, 2007

and 2009

2007

2009

2007

2009

EU-27

62.3

62.0

61.5

60.9

63.7

63.5

63.3

63.7

73.8

65.6

67.0

61.9

63.2

62.5

61.3

60.9

67.4

60.4

67.4

61.8

58.3

57.7

58.8

56.7

54.6

59.0

49.5

54.8

65.3

65.2

62.7

63.7

67.1

60.9

65.9

60.2

62.9

61.9

63.2

62.6

64.2

63.2

63.0

62.5

61.9

61.2

62.8

62.4

62.7

65.8

63.0

65.1

53.7

55.8

50.9

52.6

57.7

60.9

53.4

57.0

64.6

65.7

62.2

65.1

57.6

58.0

55.0

55.7

70.6

68.9

69.1

63.7

59.8

65.7

61.4

61.1

60.6

58.4

59.2

61.3

62.1

57.4

58.1

57.3

55.9

58.3

58.0

62.3

61.4

60.4

59.5

62.3

61.5

58.6

60.6

55.9

52.3

55.4

52.1

58.0

58.4

56.7

58.1

66.6

69.5

67.5

70.5

66.1

66.3

64.9

65.0

women

men

EU-27, IT, UK: 2008 instead of 2009.

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: tsdph100)

3.2.5. Life expectancy among highly

educated men and women

Another important factor contributing to the

disparity in life expectancy is ‘socio-economic

status’. The inverse relationship between status

and mortality is well known, based on a number of

studies (

): the higher the status, the lower the

mortality rates and, consequently, the higher life

expectancy. There are significant inequalities in

the EU-27 Member States regarding socio-

economic status, with negative consequences for

health, social cohesion and economic

development. In all countries, mortality, health and

the age at which people die are strongly influenced

by socio-economic factors such as education,

employment and income.

(

)

For an overview, see for example Mackenbach J.P.,

Meerding W.J., Kunst A., 2007, Economic implications of

socio-economic inequalities in health in the European

Union, study supported by the European Commission, DG

SANCO, available at

http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/socio_economic

s/documents/socioeco_inequalities_en.pdf.

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

Box I.3.1:

Living longer healthy lives

In comparison with earlier generations, people

today spend longer in education, start working

later, start having children later and spend fewer

years of their life in family building; they die at a

later age; life expectancy has increased by about 2

years per decade

(1)

. People's lives are being

stretched out over an ever longer period.

The same analysis could be applied to frailty: the

period in a person's life when s/he starts to develop

a disabling condition that makes them dependent

and vulnerable, leading eventually to death. Life

expectancy has increased not because frailty lasts

longer, but rather because it starts at a later age; as

a result, healthy life expectancy has been increasing

at about the same rate as life expectancy (

Health problems that used to be characteristic at the

age of 70 are now characteristic of the age of 80,

and conditions that prevailed at age 80 now prevail

at age 90. The number of years spent in self-

perceived good health has been increasing in most

of the countries studied.

The findings about frailty need to be examined

further. Poor health is more difficult to measure

than death and is often reported unreliably.

The evidence about the severity of disabilities in

old age is mixed, especially for individuals over the

age 85: whereas some severe disabilities appear to

be declining, some less severe forms of disability

and certain illnesses seem to be increasing,

although this may be due to earlier diagnosis and

greater life expectancy..

Some detailed data are available from the Danish

Health Interview Survey (Table 1).

(3)

They show

not only that healthy life expectancy has been

increasing, but also that the proportion of the

remaining life expectancy in good health increased

between 1994 and 2005; healthy life expectancy

has thus been growing faster than overall life

expectancy.

(

) J. Oeppen and J. W. Vaupel, ‘Broken limits to life

expectancy,

Science

, 10 May 2002;.

(

) J.W. Vaupel, H. Lundström, ‘The future of mortality

at older ages in developed countries, in ‘W. Lutz

(ed.), The Future Population of the World. What can

we Assume Today?, 1994; and

J.W. Vaupel,

‘Biodemography of human ageing’, Nature 464, 25

March 2010, 536-542.

(

) see

http://www.si-

folkesundhed.dk/Forskning/Befolkningens%20sundh

edstilstand/Sundhed%20og%20sygelighed%20SUSY

.aspx?lang=en

Table 1:

Life expectancy at age 65, with and

without long-term, limiting illnesses,

Denmark; by sex and year

total

with long-

standing,

limiting

illnesses

years

Men

1994

14.1

6.2

7.9

56.2

2000

15.0

6.1

8.9

59.1

2005

16.0

5.4

10.5

66.0

Women

1994

17.6

9.4

8.2

46.6

2000

18.1

8.6

9.5

52.3

2005

19.0

7.9

11.1

58.4

Expected lifetime

without long-standing,

limiting illnesses

Source:

Danish Health Interview Survey

The connection between national wealth and health

are not well understood. Frailty is being delayed

due to advances in public health (treatment and

prevention) and living conditions. In principle,

prosperity makes better treatment possible; more

productive and prosperous populations also expect

to be healthier. However, two countries at the same

level of per capita income may have different

healthy life expectancies, and some countries with

modest standards of living perform as well as

wealthier ones; as examples in the EU, Spain and

Italy, as well as France and Sweden, have the

highest life expectancy.

Overall, most people in wealthier countries, and

increasingly in developing countries, can look

forward to relatively long, and mostly healthy,

lives. This prospect enables people to make fuller

use of their lives, for example by re-allocating their

time during their lives and planning their education,

employment and retirement over the life span.

Greater life expectancy does not necessarily entail

the collapse of the social system under the growing

mass of frail elderly people. Many older people are

in good health and can play an active part in the

labour force according to their condition and

abilities, contributing to the economy and allowing

younger people to extend their education.

In J.W. Vaupel's words: 'While the 20th century

was the century of redistribution of wealth, the 21st

century may be the century of the redistribution of

work to older age groups'.

Demography Report, 2010

Overall levels of mortality have been declining

across socio-economic groups. But differences in

life expectancy between higher and lower socio-

economic status groups have on the whole

remained unchanged. In some cases, the gap has

even widened.

For the first time, Eurostat has published estimates,

based on provisional data, of life expectancy in

2007-2008 by sex, age and educational attainment

level for a selected number of EU-27 Member

States (

). These results confirm the inverse

relationship between educational attainment as a

proxy for ‘socio-economic status’ and

mortality (

As reported in Table I.3.7, in most of the countries

examined, for both men and women, life

expectancy increases with educational attainment.

The more education people have, the longer they

are expected to live. Life expectancy for women at

a given educational attainment level is always

higher than that for men at the same level.

However, differences between the sexes decline as

educational attainment increases. Based on the

data in Table I.3.7, life expectancy ‘gaps’ or

mortality differentials between educational

attainment groups can be assessed. They are

generally larger among men than among women;

in many cases they are twice as large. Also, as can

be observed in Graph I.3.5, these gaps are larger

among young men.

Gaps in life expectancy between men with medium

and low educational attainment at any age in Table

I.3.7 are also much bigger than between men with

high and medium levels. For women at any age,

life expectancy gaps between those with high and

medium educational attainment and between those

with medium and low levels are less pronounced.

While life expectancy for women is consistently

higher than for men, the differences are smaller

(

) For details see

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_

details/publication?p_product_code=KS-SF-10-024

(

) Low educational attainment corresponds to pre-primary,

primary and lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0, 1,

2); medium corresponds to upper secondary and post

secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED levels 3 and 4);

high corresponds to tertiary education (ISCED levels 5 and

6). The selection of countries is dependent on data

availability: to calculate the required indicator, detailed

data are needed broken down by sex, age and educational

attainment for both mortality and population stocks.

Although all countries can provide mortality data by sex

and age, only a few can provide data also by socio-

economic characteristics such as educational attainment.

between educational attainment groups for women

than for men.

Graph I.3.5:

Life expectancy gaps between high and low

educational attainment at selected ages, by

sex, 2008

Age 30, 2008

Years

15105

5 1015

Men

Women

Age 60, 2008

Years

15105

5 1015

Men

Women

IT: 2007 instead of 2008

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpecedu)

Large differences in life expectancy by educational

attainment level are evident among the Member

States examined, and particularly so for men in the

available Member States that joined the EU after

2004 — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,

Hungary, Poland, Romania. Among the other

countries examined, differences are less

pronounced.

The published data highlight another important

‘mortality advantage’ that women have over men:

the life expectancy of men with higher education is

lower than the life expectancy of women with the

lowest level of educational attainment. In other

words, on average, all women live longer than

well-educated men. As can be observed in Table

I.3.7, this was true in 2008 at all ages for Italy,

Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and

Sweden. For the other countries under study, this

was true in about 50

% of cases, mostly at ages 50,

60 and 70.

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

Consequently, by improving the life expectancy of

disadvantaged groups, a general increase in overall

life expectancy is also to be expected (

(

) The European Commission has raised the issue of health

inequalities in the Member States as well as the question of

disparities in life expectancy, especially for disadvantaged

people. A proposal to address the problem was outlined in

the October 2009 European Commission Communication

COM/2009/0567 ‘Solidarity in health: reducing health

inequalities in the EU’, available at

http://ec.europa.eu/health/social_determinants/policy/commissi

on_communication/index_en.htm

The EU is thus working directly, through EU policies, and

indirectly, through national authorities and stakeholders, to

reduce health inequalities.

Table I.3.7:

Life expectancy by sex and educational attainment at selected ages, 2008

Educational

attainment

Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 Age 70 Age 30 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 Age 70

Total

41.6

32.3

23.8

16.6

10.7

48.3

38.7

29.4

20.8

12.9

Low

33.9

25.9

19.6

14.7

10.3

44.1

35.4

27.4

19.7

12.5

Medium

44.5

34.9

25.9

18.0

11.1

49.7

40.0

30.5

21.6

13.3

High

47.4

37.6

28.0

19.2

11.6

51.4

41.5

31.8

22.6

13.8

Total

45.0

35.5

26.5

18.7

12.1

51.0

41.3

31.8

23.0

14.9

Low

38.0

29.5

21.8

15.5

10.9

51.4

42.0

32.7

23.7

15.2

Medium

44.8

35.3

26.3

18.6

12.2

50.3

40.5

31.1

22.4

14.6

High

51.4

41.5

31.8

22.4

13.5

54.5

44.5

34.7

25.1

15.8

Total

47.5

38.0

28.8

20.4

13.1

51.5

41.8

32.4

23.6

15.6

Low

44.0

35.3

26.8

19.3

12.6

49.0

39.8

30.9

22.7

15.3

Medium

47.8

38.1

28.9

20.5

13.2

52.2

42.5

33.0

24.1

15.8

High

50.4

40.6

31.0

22.0

13.9

53.6

43.8

34.1

24.9

16.3

Total

40.5

31.5

23.2

16.4

11.0

50.4

40.8

31.5

22.9

15.0

Low

30.7

23.3

17.0

13.0

9.3

45.0

35.8

28.3

21.4

14.5

Medium

41.2

32.1

24.0

17.2

11.4

49.5

39.9

30.8

22.7

15.0

High

47.7

38.1

28.7

20.0

12.4

54.0

44.1

34.3

24.7

15.7

Total

49.7

40.1

30.8

22.0

14.2

54.8

45.0

35.4

26.2

17.6

Low

48.0

38.6

29.7

21.4

14.1

54.0

44.3

34.9

26.0

17.5

Medium

52.9

43.1

33.4

24.1

15.2

56.6

46.8

37.0

27.5

18.2

High

53.1

43.2

33.5

24.1

15.1

56.7

46.8

37.0

27.4

18.1

Total

41.1

31.7

23.4

16.8

11.2

49.0

39.3

30.3

22.0

14.4

Low

34.0

25.2

18.4

13.7

10.8

46.3

37.0

28.7

21.2

14.3

Medium

43.7

34.2

25.8

19.2

12.0

50.6

40.9

31.7

23.2

14.9

High

47.1

37.3

28.0

19.6

12.3

51.1

41.2

31.7

22.7

14.4

Total

48.5

39.0

29.7

20.9

13.4

53.1

43.3

33.6

24.4

16.0

Low

48.0

38.7

29.5

20.8

13.3

53.0

43.2

33.5

24.3

15.9

Medium

49.4

39.5

29.9

21.8

13.8

53.5

43.5

33.6

25.1

16.3

High

51.0

41.2

31.6

21.9

13.8

54.6

44.6

35.2

25.3

16.3

Total

42.6

33.4

25.1

17.9

11.9

50.8

41.1

31.8

23.2

15.2

Low

36.5

28.6

22.3

16.7

11.4

48.6

39.3

31.0

22.8

15.1

Medium

43.1

33.9

25.3

18.0

12.0

51.0

41.3

31.9

23.3

15.4

High

48.7

38.9

29.5

20.8

13.0

53.2

43.3

33.7

24.4

15.8

Total

41.6

32.4

24.0

17.1

11.2

48.6

38.9

29.7

21.1

13.4

Low

35.3

26.9

20.6

15.9

10.8

46.4

37.1

28.7

20.8

13.3

Medium

44.5

35.1

26.5

19.0

12.0

50.7

40.9

31.5

22.5

14.0

High

43.4

33.7

24.8

17.1

11.0

48.7

39.0

29.7

21.0

13.4

Total

46.5

37.0

28.0

20.1

12.9

53.1

43.3

33.8

24.8

16.4

Low

42.7

33.6

25.3

18.2

12.3

51.8

42.3

33.0

24.4

16.2

Medium

47.0

37.4

28.4

20.4

13.1

53.6

43.8

34.2

25.2

16.6

High

50.0

40.2

30.7

21.9

13.7

54.3

44.5

34.8

25.6

16.7

Total

47.6

38.2

29.2

21.2

14.0

53.9

44.1

34.6

25.7

17.2

Low

44.8

36.2

27.9

20.5

13.8

51.8

42.5

33.7

25.3

17.1

Medium

47.5

38.0

29.2

21.2

14.0

54.0

44.3

34.8

25.8

17.3

High

50.8

41.1

31.5

22.7

14.5

55.2

45.3

35.6

26.3

17.4

Total

50.0

40.4

30.9

22.1

14.3

53.8

44.0

34.4

25.3

16.9

Low

48.1

38.9

29.9

21.5

14.1

52.2

42.6

33.4

24.7

16.7

Medium

50.1

40.4

31.0

22.2

14.3

53.8

44.0

34.4

25.3

16.9

High

51.9

42.1

32.4

23.1

14.6

55.0

45.1

35.5

26.1

17.2

Men

Women

(1)IT: 2007 instead of 2008

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_mlexpecedu)

4. MIGRATION: TRENDS

Migration is the main driver of population growth

in the most of the EU-27 Member States.

Migratory movements are making the EU’s

population more diverse and creating new

challenges and opportunities for European

societies.

4.1. MIGRATION FLOWS

The first decade of the 21st century has seen large

waves of migration both within the EU and from

outside it. The highest inflow in that decade

appears to have peaked in 2007.

4.1.1. Migration as one of the key drivers of

population growth in EU Member States

Migration plays a significant role in the population

dynamics of European societies. In recent years,

the increase in the population of the EU-27

Member States has mainly been due to high net

migration rates

(

). The share of international

migration in total population growth in the EU has

varied.

From 2004 to 2008, the population of EU Member

States increased, on average, by 1.7 million per

year, solely because inflows outweighed outflows.

Although immigration to the EU-27 Member

States fell in 2008 and emigration increased, net

migration still contributed 71

% of the total

population increase.

In many EU-27 Member States, immigration is not

only increasing the total population, but also

bringing in a much younger population. The age

structure of the EU-27 Member States' total

population at 1 January 2009 and of immigrants to

EU Member States in 2008 is illustrated by the age

pyramid in Graph I.4.1.

(

) The expression ‘total net migration’ of the EU Member

States is to be distinguished from the expression ‘total net

migration to/from the EU as a whole’: the former also

includes international migration between the EU Member

States.

Graph I.4.1:

Age structure of the population on 1 January

2009 and of immigrants in 2008, EU-27

85+

Men

Women

Solid colour: population

Bordered: immigrants

EU-27 immigration data excluding BE, EL, CY, RO and UK

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_pop2ctz,

migr_imm2ctz)

In 2008, 3.8 million people migrated to and

between the EU-27 Member States and at least 2.3

million emigrated from them, resulting in a net

gain of 1.5 million residents(

). In comparison to

2007(

), immigration decreased by 6 % (Graph

I.4.2) and emigration by 13

Graph I.4.2:

Immigration, EU-27, 2004-2008

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Millions

Includes also migration between EU-27 Member States.

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz)

(

) Includes also migration between EU-27 Member States.

(

) 2007 migration data are not fully comparable with 2008,

since several EU-27 Member States changed methodology

and definitions to improve and harmonise the data. For

further details see the Eurostat Metadata page. Detailed

analysis of comparable data shows that these

methodological changes had a limited impact.

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

4.1.2. EU citizens are becoming more mobile

Immigrants to EU Member States are of a wide

variety of origins, especially since the

enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Larger numbers of

EU-27 citizens have been included in migration

flows. The number of EU-27 citizens migrating to

a Member State other than their own country of

citizenship increased on average by 12

% per year

during the period 2002-2008, and peaked in 2007

(see Graph I.4.3). In 2008, 36

% of migrants to

EU-27 Member States were citizens of another

Member State, 2 points lower than was observed in

2007 (38

%).

Graph I.4.3:

Relative change in migration inflows to EU

Member States by citizenship groups, EU-27,

2002-2008

100

120

140

160

180

200

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

All immigrants

Nationals

Other EU-27 citizens

Non-EU citizens

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and

Eurostat estimates

The percentage of immigrants with non-EU

citizenship has been growing at a somewhat slower

pace. In 2008, non-EU citizens accounted for 49

of all immigrants to EU-27 Member States (see

Graph I.4.4). When nationals moving to their

country of citizenship are excluded, 57

% of

immigrants are found to be citizens of countries

outside the EU.

Graph I.4.4:

Immigrants by citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008

Citizens of

non-EU

countries

48.8%

Nationals

14.6%

Unknow n

0.4%

Citizens of

other EU MS

36.3%

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and

Eurostat estimates

Slightly above 10 % of immigrants were returning

to their own country of birth (see Graph I.4.5). The

majority of immigrants were, however, born

outside the EU and were moving to it (52

%),

thereby exceeding the number of non-EU citizens

by almost 4

Graph I.4.5:

Immigrants by groups of country of birth, EU-

27, 2008

Born outside

52.3%

Unknow n

0.5%

Nativ e-born

11.6%

Born in EU

countries other

than home

country

35.6%

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm3ctb) and

Eurostat estimates

4.1.3. Origins of immigrants

It is estimated that more than half (55 %) of

immigrants to the EU in 2008 were previously

residing outside the EU, while 44

% of immigrants

had previously also been residing in an EU-27

Member State (other than the country of

immigration). Immigrants to the EU can be further

differentiated according to the level of

development of the country of previous residence.

The Human Development Index (HDI) was used to

reflect this structure (

According to this indicator, half of all immigrants

to the EU previously resided in medium developed

countries, slightly fewer in highly developed

countries (44

%) and only 6 % arrived from less

developed countries (Graph I.4.6).

This distribution is almost in line with the

distribution of the total population in those

countries, according to the level of development of

the countries in question. On the basis of the latest

(

) This index is calculated by the United Nations (UN) under

the UN Development Programme. It is a composite index

incorporating statistical measures of life expectancy,

literacy, educational attainment and GDP per capita. The

Eurostat list of countries by the level of development,

based on UN’s 2006 classification, was used in order to

reflect this structure. In this index countries are classified

as highly, medium and less developed. Since the countries

are evolving, each year they are classified, based on the

new values for the statistical indicators included in the

Demography Report, 2010

available United Nations, Eurostat and national

data for the total population in these countries, it is

estimated that the share of the population living in

countries categorised as medium developed is

%, whereas the share of the total population in

highly developed countries is 22

%, with 10% for

less developed countries.

The noticeable difference is that immigrants from

highly developed countries were over-represented

by 22

% among immigrants to the EU-27 Member

States, compared to the share of the total

population living in countries classified as highly

developed.

Graph I.4.6:

Immigrants to EU-27 (from outside EU) by the

level of development of the country of

previous residence, EU-27, 2008

Highly

dev eloped

43.7%

Medium

dev eloped

49.9%

Less

dev eloped

6.3%

No detailed data for BE, HU and UK.

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm5prv) and

Eurostat estimates

In 2008, the EU-27 Member States received nearly

two millions migrants of other EU nationalities.

Romanians were the most mobile, followed by

Poles and Germans (note that these migrants were

not necessarily previously residing in their country

of citizenship). If returning nationals (see category

‘EU citizens (excluding nationals)’ in Table I.4.1)

are excluded from the analysis, Romanians still

ranked first, followed by Poles and Bulgarians.

The EU-27 Member States received 384,

000

Romanian citizens, 266,

000 Polish citizens,

Poland and 91,

000 Bulgarian citizens.

The remaining 1.8 million immigrants to EU-27

Member States were non-EU citizens. Among

them, Moroccans were the biggest group, the only

one exceeding 100

000, followed by citizens of

China, India, Albania and the Ukraine.

Most Moroccans migrating in 2008 went to Spain

(almost 94

000) or to Italy (37 000). In the same

year, Spain also received the largest share of all

Chinese immigrants (28

% or 27 000 in absolute

terms). The United Kingdom was the main

destination for citizens of India.

Table I.4.1:

Top ten citizenships of immigrants to EU-27

Member States, 2008

country of

citizenship

thousands

country of

citizenship

thousands

country of

citizenship

thousands

Romania

384 Morocco

157

Poland 302Poland 266China 97

Germany 196Bulgaria 91India 93

United Kingdom

146 Germany

Albania

France

126 Italy

67 Ukraine

Italy

105 France

62 Brazil

Bulgaria

92 United Kingdom

61 United States

Netherlands 81Hungary 44Turkey 51

Spain

61 Netherlands

40 Russian Federation

Belgium

48 Portugal

38 Colombia

EU citizens

(including nationals)

EU citizens

(excluding nationals)

Non-EU citizens

(1) At least 384 000.

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and

Eurostat estimates

Graph I.4.7 suggests that the biggest group of non-

EU nationals migrating to one of the EU-27

Member States in 2008 was formed by citizens of

countries in Asia (29

%), followed by North,

Central and South America (24

%).

Graph I.4.7:

Non-EU immigrants by continent of country of

citizenship, EU-27, 2008

Asia

29.0%

Africa

21.9%

non-EU

Europe

23.0%

America

24.4%

Oceania

1.7%

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm1ctz) and

Eurostat estimates

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

Box I.4.1:

Where immigrants come from

Eurostat data on residence permits that were valid

at the end of 2009 can be broken down to show the

geographical origins of non-EU nationals

(1)

continent (Table 1).

The total of 16.7 million residence permit holders –

excluding Denmark, Luxembourg and the United

Kingdom – is spread unevenly among the

continents of origin. The numbers are roughly

proportional to the population of the continents of

origin, although Europe is over-represented

whereas Asia and North America are under-

represented.

Each of the five largest EU-27 Member States

attracts the majority of the people from a particular

continent: most Africans hold permits in France

(1.6 million), most Asians in Italy (1.1 million),

most Europeans in Germany (2.6 million), and

most South Americans in Spain (1.5 million).

(

) EU nationals still needing residence permits under

transitional measures are not included in the table

below; for the transitional measures see

http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=

466

More permits were issued in 2009 in the United

Kingdom to immigrants from North America

and/or Oceania, than the total number of valid

permits at the end of 2009 in any other country.

The largest number of authorisations to reside in an

EU-27 Member State in 2009 was issued to the

citizens of India (190,000), followed by United

States (176,000), China (170,000) and Morocco

(156,000). These four countries accounted for

nearly 30% of all permits issued in EU-27 in 2009.

The largest proportion of Indians and Chinese

entered the EU for the purpose of education or

employment. Respectively 72,000 Chinese and

61,000 Indians were issued with education related

permits, whereas 51,000 Chinese and 63,000

Indians entered the EU for employment reasons. By

contrast, Moroccans were granted the highest

number of permits issued for family reasons in EU

(62,000), and only less than 5 per cent (7,000) were

granted permission to reside for education reasons.

The country ranking based on new permits is

similar to the one from other official sources (see

Table I.4.1), although there are some differences.

Table 1:

Valid residence permits at 31 December 2009, by issuing country and continent of origin, (in units)

Africa

Asia

Europe

North America South America

Oceania

other

total

EU-27

4,436,036

2,962,637

6,575,292

277,785

2,258,451

61,161

108,807 16,680,169

160,021

70,910

86,322

21,081

16,340

2,127

8,138

364,939

246

2,095

9,192

689

105

12,444

4,263

95,429

196,084

6,231

1,885

1,219

305,146

210,150

647,296

2,622,613

83,124

85,386

17,987

28,588

3,695,144

104

1,554

210,475

583

120

212,874

34,252

64,829

12,119

9,237

9,229

4,062

424

134,152

21,157

86,004

450,487

2,469

2,302

339

2,837

565,595

1,000,602

307,849

162,178

25,151

1,486,214

2,028

8,470

2,992,492

1,588,957

255,987

280,283

30,677

111,641

4,048

1,635

2,273,228

1,071,553

899,489

1,206,788

41,241

365,362

3,220

3,587,653

8,831

85,720

29,640

1,206

474

214

126,107

112

1,896

382,340

601

133

241

385,323

153

2,451

20,786

512

4,651

28,633

3,826

32,045

49,829

4,453

1,911

437

92,518

719

1,862

1,667

191

112

4,608

115,223

97,926

104,401

19,537

21,751

4,801

52,875

416,514

13,007

35,434

383,038

5,588

7,484

1,251

188

445,990

4,054

25,912

52,571

2,391

1,263

1,090

87,345

122,032

30,315

82,418

2,994

122,210

293

360,322

3,718

21,498

33,375

2,076

705

428

61,800

170

1,603

86,336

350

422

109

89,079

678

7,200

12,699

944

390

144

22,068

16,165

36,432

47,343

4,004

2,770

1,877

4,323

112,914

56,043

150,901

52,308

12,455

20,162

10,433

979

303,281

2,056

15,644

5,937

4,187

1,440

985

30,255

75,092

365,303

28,241

131,775

34,537

31,680

4,696

671,324

Residence permits issued in 2009 (only flow data available for the countries below)

No data available for Luxembourg; the EU-27 total was computed using the 24 available Member States

Source:

Eurostat (online data code migr_resvalid and (for DK and the UK) migr_resfirst)

Demography Report, 2010

4.1.4. Spain, Germany and the United

Kingdom reported the highest

immigration in EU in 2008

The as a whole is attractive for immigrants, but

Member States differ as to scale and patterns of

migration. The majority of EU-27 Member States

in 2008 reported more immigration than

emigration, but in Germany, Poland, Romania,

Bulgaria and the three Baltic States (Lithuania,

Latvia and Estonia) emigrants outnumbered

immigrants.

In absolute terms, Spain, Germany and the United

Kingdom were the EU countries with the highest

immigration. They received more than half (53

of all immigrants in 2008, but at the same time,

they also experienced high emigration.

Relative to the size of the resident population,

Luxembourg (with 36.3 immigrants per 1

000

inhabitants) had the highest immigration in the EU

in 2008, followed by Malta with 21.9 and Cyprus

with 17.8 (Graph I.4.8).

Luxembourg, the country with the highest

immigration per capita and one of the smallest

countries in the EU in terms of population size,

also reported the highest rate of emigration in

2008, with 20.6 emigrants per 1

000 inhabitants.

4.1.5. More men than women migrate

In 2008, there were more men than women in

migration flows to and from EU Member States in

general. Around 48

% of immigrants were women.

By contrast, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, France and

Ireland reported that women outnumbered men

among immigrants. In Cyprus, this was mainly due

to women with Filipino, Sri Lankan and

Vietnamese citizenship, whereas in Italy and Spain

women outnumbered men in the biggest group of

immigrants (with Romanian citizenship in the case

of Italy, and Moroccan citizenship in Spain). In

addition, among immigrants to Italy, women

outnumbered men among citizens of Ukraine,

Moldavia, Poland and Russia, while in Spain, the

same applied for citizens of Pakistan and Senegal.

4.1.6. Impact on the age structure of the EU

population

In 2008, immigrants to the EU-27 Member States

were, on average, younger than the population of

their country of destination. Whereas the median

age of the total population of all EU Member

States (calculated from five-year age groups) was

40.6 on 1 January 2009, the median age of

immigrants in 2008 was 28.4.

Graph I.4.9 compares the age of immigrants to

EU-27 Member States in 2008 by basic citizenship

groups.

Graph I.4.8:

Immigration (per 1 000 inhabitants), EU-27, 2008

LU MT CY ES BE

SE DK

NL DE CZ

HU FR SK PT

LT EE

PL BG

Immigration

per 1 000 inhabitants

EU-27

Immigration data for EL and RO include non-nationals only and are therefore not included.

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind, migr_imm1ctz)

Part I

Main Demographic Trends

Graph I.4.9:

Age structure of immigrants by basic

citizenship groups, EU-27, 2008

85+

Men

Women

Solid colour: nationals

Bordered: non-nationals

EU-27 excluding BE, EL, CY, RO and UK.

Source:

Eurostat (online data code: migr_imm2ctz)

Among immigrants, there were noticeable

differences in the age of nationals, EU nationals

and non-EU nationals. Non-EU nationals were the

youngest, with a median age of 27.5 years,

followed by EU nationals at 29.3 years (see Table

I.4.2). Nationals were the oldest, with a median

age of 30.2 years. The share in the 15-64 age group

was highest among non-national men (87

%) and

lowest among women returning to the country of

their citizenship (71

%).

Table I.4.2:

Median age of the population (as of 1 January

2009) and immigrants by basic citizenship

groups, 2008

EU-27

40.6

28.4

30.2

28.2

29.3

27.5

40.8

41.1

32.6

32.4

35.2

52.5

35.0

39.2

28.4

33.4

28.3

30.8

27.5

40.3

26.6

27.0

26.5

27.4

25.7

43.7

29.8

31.2

29.6

31.5

27.7

39.3

30.8

30.4

31.1

29.0

33.3

33.8

26.7

41.4

37.5

42.3

35.1

39.5

28.3

32.9

28.2

29.9

27.7

39.5

26.0

25.0

26.3

27.9

25.5

42.8

29.1

34.5

28.8

29.3

28.5

35.9

29.9

34.2

30.0

28.9

32.4

39.8

29.4

4.0

33.3

32.0

36.1

38.9

31.1

29.5

35.8

27.0

36.8

38.7

29.7

29.8

29.7

29.8

29.1

39.6

28.7

3.2

29.5

30.5

28.6

39.0

30.3

29.1

30.6

35.9

27.0

40.3

27.6

28.2

27.5

27.6

27.5

41.3

28.8

35.6

28.2

29.5

26.3